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Abstract 
 
INCOME INEQUALITY AND VULNERABIILITY TO FLOOD HAZARD IN 
BRAZIL 
by 
REBECCA JOAN RASCH 
 
 
Advisor: Professor Janet Gornick 
Social theorists suggest that income inequality within a society leads to a 
breakdown of social cohesion, spatial segregation, and as a result, uneven public resource 
access. I will assess whether this social phenomenon is important to consider when 
measuring vulnerability to climate change in urban, middle-income countries. To test this 
relationship, I create a flood hazard vulnerability index at the municipality level and 
determine whether income inequality, measured at the municipality level, is a predictor of 
municipality vulnerability to flood hazard. The flood hazard vulnerability index 
incorporates socioeconomic, built environment and natural environment data, providing a 
more holistic approach to vulnerability assessment. I draw on socioeconomic and spatial 
data from urban municipalities across 25 Brazilian states.  
  Using multi-level regression models, which account for state-level political 
economy impacts, as well as for the spatial dependence of flood hazard vulnerability, I 
test whether income inequality in a municipality, controlling for absolute poverty level 
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and environmental hazards, predicts vulnerability to flooding, the most prevalent climate 
hazard in Brazil. I use several measures of income inequality to determine whether the 
effect of income inequality varies depending on where along the income distribution the 
income inequality lies. The measures of income inequality I select are: the Gini index, 
two measures of both bottom and top half income inequality and two specifications of the 
Atkinson index with ε= 0.5 and with ε= 1. 
 I find that the Gini index and the Atkinson index (ε =0.5, calibrated to give more 
weight to the top end of the distribution), were the only two significant predictors of 
vulnerability. These results provide strong evidence in support of the two hypotheses in 
this dissertation, mainly that a certain type of income inequality is a predictor of 
vulnerability and that the location of the income inequality along the distribution does 
matter in terms of its impacts. It appears that top end, not bottom end income inequality 
significantly predicts vulnerability. 
 Next I dig further into the data and separately test each of the factors which 
comprise the composite vulnerability score: socioeconomic status, infrastructure quality 
and governance. This line of analysis yields some illuminating results. I find that while 
all types of income inequality positively predict socioeconomic status, when I control for 
absolute poverty, municipality size, and environmental conditions, top end and top half 
income inequality predict the poor governance component of the vulnerability index, the 
factor most closely correlated with the presence of slums, informal settlements and high 
population density. 
 In sum, these findings suggest that the level of absolute poverty does not fully 
explain the presence of slums, informal settlements, and high-population density within a 
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municipality. Top end and top half income inequality also play a role. My data illustrate 
that considering income inequality, and specifically top end and half income inequality, 
as part of vulnerability assessments can significantly aid in crafting more effective, 
sustainable adaptation efforts by helping to better identify which municipalities are most 
vulnerable to climate change.  
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I. Introduction 
A. Research Question and Expectations 
 This analysis examines the relationship between income inequality and 
vulnerability to climate change in urban, middle-income countries by answering the 
following research question: Is income inequality a determinant of municipality 
vulnerability to flooding in Brazil? The literature points to a host of negative impacts of 
income inequality, such as prolonged absolute poverty, a lack of social mobility, spatial 
segregation, increased mortality, and unequal access to and distribution of resources and 
protections. What is less understood is how these negative effects of income inequality 
might be hindering society’s ability to adapt to climate change.  
 Theories of income inequality suggest that high levels of inequality lead to a 
breakdown of social cohesion which results in inequitable distribution of public 
resources, not simply due to poverty, but through two other distinct mechanisms: spatial 
segregation (Massey 1996) and political power concentrated in the elite class1 (Cardoso 
1972). I hypothesize that income inequality measures which capture the income position 
of those at the top of the income distribution are best suited to capture the social 
phenomena in question, i.e., spatial segregation and unequal resource distribution. 
Bottom half income inequality, a measure of the difference between those in the middle 
and those at the bottom of the income distribution, does not provide any explicit 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this analysis, I consider elites those with incomes at or above the 
90th decile of the income distribution.  
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information on those at the top of the income distribution, which are the population most 
likely to be in charge of resource allocation (Portes 2010). 
This research will focus on how these social conditions influence vulnerability to 
climate change in urban, middle-income countries. Currently, policymakers are in the 
habit of giving only marginal, if any, consideration to income inequality when crafting 
climate change adaptation strategies (Ribot 2011). By demonstrating that income 
inequality influences vulnerability, this research will aid adaptation experts in more 
accurately identifying vulnerable areas and crafting policies that address the underlying 
causes of vulnerability.  
This analysis considers the effects of income inequality on urban municipalities in 
urban, middle-income countries by focusing on Brazil, a predominantly urban, middle-
income country. Brazil is infamous for its high levels of income inequality (Souza and 
Medeiros 2013); however, Brazilian municipalities and states vary substantially on this 
metric. Within the 1,276 urban municipalities across 25 states under analysis, the Gini 
index values across municipalities range from a score of 0.32 (low inequality) to 0.68 
(high inequality) and from 0.44 to 0.57 across states. Mean gross monthly income also 
varies tremendously across municipalities and states, from R$297 to R$2943 for 
municipalities and from R$586 to R$15382 across states. With considerable ranges of 
both income inequality and gross monthly incomes across geographies, Brazil is an ideal 
case study for examining the impacts of income inequality. Brazil is also a prime 
example of a country where country-level metrics, such as Gross National Income (GNI) 
                                                 
2 The purchasing power parity conversion factor for 2010 Brazilian Reals to 2005 United 
States dollars is 1.74 (World Bank 2015). 
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per capita and the Gini index, obscure the true spectrum of social cohesion and well-
being that Brazilians experience, across subnational areas. 
In terms of vulnerability to climate change, Brazil is also an especially 
appropriate case study as the bulk of its urban population, to varying degrees, is subject 
to climate hazards. Heavy precipitation causes severe inland flooding as well as 
landslides, while storm surges and sea level rise put urban coastal communities at risk. 
While droughts are also a concern, as they affect both agricultural and energy production, 
they disproportionately affect rural areas. Flooding and landslides are of more pertinent 
concern for urban areas, especially since so many urban areas are located along the 
coasts. Since 2000, Brazil has weathered fifty-one floods and five landslides, which 
caused 2,559 deaths, 514,845 people to lose their homes, 6,403,073 people to be affected 
and $4,831,870 USD in economic losses (EM-DAT, The International Disaster Database 
2014). As climate change accelerates, these disasters will undoubtedly increase in 
frequency and severity (Moser and Satterthwaite 2010). 
This research aims to add to the income inequality and vulnerability literatures by 
providing empirical evidence for the linkages theorized between income inequality and 
vulnerability to climate change. Income inequality, measured at the municipality level, is 
expected to be a significant predictor of municipality vulnerability. It is worth noting that 
I use the word “predictor,” rather than “cause.” This choice of language is deliberate. I 
am not suggesting that this research design can be used to determine causality. Instead I 
draw on the theoretic literature to buttress the claim that income inequality may impact 
vulnerability. A significant finding in this dissertation thus can only supply evidence of a 
significant relationship, not a causal one.  
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To test this relationship, I draw on several data sources: 
 household data from the 2010 Brazilian census hosted in the Integrated Public 
Use Microdata Series International (IPUMS) database  
 municipality data from the 2011 Perfil dos Municipios, a Brazilian municipality 
survey from the IBGE  
 urban population count data from the 2010 Brazilian census (IBGE) hosted in the 
Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN)  
 flood frequency projection spatial data from the 2011 Global Assessment Report 
on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR)    
 urban areas identified using satellite data of night time lights (NOAA 2010)  
 aridity spatial data from the Consortium for Spatial Information (CSI 2012)  
 With this unique combination of data sources and types, I am able to test the 
theoretical relationships outlined above using multi-level regression models which 
account for both the physical and socioeconomic conditions which may be impacting 
vulnerability. I measure vulnerability at the municipality level; however I also control for 
state-level impacts by including the state as the grouping or clustering variable in the 
multi-level model.  
 I select the municipality as the primary unit of analysis for three main reasons. 
The first is that the municipality is the smallest geography to which household level 
socioeconomic data could be reliably geo-coded (IPUMS 2014). The municipality is also 
the preferred unit as it is the governance level at which most adaptation policies are 
implemented (Nepstad et al. 2002; Puppim de Oliveira 2009). Lastly the municipality is 
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the level of government in Brazil that has most control over land use, housing 
development and general public resource allocation (Soares 2007; Tompkins, Lemos, and 
Boyd 2008). 
 I use a multi-level model structure, with municipality as the lower unit of 
analysis, and state as the upper level unit of analysis, for two reasons. The first is to 
account for state-level political economy differences (Font 2003; Weinstein 1982), i.e., 
the extent to which the political economy of the state may be impacting vulnerability. 
The second impetus for using a multi-level model structure is to account for the potential 
spatial autocorrelation of vulnerability, i.e., the extent to which the vulnerability of other 
municipalities within the same state may be impacting the vulnerability of a given 
municipality. While the state-level impacts I aim to control for are distinct (one a spatial 
relationship, the other a political economy effect), I also acknowledge that the two are 
inextricably linked. The political economy of a state also likely drives the spatial 
autocorrelation of vulnerability, as neighboring municipalities within a given state are 
subject to the same political economic regime. Given this tautological relationship, I 
acknowledge that the political economy variable in the model may be also be capturing a 
portion of the spatial autocorrelation of vulnerability. In subsequent chapters, I describe 
the data and methods in more detail.  
 This work will help bridge the gap between income inequality and vulnerability 
scholars. In addition, adaptation policymakers can draw on this work to: (a) determine 
whether including income inequality measures in vulnerability assessments is both 
theoretically and empirically defensible and; (b) whether funds slated for adaptation 
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could be legitimately distributed to programs aimed at tackling the problems related to 
income inequality including spatial segregation and inequitable resource allocation. 
B. Brazil in Context 
1. Background 
Brazil is the largest country on the South American continent, in terms of both 
population and land area. According to 2013 estimates, Brazil also has the fifth largest 
population in the world (World Population Statistics 2013). Brazil is a democratic, 
federal constitutional republic. The federal government is divided into three branches: the 
executive, legislative and judicial. Brazil is sub-divided into states and states are further 
sub-divided into municipalities. Each state and municipality has its own autonomous 
government (Setzer 2009). Table I-1 lists some key national level socioeconomic, 
environmental and governance indicators for Brazil.  
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Table I-1 Brazil: National Indicators 
National Indicators Brazil Data Year 
Population size 199.321 million 2013 
Population growth rate 
(2011-2012)  
1.30 % 2011-2012 
Percent urban  85 % 2012 
Gross National Income   
(GNI) (US$) 
$2,217,452,244,807 2012 
Per capita GNI (US$) $11,630  2012 
Income inequality (Gini 
index) 
0.55 2009 
Literacy 90 % (adults 15+) 2012 
Disaster risk medium risk 2010 
Violence indicators high violence: 42,785 
homicides; 717,185 assaults 
2011 
Political freedom “free”  2010 
Transparency indicators "significant" budget openness 2010 
Corruption indicators rank #69/176 in corruption 
perception, "little" 
enforcement of OECD anti-
bribery convention (2011)  
2012 
Sources: World Population Statistics 2013; World Bank 2013; Prevention Web 2013; 
United National Office on Drugs and Crime 2013; Freedom House 2013; Transparency 
International 2013. 
As a developing, modern democracy, Brazil has some impressive achievements in 
regards to socioeconomic outcomes. The literacy rate is 90 percent for adults fifteen and 
older and GNI per capita, at $11,630, is at the top of the income range ($1,036 to $12, 
615 USD) for middle-income countries. The National Disaster Risk Index, a measure of a 
country’s overall risk to natural disasters, categorizes Brazil as at “medium” risk. This 
measure is calculated by estimating a projected frequency of all possible natural hazards 
and the total population exposed. 
The next few indicators speak to the quality of Brazil’s governance structures. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported 42,785 homicides and 717,185 
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assaults in 2011. Transparency International, an agency devoted to cataloging the quality 
of national governance, ranks Brazil #69 out of 176 countries in terms of corruption and 
notes that there is “little” enforcement of the OECD anti-bribery convention. The Gini 
index, the measure of income inequality commonly used by the World Bank and other 
international development agencies, ranges from zero to one. A score of zero denotes 
perfect equality–where everyone earns exactly the same amount. A Gini score of one 
means perfect inequality, or that a single person earns all the income. With a Gini index 
score of 0.55, Brazil’s income inequality score in 2010 was high, although it has been on 
the decline since the early 2000s (Souza and Medeiros 2013; Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and 
Ortiz-Juarez 2013). Other nations with similarly high Gini scores include: Colombia 
(0.56), Panama (0.52) and Paraguay (0.52) (World Bank 2013). Although income 
inequality is high, Brazil was labeled as a “free” society by Freedom House, an 
organization which ranks the level of political freedom in a country.  
As a member of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), the term coined by financial 
analysts at Goldman Sachs in 2003 for major, developing economies, Brazil is considered 
a key player in the global economy. Throughout the 2000s, Brazil has been referred to by 
financial analysts as a positive model of economic development (Rohter 2012). In 2010, 
Brazilian GDP growth was 7.5 percent (World Bank 2013), an impressive figure. While 
receiving accolades for its economic growth, Brazil has also been chided for its high 
levels of income inequality. While newly minted billionaires travel by helicopter to avoid 
Rio de Janeiro’s notoriously bad traffic, residents of favelas, Brazilian shantytowns, 
struggle to feed their families.  
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This story of uneven development is not uncommon in middle-income countries 
(National Research Council 2003). While the gap between the haves and have-nots is 
admittedly more extreme in Brazil as compared to some other middle-income nations, 
this development trajectory is typical of rapidly urbanizing middle-income countries, 
where markets have effectively allowed some to enjoy a lifestyle akin to high-income 
countries, but have also left many behind (Roberts and Bradley 2006). Although income 
inequality has been on the decline in recent years in Brazil and other urbanized, Latin 
American countries (Lustig et al. 2013), the level of income inequality in Brazil is still far 
above those of most developed countries. For example, the United States, also criticized 
for its high level of income inequality, has a Gini index score of 0.48 (United States 
Census Bureau 2012), seven points lower than that of Brazil.  
2. Natural Hazards   
  The Prevention Web, a project of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction, designates Brazil as at “medium” risk for natural disasters. The most common 
natural disasters in Brazil are drought and flooding (EM-DAT 2014). While droughts 
tend to cause more economic damages due to loss of crops and energy shortages (Brazil 
derives the majority of its energy from hydro-electric dams) (Cohen, Lenzen, and 
Schaeffer 2005), floods cause more physical harm and loss of life, as well as considerable 
economic losses. Brazilian cities are vulnerable to coastal and in-land flooding of deltas 
due to storm surges and sea level rise, as well as in-land flooding of rivers due to 
increased precipitation. With many high elevation coastal areas with steep elevation 
profiles, Brazil is also highly vulnerable to landslides. For the period 1900 to 2014, of the 
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top ten natural disasters in Brazil in terms of number killed, nine were either floods or 
landslides (EM-DAT 2014a). 
3. Vulnerability, Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Policies 
While there are many ways to describe vulnerability to climate change, I draw on 
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) definition, which explains vulnerability as “the 
characteristics of individuals or groups in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, 
resist and recover from the impact of a natural or anthropogenic disaster – noting that 
vulnerability is made up of many political-institutional, economic and socio-cultural 
factors” (Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich 2006:79).  
Climate change mitigation policies focus on reducing or preventing greenhouse 
gas emissions and typically center on energy conservation, energy efficiency, renewable 
energy, and forest conservation, as forests absorb carbon from the atmosphere (United 
Nations Environmental Program 2014). Climate change adaptation policies are those that 
aim to either reduce vulnerability and/or increase adaptive capacity to climate shocks, 
such as flooding (United Nations Environmental Program 2014a).  
While this research focuses on vulnerability to climate change and hopes to 
impact adaptation policymakers, it is helpful to have a more complete understanding of 
the climate change policy landscape in Brazil. As such, in the subsequent sections I 
describe how Brazil, at both the national and sub-national levels, is addressing climate 
change from both the adaptation and mitigation perspectives. The aim of these next 
sections is to highlight the current policies in relation to income inequality, apart from 
poverty reduction schemes. I show that while income inequality is mentioned as part of 
the mitigation frame, it is only in reference to poverty alleviation. It is not mentioned at 
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all as part of adaptation policy. In this dissertation, I make the case for incorporating 
income inequality measures into adaptation policy. These next sections demonstrate that 
current policies do not already take this issue into account. 
4. Adaptation Policies 
Acknowledging the risks climate change poses to Brazilian lives and livelihoods, 
the Brazilian federal government approved the National Plan on Climate Change (NPCC) 
law (National Plan on Climate Change 2008), which itemizes specific targets for both 
climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. In the following section I will briefly 
summarize the main policy initiatives outlined in the NPCC3 which relate to adaptation.   
 While the NPCC law focuses mainly on mitigation, it also includes provisions for 
the reduction of vulnerability, which are framed as adaptation policies. In order to reduce 
vulnerability, vulnerable groups must first be identified. To this end, the policy provides 
incentives for increased research relating to the human health impacts of climate change. 
Other adaptation measures include the expansion of the public health system and creation 
of new alert systems to warn the public of impending climate events. Increased research 
is also encouraged in the area of mapping ways to minimize the socioeconomic costs of 
adaptation. A push to strengthen a “Climate Network” of researchers focused on 
measuring vulnerability and weighing adaption policy options is also part of the NPCC.
 Although the NPCC was signed into law in 2009, it is unclear how many of the 
adaptation provisions have been implemented. In some sense, this ambiguity of outcomes 
is by design. The policy states that it is to be implemented in phases, with the first phase 
                                                 
3 A summary of the National Plan on Climate Change is available in English and it is 
from this summary that I draw the following information.  
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focused mainly on action and subsequent phases focused on monitoring and evaluation. 
As such, it will only be possible to assess what has been achieved in the initial phase once 
the subsequent phases are complete.   
 In addition to the NPCC, there has also been considerable action in the private 
sector. Companies in the chemical industry, financial services, and agricultural sectors 
have implemented adaptation initiatives through the introduction of new products that 
serve to reduce vulnerability. BASF (a chemical company), in partnership with Espacoa 
ECO is applying superabsorber polymers in reforestation projects to reduce flooding 
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2013). In the financial 
services industry, Allianz, in partnership with HSBC, is offering micro-insurance to 
farmers to protect against extreme weather events. Adapta Sertao, an agriculture focused 
non-governmental organization, is helping farmers in the arid northeastern regions install 
irrigation systems and switch to more drought-resistant crops (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 2013a). It is interesting that these private sector 
adaptation efforts are focused predominantly in rural areas, where most of their resource 
extraction activities occur. There is little evidence of private sector engagement in 
adaption efforts for urban communities (Puppim de Oliveira 2009).   
 Brazil appears to treat climate change mitigation and sustainable development as 
a single process. The NPCC states that:  “Brazil’s efforts are based on the commitment to 
reduce social inequality and to increase income by seeking an economic dynamic with a 
low emissions trajectory, not repeating the pattern and the standards of the countries that 
have already industrialized” (NPCC 2008:7). The discussion of climate mitigation 
revolves around decreasing emissions while simultaneously increasing incomes and 
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reducing inequality. This will be achieved through greater energy efficiency and 
increased use of renewable energies. There is a clear effort to tie mitigation and 
sustainable development together, and shrug off arguments that a trade-off exists between 
economic development and emissions reduction. For example, the policy to reduce 
emissions through expansion of sugarcane is directly tied to increasing incomes for 
ethanol producers by expanding sales to international markets. 
 When it comes to adaptation however, there is a slightly different framing.  
Efforts to reduce vulnerability by increasing incomes are clearly in line with a sustainable 
development agenda. However, the specific adaptation programs cited in the policy 
document do not focus on reducing vulnerability through income generation. Instead, the 
adaptation policies are housed outside of the sustainable development framework. The 
adaptation policies focus on research, expanding emergency alert systems and increasing 
public health services. While public health policies do serve to increase the assets and 
options for vulnerable populations, they are not specifically targeted at reducing income 
inequality. They are listed as separate policies aimed at aiding the most vulnerable 
segments of the population. The government appears to see a clear pathway for how 
mitigation efforts can help reduce income inequality; however, adaptation policies do not 
include provisions for income inequality reduction. As such, income inequality is framed 
as a social problem but not directly related to increased vulnerability to climate change. 
Instead, they are considered as two separate social problems.   
 In contrast to the adaptation effort recommendations listed in the NPCC, which 
omit both income generation opportunities and income inequality reduction strategies, 
private sector initiatives do place income generation for the poor at the heart of their 
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adaptation efforts. For example, sales of micro-insurance will theoretically increase 
profits to both financial services firms (directly through sales of the new product) and 
farmers (indirectly by mitigating risk of expansion). Farmers who switch to drought-
resistant crops will have more income security.  
 The NPCC does recognize income inequality as a social problem. It does not, 
however, directly acknowledge a link between income inequality and vulnerability to 
climate change. The adaptation polices listed in the policy document focus mainly on 
researching potential negative health impacts of climate change, rather than on reducing 
the existing health disparities between rich and poor. One exception is the listed 
adaptation effort to expand health services. However, this adaptation effort is cited as a 
way to protect vulnerable populations from extreme climate events, rather than an 
attempt to reduce the inequality of health services in general.  
In sum, in the NPCC, there is little focus on adaptation polices that aim to 
explicitly increase incomes for the poor or reduce income inequality. The private sector 
adaptation efforts are more specifically focused on reducing inequality by increasing 
and/or protecting incomes of poor farmers. Micro-insurance products and drought-
resistant crops should allow farmers to grow their businesses, resulting in increased 
yields and profits.   
While the NPCC is a national law passed by the federal government, it is the 
municipality governments who are most actively engaged in promoting and 
implementing specific adaptation efforts. In 2009, the city council of São Paolo approved 
law 14.933 (São Paulo State Government 2009), which focuses on both greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction and adaptation measures (Robinson 2009).  
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 The adaptation plan described in law 14.933 is comprised of three main 
initiatives: research, education and preparedness. The research element mandates more 
climate change research focused on rapid detection and monitoring of climate changes. 
The public health education program is centered on malaria and dengue fever prevention, 
and the preparedness program is geared toward preparing civil defense forces to both 
prevent and respond to emergencies.  
 There was not clear evidence of implementation of adaptation initiatives 
described in law 14.933. In a 2011 report by Siemens (2013), Alda Marco Antonio, 
deputy mayor of São Paulo, was quoted as having the goal of transforming São Paulo into 
a low carbon city. Alda Marco Antonio made no mention of goals specifically related to 
adaptation. Similar to the national plan, income inequality and income generation for the 
poor are clearly absent from adaptation polices outlined at the municipality level for São 
Paulo.    
5. Mitigation Polices 
 While this dissertation is mainly concerned with adaptation, it is helpful to 
understand how Brazil has addressed mitigation as well. When faced with limited 
resources, governments favor mitigation over adaptation policies, as mitigation policies 
are often concerned with reaping the benefits, while adaptation efforts are focused on 
minimizing the costs (Kane and Shogren 2000). Brazil is no exception. The bulk of 
policies, at both the national and municipality level, focus on mitigation (Puppim de 
Oliveira 2009).   
  A key mitigation policy initiative outlined in the NPCC is the National Energy 
Efficiency Policy. It is expected to result in a 10 percent reduction in energy consumption 
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by 2030. The reduction will be achieved through a host of efficiency measures across 
several industries such as manufacturing, agriculture, and waste management. Specific 
projects include: increase of sustainable charcoal usage to replace coal in iron 
manufacturing, replacement of one million antiquated refrigerators per year, encouraging 
use of solar powered water heating systems, increase in recycling by 20 percent by 2015, 
incentives for sustainable agricultural practices, and increases in usage of renewable 
energy sources such as sugar cane and solar. 
 In addition to the National Energy Efficiency Policy, the NPCC also includes a 
National Agro-Energy Plan. The stated goal of this policy is “carrying out research, 
development, innovation and the transfer of technology to guarantee agro-energy chains 
sustainability and competitiveness” (NPCC 2008:14). This will involve expanding 
ethanol production and encouraging broader international ethanol consumption. 
 Reducing deforestation is also a key part of the NPCC. The stated target is to 
reduce the average (1996-2005) deforestation rate by 30 percent by 2013 and by an 
additional 30 percent by 2017. The Amazon Fund and the Climate Fund were established 
to finance programs aimed at deforestation reduction. 
 Between 2005 and 2009, Brazil reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 25 
percent, mainly through reduction of deforestation in the Amazon. Although overall 
GHG emissions declined, over the same period, emissions from production and 
consumption increased by 50 percent. This was due largely to increases in diesel 
consumption, oil refining and the percentage of electricity generated from fossil fuels 
(Viola 2013).  
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Similar to adaptation policies, the municipality governments are most concerned 
with promoting and implementing mitigation efforts. In 2009, the city council of São 
Paolo approved law 14.933 (São Paulo State Government 2009), which focuses on both 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction and adaptation measures (Robinson 2009). In terms 
of mitigation, the bill outlines a five-pronged strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
by 30 percent of 2005 levels by 2012. The mitigation plan targets five sectors for 
emissions reduction: transportation, energy, waste management, construction and land 
use.   
 For the transportation section, the bill itemizes several concrete targets. A ten 
percent reduction in fossil fuel usage in public transit each year is one goal. By 2017, all 
city fleets should be powered by renewable fuels. There are also stipulations to improve 
traffic management by creating carpool lanes, a ride share program and improving 
infrastructure for urban bicycling.  
 The stated goals for mitigation efforts in the energy sector are less clear-cut. The 
bill encourages incentivizing renewable energy generation, but does not explicitly state 
how that might be accomplished. There is also mention of incentivizing research in 
energy efficiency and renewable energy. Setting higher standards for energy efficiency in 
municipal lighting is one of the few specific legislative items outlined for how to reduce 
emissions in the energy sector.  
 Mitigation efforts highlighted for the waste management sector include expanding 
a citywide recycling program and cutting down on plastic bag usage. There is also a 
stipulation that requires all new large building projects to include a recycling plan. 
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Reducing methane at landfills, by implementing improved waste treatment programs and 
methane capture, is also part of the mitigation plan in the waste management sector. 
 For the construction sector, the bill instructs officials to create new standards for 
energy efficiency of buildings and for materials used in construction.  There is also a 
provision that bans the use of illegally harvested wood in municipal construction.  
 Efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases in the land use sector focus on maximizing 
population density and increasing green space. There is a measure to increase the number 
of trees in the city and to refurbish existing preservation areas.  
 Though not explicitly stated as a climate change mitigation or adaptation effort, in 
2003, the São Paulo city council approved a strategic plan to preserve the biodiversity of 
São Paulo (Green and Environment Secretariat 2005). This plan established specific 
zones for environmental protection called municipal environmental protection areas. In 
2007, a new municipal environmental police division was created to ensure these areas 
are properly protected. 
 The biodiversity protection plan, managed by the Green and Environment 
Secretariat, also includes a tree planting initiative. 180,000 native trees are being planted 
each year to increase the green cover in the city. There is also an ordinance to create four 
municipal nature parks.  
 Evidence of implementation of mitigation initiatives described in law 14.933 was 
difficult to obtain.  There is some evidence that mitigation efforts to reduce emissions are 
underway. Ms. Marco Antonio, deputy mayor of São Paulo, stated that the transportation 
sector has made great strides in emissions reduction (Siemens 2013). Some city buses run 
on ethanol while overhead electrical lines power others. The metro has seventy 
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kilometers of track which transports four million riders daily. She does admit however, 
that the transportation infrastructure still needs improvement. She also failed to mention 
whether the city is on track to meet the stated goal of all city fleets powered by 
renewables by 2017. 
 According to Ms. Marco Antonio (Siemens 2013), São Paulo is still unable to 
meet the water and electricity needs of its residents. As part of its mitigation efforts in the 
energy sector, the city hopes to switch to renewables. However, if the city is unable to 
meet current energy demand with a mix of fossil and renewable energy, it is difficult to 
see how it will be able to switch to renewables entirely in the near future. Ms. Marco 
Antonio also does not mention energy conservation when describing São Paulo’s 
sustainable development plan. In contrast to the national plan, a discussion of income 
inequality reduction is absent from the mitigation discussion. While at the national level 
the sustainable development rhetoric of mitigating climate change while increasing 
incomes and reducing inequality is clear, on the ground, at the municipality level, these 
stated goals drop away, perhaps due to feasibility constraints (Deák 2001). 
 The Brazilian federal government is clearly aware of the risks climate change 
currently poses and will continue to pose, and has thus passed climate change legislation 
(NPCC 2008). State governments, perhaps due to the presence of the federal law, have 
been less active in setting climate change adaptation and mitigation policies. It is at the 
municipality level that specific mitigation and adaptation efforts are designed and 
implemented (UN-Habitat 2010). While the NPCC does explicitly mention income 
inequality as a social problem, it is through mitigation, not adaptation policies, that 
income inequality reduction is addressed. It is also not framed as a cause of vulnerability 
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to climate change, but rather a separate social concern. At the municipality level, there 
appears to be even less concern for income inequality in relation to either mitigation or 
adaptation to climate change.       
C. Relevance 
 This work is relevant to sociologists of income inequality, sociologists concerned 
with vulnerability to climate change (a small but growing group), and adaptation 
policymakers. Given the distinctness of these audiences, I address each separately in the 
sections below. 
1. Applying the “Wilkinsonian” Theory of Income Inequality to 
Middle-Income Countries  
 Income inequality scholars (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Gornick and Jӓntti 2013) 
suggest that income inequality has negative social consequences in developed countries. 
There is a great deal of debate, however, on the exact causal mechanisms for how income 
inequality creates these negative impacts. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010), who popularized 
the claim that income inequality negatively impacts society, suggest that a breakdown of 
social cohesion is one of the causal mechanisms in developed countries. Massey (1996) 
proposes that income inequality produces spatial segregation which, in turn, leads to 
negative social outcomes. Massey notes that, in Chicago in both the 1930s and the 1980s, 
“the spatial concentration of material deprivation stemmed from the same underlying 
causes: rising income inequality and growing class segregation” (Massey 1996:407). 
Others (National Research Council 2003) have noted that increasing income inequality 
and urbanization have led to spatial segregation of high-and low-income neighborhoods 
in cities in developing countries around the world.  
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 In middle-income countries, the negative impacts of income inequality are often 
assumed to be simply a consequence of high levels of absolute poverty. This dissertation 
suggests, drawing on the work of Wilkinson and Pickett (2010), absolute poverty is only 
part of the story and cannot fully explain the impacts of income inequality within an 
urban, middle-income society. The concentrated power of the elite, ruling class, coupled 
with the spatial segregation of high- and lower-income households, in addition to high 
levels of absolute poverty, leads to a situation of uneven access to assets and options that 
are related to vulnerability. All are therefore contributing factors to the impacts of income 
inequality in urban, middle-income countries.  
While Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) make a compelling theoretical argument, 
their empirical work, and specifically the quantitative methods they use to establish 
causality, have been widely critiqued (Reeves 2010; Saunders 2010). This dissertation 
will test the relationships between income inequality and vulnerability to climate hazards 
using multi-level statistical models which are better equipped to control for spurious 
relationships, and have been used extensively to test the relationship between income 
inequality and health outcomes (Subramanian and Kawachi 2004).     
 It is also important to consider which measure of income inequality is most 
appropriate. Income inequality can be calculated using various measures and geographic 
levels. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) and Gornick and Jӓntti (2013) measure income 
inequality at the national level, the most common geographic level of analysis.  Others 
(Firebaugh 2003; Milanovic 2011) have begun to popularize a focus on the study of 
global income inequality.  
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There are also many different methods for measuring income inequality. The Gini 
index, though helpful for identifying an overall level of income inequality, fails to show 
where along the income distribution the income inequality is located (Allison 1978). For 
example, two countries could have the same Gini score but different income distributions. 
The general entropy indexes, another class of income inequality measures, have the 
added benefit of decomposition properties, where one can calculate which segment of a 
population is disproportionately contributing to the inequality, e.g., women or the elderly 
(Allison 1978).  
 The percentile ratio and income share measures of income inequality, perhaps the 
easiest to understand and interpret, are often used to identify where the inequality lies 
along the income distribution. Common percentile ratio measures include the 90th/50th 
and the 50th/10th. These ratios compare the income level of the 90th percentile of the 
income distribution to the 50th percentile, and the 50th percentile to the 10th percentile 
respectively.  Income share measures calculate the total share of income held by various 
portions of the income distribution. For example, the income share of the bottom 20 
percent is the percentage of total income held by the bottom 20 percent of the income 
distribution.  
 By employing several different measures of income inequality, this analysis will 
add to the subsection of income inequality literature focused on identifying whether the 
effects of income inequality vary depending on its location along the income distribution 
(Voitchovsky 2005). Testing multiple measures of income inequality also allows for a 
cleaner distinction between income inequality effects and absolute poverty effects on 
vulnerability. For example, for urban Brazilian municipalities, the Gini index is 
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correlated with measures of absolute poverty; however, the 90th/50th percentile ratio is 
not. If the Gini index is a significant predictor of vulnerability, one could argue, as critics 
of Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) have, that it may be simply absolute poverty at the 
bottom of the distribution, and not income inequality, that is driving the relationship 
between income inequality and negative social outcomes. However, if the 90th/50th 
percentile ratio measure of income inequality is also a significant predictor of 
vulnerability, the above critique can be challenged.  
 This dissertation adds to the growing body of income inequality literature in two 
ways: by empirically testing whether income inequality impacts vulnerability to flooding 
in Brazil; and by examining whether the effects of income inequality are different 
depending on where along the income distribution the income inequality is located.  
2. Vulnerability Scholarship 
 Climate change will increase the frequency of natural hazards and risks for urban 
populations in middle-income countries (Moser and Satterthwaite 2010). There is 
agreement in the literature that not all countries, regions, municipalities and households 
are equally vulnerable to natural hazards. However, there is significant debate on how 
best to measure and rank vulnerability to natural hazards. In fact, Birkmann (2006:11) 
notes that “the current literature encompasses more than twenty-five different definitions, 
concepts and methods to systematise vulnerability.”  
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) use a quantitative framework for measuring 
vulnerability while Adger (1999) draws on qualitative methods to identify vulnerable 
groups. In this dissertation, I add to the complex landscape of vulnerability analysis by 
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utilizing Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) vulnerability framework to test Adger’s 
(1999) supposition that income inequality is a determinant of vulnerability. 
3. Climate Change Adaptation Policymakers 
Although sociologists of income inequality and vulnerability to climate change 
are the central audiences, climate change adaptation policy experts will also find this 
research relevant to their work. Climate adaptation polices are often divided into two 
types: hard and soft adaptation. Hard adaptation policies include infrastructure 
improvements such as reinforcing dams or building sea walls to avoid flooding. Soft 
adaptation efforts focus on planning for and increasing human adaptive capacity. 
Examples include expanding insurance coverage, land-use planning and improving 
emergency action warning systems (Obermaier et al. 2009).  
  A main component of soft adaptation policy is reducing vulnerability by 
identifying which populations are most vulnerable, and structuring programs to ensure 
those groups are adequately equipped to protect themselves. Attempts to manage 
adaptation without consideration of vulnerability can lead to inequitable distribution of 
adverse climate effects, where those least vulnerable are in a position to adapt, while the 
weakest in society are left defenseless (Ribot 2011).  
 This research is relevant to adaptation policymakers tasked with deciding how 
adaptation funds should be allocated. If there is strong empirical evidence that income 
inequality is a determinant of vulnerability to climate shocks, policymakers are justified 
in including income inequality measures in vulnerability assessments as well as directing 
adaptation funds towards income inequality reduction schemes. 
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 Several vulnerability scholars (Mearns and Norton 2010) point to a correlation 
between income inequality and vulnerability, but few have supplied concrete evidence of 
this relationship (Adger 1999; Tompkins et al. 2008). This research hopes to substantiate 
their claims by providing empirical evidence that income inequality is a predictor of 
vulnerability in urban, middle-income countries.  
D. Urban Approach 
This dissertation includes only those municipalities with over 20,000 residents 
and at least 50 percent of households classified as urban. I select an urban approach to 
join the growing body of literature focused on urban inequality and vulnerability in 
middle-income countries (Bloom et al. 2008; Cohen 2004; McGranahan et al. 2007; 
Romero-Lankao et al. 2012). In 2011, 84.6 percent of Brazilian households were 
classified as urban (World Bank 2013). Large cities in middle-income countries continue 
to grow more quickly than does the population. For example, in 2010, São Paulo’s 
growth rate was 9 percent, as compared to an overall population growth rate of 1.17 
percent (World City Information 2012). This urbanization trend is not unique to Brazil. 
Urbanization due to migration, as well as natural increases, is continuing and rural 
households will likely become an even smaller percentage of the world population in the 
future. In fact, all middle-income countries are becoming more urban (Montgomery 
2008; National Research Council 2003). The percentage of urban households in many 
middle-income countries in 2012 was well over 50 percent (World Bank 2013).  
As the world urbanizes, it is becoming increasingly important to understand social 
and climate-change related dynamics within urban populations, rather than focus on rural 
populations or the differences between rural and urban populations. Urban areas are often 
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coastal; therefore, sea-level rise may disproportionately affect urban areas (McGranahan 
et al. 2007).    
E. Generalizability 
 For the purposes of this analysis, Brazil is considered to be symbolic of other 
large, urban, middle-income countries. I use data from a single country, rather than a 
sample of many, middle-income countries, so that I can effectively, by design, control for 
country-specific effects such as culture, national climate change policy or regime type. A 
drawback of this approach is its inability to decipher whether the social phenomenon is 
unique to Brazil or also present in other urban, middle-income countries more broadly.  
One issue to consider is whether urban municipalities in Brazil are particularly 
unique, compared with those in other middle-income countries, in ways that might impact 
the relationships under analysis. In her longitudinal ethnographic study, Favelas: Four 
Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio De Janeiro, Perlman (2011) portrays modern life 
for Brazilians living in favelas (shanty towns) in Rio de Janeiro. She describes how living 
conditions vary widely both within and across favelas in terms of services and 
infrastructure. While many favelas have some paved roads and electricity, not all 
dwellings are connected to the electricity grid. Additionally, not all favela residents are 
particularly poor. Some have cars, flat-screen TVs, and all the latest electronics. Others 
can barely afford school fees for their children and share single bedrooms with ten or 
more family members. Perlman explains that in developing countries, the urban poor are 
relegated to “the fringes of habitability, in swamps, in garbage dumps, in cemeteries, on 
rocky hillsides, or in abandoned factories and office buildings” (Perlman 2011:30). 
Perlman notes how favelas have grown faster than other parts of the city, a trend she 
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explains is occurring in developing countries around the globe. This assertion is, 
however, difficult to validate empirically as there are no reliable estimates of slum 
populations (Dorelien, Balk, and Todd 2013). Perlman does point out that the violence 
and safety concerns in Brazilian favelas are among the highest of any nation. However 
she also suggests that the social dynamics she uncovers in Brazilian favelas are not 
wholly unique to Brazil and are generalizable to other urban, middle-income countries. 
Although the data cannot definitively prove as much, the literature suggests that Brazil is 
a suitable case selection as urban development in Brazil is following a trajectory similar 
to that of other urban, middle-income countries.  
F. Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is divided into three sections: vulnerability to climate change and 
flood hazard, income inequality as a social determinant, and income inequality as a 
predictor of vulnerability. In Chapter 2, I review the literatures on vulnerability to climate 
change, flood hazards and vulnerability index construction. I explain how I construct the 
vulnerability index I use as the dependent variable in the later analyses. I also create a 
map of municipality vulnerability to more concretely illustrate the variation in levels of 
vulnerability across urban, Brazilian municipalities. In Chapter 3, I discuss income 
inequality as a social determinant. I review the literature on impacts of income inequality 
as well as different measurements of income inequality. I explain which measures of 
income inequality I use in the subsequent models and why. Lastly I map income 
inequality at the municipality level to visually display the variation in income inequality 
across Brazilian municipalities. Chapter 4 tackles the heart of the analysis, the 
relationship between income inequality and vulnerability. In this chapter I explain in 
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detail the specifics of the multi-level models I use to test the research question: is income 
inequality a predictor of vulnerability to flooding? I include both the results of the 
statistical analyses and a discussion of the findings. In Chapter 5, I conclude with a 
summary of the main findings in previous chapters and how they add to the current 
income inequality and vulnerability literatures. I highlight the climate change adaptation 
policy implications of this work and suggest avenues for further inquiry. Lastly, I 
conclude the work with a brief photo essay depicting five urban municipalities across 
four states, each of varying levels of income inequality and vulnerability. I include this 
final section in an attempt to transport the reader from the theoretic realm to the lived 
experience, encouraging a more vivid, tangible understanding of how the social 
phenomena described throughout this dissertation play out on the ground.  
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II. Vulnerability to Climate Change and Flood Hazards 
Vulnerability to climate change, and specifically to flooding, is difficult to measure. 
Drawing on the vulnerability literature for guidance, I construct a vulnerability index which aims 
to capture vulnerability to flooding of urban municipalities in Brazil. In this chapter, I describe 
how I construct the index using factor analysis and map the vulnerability scores of urban 
municipalities. I also test for spatial autocorrelation of vulnerability, that is, the extent to which 
neighboring municipalities have more similar levels of vulnerability, using spatial analysis 
methods.4 
As vulnerability is just one component of the overall flood risk, I also measure the flood 
hazard and flood exposure levels of each municipality and include these measures, along with 
the vulnerability index score, in a final flood risk map of urban Brazilian municipalities.  
A. Vulnerability and Natural Hazards: A Brief Review of the Literatures 
“Over the last 100 years, the average temperature of the earth has increased over 1.4 
degrees Fahrenheit. Changes in the earth’s climate are projected to continue, with an increase of 
2 to 11.5 degrees Fahrenheit likely to occur in this (21st) century” (United States Environmental 
Protection Agency 2014). While climate scientists agree that the earth is warming, and that 
human activity is a leading cause of the temperature rise, they are unable to predict with 100 
percent certainty what the exact weather implications will be. As a result of climate change, there 
has been an increase in extreme weather events around the world, such as flooding, heavy 
                                                 
4 In Chapter 4, I use this index as the dependent variable in the models which test whether 
income inequality is a predictor of vulnerability to flood hazards in Brazil. Spatial 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable is important to detect as it can bias results if it is not 
controlled for in the final models.  
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precipitation, drought and heat waves. Sea levels have also begun to rise and will continue to rise 
as a result of melting ice caps and glaciers. Although it is difficult to forecast the exact weather 
impacts of climate change, it is clear that an increase in flooding is of serious concern, 
particularly for countries with large coastlines and river systems, such as Brazil. Urban 
populations in countries with substantial coastlines, such as Brazil, are particularly at risk as they 
are disproportionately located in coastal areas (Moser and Satterthwaite 2010).  
In the natural hazards literature, there are myriad frameworks for how best to measure 
vulnerability (Barnett, Lambert, and Fry 2008). Acknowledging the disparate state of the field, 
the United Nations University Press published Measuring Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: 
Toward Disaster Resilient Societies (Birkmann 2006), an effort to showcase the different and at 
times competing frameworks, and to synthesize and advance this important literature. In the final 
chapter of this edited volume, Birkmann lays out a set of recommendations for researchers and 
policy analysts, and focuses on the importance of incorporating and amending existing 
frameworks to add value to the growing, diverse and extensive vulnerability literature landscape.  
Unlike Birkmann (2006), I do not attempt to cover the complete breadth of approaches to 
vulnerability analysis in the following pages. Instead I provide a brief review of a few dominant 
paradigms and then focus in more detail on the vulnerability frameworks that I find to be most 
relevant to the research question at hand: assessing whether income inequality is related to a 
municipality’s vulnerability to flooding. In their meta-analysis, Romero-Lankao, Qin, and 
Dickinson (2012) review the landscape of urban vulnerability literature, focusing on those 
studies measuring urban vulnerability to temperature-related hazards. They find that the majority 
of research in this area uses the urban vulnerability as impact approach, which draws on the risk-
hazard framework from the natural hazards literature. This approach defines vulnerability in 
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terms of exposure to a specific hazard, sensitivity of the population and particular impacts, such 
as mortality. 
 For this analysis, the urban vulnerability as impact framework is not appropriate due to 
data constraints. Although impact data such as mortality and/or economic loss data are available 
at the national or regional level for some countries, they are very difficult to obtain at the 
municipality level, especially in middle-income countries. Some researchers (Müller, Reiter, and 
Weiland 2011) have collected their own data by conducting household surveys of a single 
community or municipality. Given the broad scope of my analysis (i.e., all urban municipalities 
in Brazil with over 20,000 inhabitants) however, primary data collection is not feasible.  
 Romero-Lankao et al. (2012) identify two additional urban vulnerability frameworks: 
inherent urban vulnerability and urban resilience. Inherent urban vulnerability, drawing on the 
political economy literature, defines vulnerability in relation to adaptive capacity and structural 
drivers. Urban resilience focuses on a population’s ability to recover from hazard stresses and 
incorporates elements of the built environment in assessing hazard risk. Below in Table II-1 is a 
brief summary of each framework and the data it requires. 
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Table II-1. Common Urban Vulnerability Frameworks 
Framework Description Data Requirements 
Urban vulnerability as impact Vulnerability defined in terms of 
exposure to a specific hazard, 
sensitivity of the population and 
particular impacts 
Socioeconomic, impact, 
hazard and exposure  
Inherent urban vulnerability Vulnerability defined by adaptive 
capacity and structural drivers, 
draws on political economy 
literature 
Socioeconomic and 
political economy  
Urban resilience Vulnerability defined as a 
population’s ability to recover 
from hazard stresses, 
incorporates elements of the built 
environment in assessing hazard 
risk 
Socioeconomic, political 
economy, build 
environment, hazard and 
exposure  
Source: Romero-Lankao et al. 2012. 
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006:78) define vulnerability as “the characteristics of 
individuals or groups in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from 
the impact of a natural or anthropogenic disaster – noting that vulnerability is made up of many 
political-institutional, economic and socio-cultural factors.” Their definition aligns most closely 
with the inherent urban vulnerability tradition though it also incorporates elements that might 
fall within the scope of the urban resilience literature, such as including building quality in their 
measure of vulnerability. Consistent with the natural hazards literature, and borrowing 
Crichton’s (1999) notion of the risk triangle, shown in Figure 1, Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich 
(2006) define disaster risk as a function of the hazard, exposure and vulnerability.  
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Figure 1. The Risk Triangle 
Source: Crichton 1999. 
 
The hazard is defined as a particular disaster type and characterized by its frequency and 
severity.  In the case of this dissertation, the hazard under examination is flooding. Flood hazard 
is typically projected on a 100 year frequency basis, i.e., how many floods a particular region is 
expected to experience within 100 years (GAR 2011). Exposure relates to the population or 
property at risk, i.e., whether the property or the population are actually susceptible to harm from 
the flood. For example, an overflowing river deep in the Amazon may not cause any flood risk if 
there are no humans or property exposed to the flood waters. Therefore, in order for a flood risk 
to exist, all three aspects of the disaster risk must be present: vulnerability, exposure and hazard 
(Crichton 1999).   
While the disaster risk model is widely used, some vulnerability scholars include 
exposure within the definition of vulnerability itself. For example, the IPCC Third Assessment 
Report defines vulnerability to climate change as:  
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“the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate 
change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, 
magnitude, and rate of climate variation and to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its 
adaptive capacity” (IPCC 2001).  
 I select Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) definition of vulnerability, which describes 
vulnerability as a characteristic which is both affected by, but also designated as separate from, 
both the hazard and exposure levels. While I acknowledge that both hazard and exposure may 
impact the level of vulnerability, I do not include measures of hazard and exposure within the 
flood vulnerability index explicitly. Instead I draw on Crichton’s (1999) framework which 
distinguishes between vulnerability, exposure, hazard and risk. To account for the impacts of 
hazards and exposure on vulnerability, I control for these factors in the final model.  
 I do however, include whether or not a municipality is located within a low elevation 
coastal zone (LECZ) as part of the flood vulnerability index as the location of an urban 
municipality within a LECZ increases its vulnerability. The built environment may inhibit proper 
drainage and increase flooding (McGranahan et al. 2007). Adaptation infrastructure is also 
particularly challenging to manage in LECZs, such as the construction of high sea walls or 
managing sensitive mangrove habitats to combat soil erosion (Szlafsztein and Sterr 2007). 
Therefore the location of a municipality within a LECZ can be conceived of as a characteristic 
which is deeply tied to coping and adaptation strategies. Clearly vulnerability and exposure are 
intrinsically linked. As a researcher tasked with deciding how to differentiate the two, I rely on 
the literature and follow Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) lead, taking the elevation and 
coastal location of the municipality into consideration within the vulnerability index. 
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Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) note how in recent years disaster management 
research has become increasingly concerned with vulnerability analysis, not simply hazard 
analysis, and that socioeconomic conditions, in addition to environmental conditions, play a key 
role in identifying vulnerable groups. The authors point to a lacuna in the vulnerability literature 
of methodology for measurement of vulnerability at the sub-national level. While vulnerability 
indexes at the national or community level are common (Barnett et al. 2008), a framework which 
included indicators at different “social levels” such as individual/household and community, yet 
was still broad enough to allow for measurement across multiple sub-national units, was lacking. 
Their contribution, a vulnerability framework and corresponding indicators which allow for 
clean measurement of sub-national vulnerability, incorporating physical, environmental and 
socioeconomic elements, attempts to fill the void.  
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) vulnerability framework is especially appealing as it 
includes indicators at the individual, household and municipality level. This framework is also 
well suited for assessing the relationship between income inequality and vulnerability in middle-
income countries as it allows for a measurement of vulnerability without the need for data on a 
particular impact, e.g., mortality. Another benefit of this approach is that it does not include any 
measure of income inequality in the definition of vulnerability, ensuring that the hypothesis to be 
tested, whether income inequality is a determinant of vulnerability, is not tautological. One 
weakness of this approach is that the framework can only calculate the relative vulnerability of 
municipalities, rather than an absolute level of vulnerability to a particular impact such as 
mortality or economic loss. 
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) sub-divide vulnerability into two categories: hazard-
independent and hazard-dependent vulnerability. This distinction is helpful to the authors as they 
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are aiming to create a framework they hope will be applicable to the full range of natural 
disasters. Each vulnerability type includes a host of parameters at the individual, community, 
country, region and cultural level5. Table II-2 and Table II-3, reproduced from Schneiderbauer 
and Ehrlich’s Tables 3.2 and 3.3, list suggested indicators for measuring both hazard-
independent and hazard-dependent vulnerability, respectively. In Table II-3, only the indicators 
which are most relevant to flooding are included. 
  
                                                 
5 The cultural level is defined as a community with “shared cultural, social and/or ethnic traits” 
(Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich 2006: 95).   
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Table II-2. Selected Hazard-independent Parameters and Potential Indicators for Vulnerability at 
Different 'Social Levels' 
Social levels Parameters Indicators 
Individual and household Age Average age 
 Income GDP per capita 
 Health/ Disability Malnutrition of children <5 
 Education Life expectancy 
 Subsistence economy in primary 
sector 
HIV/AIDS infection rate 
 Savings Illiteracy rate 
 Individual and family related 
insurance 
Productivity per capita (primary 
sector) 
 Neighborhood network Number of mobile phones, TVs, 
radios/per capita 
 Access to Information  
Administrative 
community 
Infrastructure/accessibility Traffic infrastructure,  Road 
network 
 Presence and quality of civil 
protection, incl. early 
warning/emergency 
plans/disaster management 
capacities 
Density of rural population, Level 
of urbanization, Level of 
corruption           
 Disaster preparedness  
 Degree of autonomy/participation 
in decision making procedures 
and access to resources 
 
Source: Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich 2006. 
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Table II-3. Selected Hazard-Dependent Parameters and Potential Indicators for Vulnerability to 
Different ‘Social Levels’ for Flooding Hazard 
Social levels Parameters Indicators 
Individual and 
household 
Quality and age of building Main building material 
  Urban growth 
 Size/ Height of building Number of floors 
  Number of families/ Residential buildings 
 Location of dwelling Terrain information (for example slope gradient) 
  Altitude (relating to sea level or local 
watersheds) 
 Hygiene Access to drinking water 
  Quality of sewage system 
Administrative 
community 
Preparedness for floods Dams 
  Legal regulations relating to floods 
Source: Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich 2006.   
This distinction between hazard-dependent and hazard-independent indicators allows for 
a more parsimonious application of the framework across disaster types. However, in practice, 
many hazard-independent indicators will vary based on the hazard in question. While the authors 
justify the distinction between hazard-independent and hazard-dependent parameters as helpful 
for understanding certain “universal” parameters of vulnerability, this dichotomy has also been 
critiqued.   
Bollin and Hidajat (2006) point to the fact that the impact on vulnerability, even for 
supposedly hazard-independent parameters, can still be hazard-specific. For example, age is 
considered a hazard-independent parameter, yet the impact of age on vulnerability is 
considerably different in a flood compared to a heat wave. Children are especially vulnerable to 
floods due to their short stature and lack of swimming abilities. While heat waves are also a 
concern for children, floods may be more dangerous. Considering age as a hazard-independent 
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parameter obscures the different levels of vulnerability young children might experience as a 
result of different hazards (Bartlett 2008). Disaster management capacity is another example. 
Although listed as a hazard-independent indicator, disaster management capacity will, in fact, 
vary by hazard type. If a community has a disaster management plan in place that was initially 
designed to manage flood hazards, this same plan may not be as effective in the event of an 
earthquake. Given these concerns, and that I am only examining one hazard as part of the 
vulnerability index, flooding, I do not make the distinction between hazard-independent and 
hazard-dependent vulnerability parameters in the flood vulnerability index I construct.  
 While Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) fail to include income inequality in their 
quantitative vulnerability measure, other vulnerability scholars, following a political economy 
approach, do note a relationship between income inequality and vulnerability. The political 
economy approach focuses on the causes of vulnerability (Mearns and Norton 2010) and lists 
income inequality as having both direct and indirect links to vulnerability. Adger (1999:264), in 
his qualitative work assessing the vulnerability of coastal communities in Vietnam, explains how 
income inequality can result in “concentration of wealth and capital [,] restricting access of a 
larger proportion of the population from resources for buffering the impact of external shocks.” 
Adger shows that income inequality impacts vulnerability in two ways – through limiting access 
to resources, assets, and options, and through poverty. In Figure 2, Adger clearly defines the dual 
mechanisms that link income inequality and vulnerability. 
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Figure 2. Linking Inequality and Vulnerability 
Source: Adger 1999. 
 
 In this research I measure vulnerability using Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) 
quantitative approach and control for both income inequality and absolute poverty in the multi-
level regression model. This research design will test Adger’s (1999) and other political 
economists’ supposition that income inequality is a determinant of vulnerability, not simply due 
to poverty, but also due to the impacts of income inequality on social cohesion and resulting 
limits to resource access. In the next chapter, I describe in more detail the relationships theorized 
between income inequality, social cohesion, and resource access, drawing on the income 
inequality literature.  
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B. Data 
To measure vulnerability, hazard and exposure at the municipality level in Brazil, I draw 
on several data sources. To capture the socioeconomic parameters in the vulnerability index, I 
use household survey data from the 2010 Brazilian census, hosted in the Integrated Public Use 
Micro data Series (IPUMS) International database. These data are representative at the 
municipality level. To capture the health and education levels of each municipality, I use the 
health and education index scores from the Indice Firjan de Desenvolvimento Municipal 
(IFDM), the index of municipal development using 2010 data calculated by Sistema Firjan 
(Sistema Firjan 2012), a well-regarded research and development company. The index is widely 
used by the Brazilian government and other social science research institutes across Brazil. 
For parameters related to municipality infrastructure and governance, I use municipality 
data from the 2011 Perfil dos Municipios, a Brazilian municipality survey from the Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE). To determine whether a municipality is located in a 
low elevation coastal zone (LECZ), I use the LECZ spatial dataset, which defines LECZ as 
coastal areas ten meters or below sea level (McGranahan et al. 2007). The LECZ is measured as 
a contiguous band from the coast and extends inland until the elevation rises above ten meters. 
Thus, very flat deltas which extend inland, such as parts of Amazonia, are also included as part 
of the LECZ. These areas will surely be affected by sea-level rise, even though they are not 
located on the coast. For this reason, they are included as part of the LECZ. To calculate the 
proximity of the nearest primary road to each municipality, I use 2010 primary road data from 
the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE).     
To measure the flood hazard, I use inland flood frequency spatial data from the 2011 
Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR), which projects inland flood 
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frequency for a 100 year period based on previous flood occurrences, forecast precipitation 
levels and climate change projections. These projections are based on observed flooding between 
1999 and 2007 and do not take climate change forecasts explicitly into account. While GAR does 
also provide estimates of coastal flooding, I use LECZ data instead as the GAR estimates tend to 
underestimate coastal flooding6.  
To identify urban areas, I use satellite data of night time lights, a spatial dataset from the 
NOAA (2010). I combine urban area data with both the flood projection data and the LECZ data 
to approximate urban flood exposure.  
 In addition to flooding, Brazil is also susceptible to a host of other natural hazards 
including heat waves, epidemics, landslides, and drought (EM-DAT 2014). As this dissertation is 
only focused on flood hazard, I do not include measures of these other hazards in the calculation 
of disaster risk, with one exception -- landslides. Landslides can be triggered by increased 
precipitation, and often occur as either a result of flooding or in tandem with flooding 
(Geoscience Australia 2014). While I do not explicitly measure landslides as part of flood 
hazard, landslides which result from flooding could be captured in the flood hazard 
measurement. Landslides that result from other causes, such as earthquakes or increases in 
precipitation that do not cause flooding, are not captured by the flood hazard measurement.    
C. Methods: Constructing the Vulnerability Index 
 Measuring vulnerability to natural hazards in general, and flood hazard, more 
specifically, is not a cut and dry task (Barnett et al. 2008). While a variety of indexes exist at the 
individual, household, community, sub-national, national, and global levels (van Ruijven et al. 
                                                 
6 Deborah Balk, written correspondence, January 14th, 2015. 
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2014), there is little agreement in the literature on how best to capture this amorphous concept 
(Barnett et al. 2008). I choose to measure municipality vulnerability by constructing a 
municipality vulnerability index based on Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) vulnerability 
framework, which includes indicators at all levels: individual/household, administrative 
community, country, region and cultural community level. As this analysis aims to capture 
vulnerability at the municipality level, Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) framework, which 
includes both household and sub-national parameters, is particularly useful. The index I construct 
differs from Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) slightly in terms of disaggregation and scope. I 
do not distinguish between hazard-independent and hazard-dependent parameters, and do not 
include national or regional metrics. As this analysis focuses on differences in vulnerability 
levels across municipalities within a single country, I do not include measures at these more 
aggregated levels of geography.  
 An ideal vulnerability index would include measurable indicators of all dimensions of 
vulnerability. Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) cite these as: physical, economic, social, 
educational, political, institutional, cultural, environmental, and ideological. Unfortunately, data 
constraints force most researchers to capture only a fraction of these dimensions. More 
problematic is that there is no fully reliable way to test whether any vulnerability index is truly 
capturing what it is meant to capture. One method is looking at damage or mortality reports post-
hazard, and measuring whether those areas most affected by a disaster had been characterized as 
more vulnerable (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003). However, damage reports are typically only 
available for larger geographic areas, i.e., at the country or state level. It is also difficult to 
compare the magnitude of various natural hazards. For example, if an area classified as less 
vulnerable had minimal flood damage, as compared to an area labeled more vulnerable, this 
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could lend validity to the vulnerability index. However, this damage differential could also be 
due to the fact that the hazard was more severe in the more vulnerable area (Desinventar 2014).   
 Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich do acknowledge that data at the sub-national level can be 
hard to obtain. Therefore, vulnerability measures are destined to fall short of the level of 
precision desired by researchers. Due to data constraints, I am unable to include all indicators 
suggested by Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich into the municipality flood vulnerability index for 
Brazil. The parameters and related indicators I include are listed in the following table.  
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Table II-4. Urban Municipality Flood Vulnerability Index 
Parameter Indicator 
Age %  of non-working age population (<15 and >64) 
Income Log of median equivalized household income, % 
below the absolute poverty line 
Health % disabled, IFDM health indicator (composite 
health indicator)  
Education IFDM education indicator (composite education 
indicator) 
Savings % of owner-occupied homes; % not working 
Neighborhood network/access to 
information 
% with mobile phone, % with TVs, % with 
radios 
Presence and quality of civil protection Housing/ Land-use plan 
Disaster preparedness Risk plan for environmental hazards  
Degree of autonomy/participation in 
decision making procedures and access to 
resources 
Presence of slums, presence of tenements, 
presence of informal settlements 
Preparedness for floods Regulation relating to floods 
Infrastructure/accessibility Distance of municipality to primary road, % with 
automobile 
Quality and size of building  % of households constructed with low-quality 
building material, average household size 
Location of dwelling Municipality in low elevation coastal zone 
Crowding Population density 
Hygiene % of households with piped drinking water, % of 
households with sewage disposal system 
  
1. A Discussion of Vulnerability Parameters and Indicators 
 Age: Children and the elderly are more vulnerable to flood hazard as it is more 
difficult for them to quickly find higher ground (Bartlett 2008). They are also smaller 
in stature and therefore more susceptible to drowning. Therefore, municipalities with 
lower percentages of children and elderly will be less vulnerable to flooding. 
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Municipalities with a higher percentage of working-age population (15-64) are also 
less economically vulnerable as they have more people available to work to recoup 
economic losses.  
 Income: Income determines an individual’s ability to both prepare for a flood and 
rebuild - the higher the income, the more capable a person is of restoring damaged 
areas or protecting herself from flooding. I calculate the equivalized household 
income, as opposed to per-capita household income, as equivalized income takes 
economies of scale within a household into account7. I measure equivalized 
household income with the median, not the mean income, as the median better 
captures the typical income level when there are high levels of income inequality. I 
use the log of equivalized median income to account for the fact that the relationship 
between vulnerability and income is not strictly linear. As incomes increase, each 
additional dollar of income has diminishing influence on household vulnerability. I 
also include a measure of the percent of the population classified as “poor.” I use the 
OECD definition of “poor” for Latin America (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 2013), those living on less than 4 2005 USD per day at 
purchasing power parity. As equivalized household income is a measure of monthly 
income, I define the “poor” as those living on less than R$ 233.51 per month. While 
this is a widely used measure of absolute poverty, it can also be misleading. Even an 
income of twice that level will not provide a decent standard of living in the 
expensive urban areas of Rio de Janeiro. In a personal interview, on December 9th 
                                                 
7 Households have both fixed and variable costs. Each additional household member 
significantly increases only variable costs, such as food, clothing and school fees. Fixed costs, 
such as rent or mortgage payments, remain unchanged. 
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2014, Patrick, a tour guide at “Be a Local” favela tours, explained that a 150 square 
foot room in the Rocinha favela rents for R$ 400 per month.8   
 Health: The physical health of individuals also contributes to their ability to both 
escape and/or recover from floods. Disabled and unhealthy people are more 
vulnerable than healthy individuals. In developing countries, health services are often 
not as advanced. Public health knowledge is also lacking (Montgomery and Hewett 
2005). This dearth of both sufficient health knowledge and services can leave people 
more vulnerable. To measure health, I use two indicators, the percent of the 
municipality population that is disabled, and the IFDM health indicator (Sistema - 
Federação das Indústrias do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Sistema Firjan 2012). The 
IFDM is the Indice Firjan de Desenvolvimento Municipal, or the index of municipal 
development calculated by Sistema Firjan, a well-regarded research and development 
company. The index is widely used by the Brazilian government and other social 
science research institutes across Brazil. The IFDM health measure is comprised of 
three indicators: percent of women with more than six prenatal visits per live birth, 
number of deaths from ill-defined causes and death rate of children under five from 
preventable causes. These indicators speak to the level/quality of health knowledge 
and services available in the municipality. Each component of the IFDM health index 
is given equal weight and the final composite IFDM health indicator ranges from zero 
to one.  
 Education: The level and quality of education of a population is highly indicative of 
its vulnerability. A more highly educated population has the knowledge to mitigate 
                                                 
8 Patrick, personal interview, December 9th, 2014, Rocinha, Rio de Janerio, Brazil.  
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flood damage and implement feasible solutions to rebuild wisely after the fact 
(Brooks, Adger, and Kelly 2005). I use the IFDM measure of education, which is 
comprised of six components of varying weights (Sistema Firjan 2012). The 
individual components and their weights are as follows: pre-school education (20 
percent), age-grade distortion, i.e., the percent of children who are older than the 
average student in that grade should be (10 percent), percent of faculty with advanced 
credentials (15 percent), average hours a day in class (15 percent), drop-out rate (15 
percent), and average score on the IDEB (the index of basic education development, 
the national exams for proficiency in language and mathematics) (25 percent). The 
IFDM education index is calculated according to the above weights and scores, and as 
with the metric for health, ranges from zero to one.   
 Savings: The wealth of the population is directly related to how capable they are of 
recovering from a flood (McGranahan et al. 2007). Unfortunately, data on wealth and 
savings at the municipality level are unavailable. I use two indicators to approximate 
savings: percent unemployed or inactive9 and percent of owner-occupied homes. 
These are the closest indicators available that help to capture wealth. The 
unemployment rate is related to savings as those who are unemployed need to deplete 
their savings to meet their basic needs. When unemployment rates fall, savings rates 
tend to rise (Federal Statistics Office 2014). Home-ownership is a proxy for wealth as 
owner-occupied housing is often a Latin American’s sole asset (De Ferranti et al. 
2004). Home owners are also more likely to both protect their home and rebuild it 
after a flood, given, of course, that they have the available resources.  
                                                 
9 I include both those unemployed and those not in the labor force for this measure. 
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 Neighborhood network/Access to information: The ability to access pertinent hazard 
information keenly influences vulnerability. Flood warnings are often broadcast over 
mass-media channels. To capture information access, I use three separate indicators: 
the percent of households with mobile phones, the percent of households with TVs, 
and the percent of households with radios.  
 Governance measures: The institutional infrastructure of a municipality also greatly 
influences its level of vulnerability. Well-prepared municipalities with strong 
governance structures will have a greater capacity to prepare for, and recover from 
flooding (Puppim de Oliveira 2009). Assessing the quality and efficacy of institutions 
is difficult and only indirect measures are available. The indicators I select record 
whether particular policies are in place. They cannot, unfortunately, lend insight into 
the quality of the policy design or the level of implementation.  
o Presence and quality of civil protection: The selected indicator, presence of a 
housing/land use plan, relates to flooding as municipalities with a land use 
plan will mark flood prone areas as unavailable for development. Land use 
plans also are designed to minimize soil erosion, another factor which can 
exacerbate flooding (McGranahan et al. 2007).   
o Disaster preparedness: The presence of a risk plan for environmental hazards 
is a good indicator of whether a municipality has policies in place to manage 
hazards. As flooding is the most common natural hazard in Brazil (EM-DAT 
2014), it is likely that the risk plan is designed to take flooding into account, 
except possibly in the most arid regions.  
50 
 
o Degree of autonomy/participation in decision making procedures and access 
to resources: Although there is no direct measure of this parameter, I use the 
presence of slums, tenements and informal housing to indicate the degree of 
participation and access to resources. This indicator selection is based on 
literature (National Research Council 2003) which notes how informal 
settlements and slums are often treated as silos and have little access to 
government support and resources. While slums are also often an indicator of 
poverty, their existence speaks to the level of support government institutions 
are providing. The existence of illegal settlements suggests that the 
government is not evenly distributing municipal resources to all residents. 
Slum dwellers are mostly excluded from municipal supports (McGranahan et 
al. 2013). 
o Preparedness for floods: Whether or not a municipality has dedicated policies 
to address flooding is an important measure of vulnerability. Those 
municipalities that have taken concrete steps towards reducing flood risk, such 
as building sea walls, are likely to be less vulnerable to flooding in the future.  
 Infrastructure/accessibility: The ability to flee a flood zone quickly as well as receive 
supplies post-flood are contributing factors to the vulnerability of a municipality. 
Areas far from major highways may become isolated from humanitarian aid. Public 
transport may be limited. I use distance to primary road and percent of households 
with their own automobile to capture this parameter.  I considered including a 
measure of public transport, however, this indicator would also be imperfect. Even 
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high quality public transport systems may be affected by flooding, as with the New 
York City subway system during Hurricane Sandy. 
 Quality and size of building: The quality of the walls of a home will determine how 
susceptible the dwelling is to flood damage. To measure building quality, I create a 
binary variable of whether the primary material used to construct the walls is 
“substantial”. I code homes without walls, walls made from reused materials, wood, 
plant-based materials and coated clay/mud with sticks as “not-substantial,” and walls 
made from brick with plaster, brick without plaster, and unfinished lather and plaster 
as “substantial.” Those homes made from walls of “other material” (0.3 percent of the 
sample), I code as missing data. Although this coding system is admittedly basic, it is 
a proxy for building quality and will distinguish between homes that are more or less 
vulnerable to flood damage. I also include a measure of average household size as 
larger households have more people at risk. 
 Location of dwelling: A municipality’s elevation and proximity to the coast 
determine how vulnerable a municipality is to coastal flooding. Those municipalities 
in low elevation coastal zones, defined as zones with an elevation of 10 meters or 
below sea level, are more vulnerable to coastal flooding. I identify municipalities in 
LECZ (low elevation coastal zone) using the LECZ spatial data set (McGranahan et 
al. 2007). I code a municipality as a LECZ if any part of the municipality falls within 
the LECZ.  
 Crowding: I include a measure of population density, as more densely populated 
urban municipalities will likely incur more damage in the event of flooding. There is 
some evidence that population density may also reduce vulnerability. In higher 
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income countries, high density areas are often highly developed urban area with 
advanced risk plans. In developing countries, scholars have argued that it is easier to 
target aid in densely populated areas (Martine and Schensul 2013). However, in 
Brazil, more densely populated areas include overcrowded areas, where evacuation 
can be more difficult (Perlman 2011). For this reason I include population density as 
an indicator which increases vulnerability. 
 Hygiene: Both the condition of water and sanitation infrastructure are important 
measures of vulnerability. Residents of municipalities without piped water and 
sewage disposal systems are more at risk for dehydration and water-borne illness in 
the case of floods (Bartlett 2008). I measure municipality hygiene using two 
indicators: the percent of households with piped drinking water, and the percent of 
households with a sewage disposal system. 
2. Relating Vulnerability Indicators and Income Inequality 
 While some components of vulnerability are due to demographic variation, such as age, 
others are theorized to be the consequences of income inequality. As mentioned in the previous 
section, income inequality may affect vulnerability both directly through absolute poverty and 
indirectly through uneven resource access. Almost all parameters in the index, except for age, 
measure either direct or indirect resource access. Parameters such as income, percent 
unemployed, quality of building material and owner-occupied home may be influenced by elites 
governing in their best interest, keeping wage increases and skilled job growth as low priorities, 
thus prolonging poverty and inhibiting social mobility (Portes 2010). Access to high-quality 
health care, water, sanitation, education, information and infrastructure may also be controlled by 
elite groups, and therefore may be affected by income inequality (Weinstein 1982).  
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Similarly, governance measures are related to income inequality such that elites may not 
find it worthwhile to divert municipality funds towards public safety measures, given that they 
are capable of protecting their own properties using their own private funds. This phenomenon of 
high-income households “opting-out” of paying for public services is well-documented in the 
income inequality literature (Frank 2007). The presence of slums, tenements and informal 
housing speak to the spatial segregation and breakdown in social cohesion which are theorized to 
be consequences of income inequity. This leaves lower income families to settle far from the 
high-income families and decisions makers, often in areas prone to flooding. Although certain 
favelas in Rio de Janeiro are in the city center, many informal settlements in Brazil are located in 
city outskirts, in flood prone areas, with limited access to resources, and off the radar of public 
officials who ultimately decide how municipality resources are allocated (Baptista and Adamo 
2014). While some elites do also choose to settle in areas with a high risk of flooding, or high 
elevation coastal areas with steep slopes, which are prone to landslides, elites are also in a 
financial position to construct their properties using state-of-the-art, disaster resistant 
construction materials and designs (McGranahan et al. 2007). In the unfortunate event that their 
homes are destroyed, they are able to rebuild. Elites may also be more capable than favela 
residents of directing government resources toward protecting their properties, even when they 
are built in environmentally sensitive locations (Adger 1999; Puppim de Oliveira 2009).  
3. Building the Index using Factor Analysis  
To create the vulnerability index, first I normalize each indicator following the United 
Nations Human Development Index (UN HDI) method and scale each indicator to a value of 0 to 
1.  
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Normalized value =   
actual value − minimum value
maximum value −  minimum value
 
 While there are several methods for normalizing values for indexes (Nicoletti, Scarpetta, 
and Boylaud 1999), I follow the UN HDI method as it is commonly used in the vulnerability 
literature (Romero-Lankao, Qin, and Borbor-Cordova  2013). As some indicators in the analysis 
are binary, I use a polychoric correlation matrix, rather than the standard factor analysis matrix 
based on Pearson’s correlations, which assumes all indicators are continuous.  
I follow Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley’s (2003) method of using factor analysis to generate 
synthetic components and use an additive model to create a vulnerability index score for each 
municipality. I follow the Kaiser criterion and only keep factors with eigenvalues of 1 or above. 
Although there are several “stopping rule” options for deciding which factors to keep when using 
factor analysis, the Kaiser criterion is a commonly used method. The justification for this 
approach is that each factor should explain more variance that any single indicator (Nardo et al. 
2005).  
Next I rotate the factors using the “varimax rotation” to maximize ease of interpretation 
of each factor. The aim of the rotation is to minimize the number of indicators that have high 
loading (i.e., high correlation) with the factor. This aids in interpreting the factor as each factor 
can be categorized as representative of an underlying process or concept which encapsulates the 
indicators with the highest loadings. Table II-5 below lists descriptive statistics for each 
normalized indicator. Table II-6 lists the associated, rotated factor score. Table II-7 groups the 
indicators based on their factor correlations. Three concepts emerge from the factor analysis as 
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the main drivers of vulnerability to flooding: socioeconomic status (Factor 1), infrastructure 
(Factor 2) and poor governance (Factor 3)   
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Table II-5. Descriptive Statistics of Vulnerability Index Indicators  
Normalized Indicator Mean SD 
% of non-working age population 0.36 0.14 
Log of median equivalized household income 0.56 0.16 
% below the absolute poverty line 0.23 0.19 
% disabled 0.41 0.17 
IFDM health indicator (composite health indicator) 0.63 0.20 
IFDM education indicator(composite education indicator) 0.57 0.21 
% of owner-occupied homes 0.48 0.15 
% unemployed or inactive 0.47 0.16 
% with mobile phone 0.81 0.16 
% with TV 0.88 0.13 
% with radio 0.78 0.14 
Housing/land-use plan 0.42 0.49 
Environmental risk management plan 0.15 0.36 
Presence of slums  0.35 0.48 
Presence of tenements 0.25 0.43 
Presence of informal settlements 0.76 0.43 
Specific actions taken to reduce flood risk 0.57 0.50 
Minimum distance to main road 0.04 0.13 
% with automobile 0.44 0.25 
% of households constructed with low quality building material 0.11 0.18 
Average # of people per household 0.20 0.12 
Municipality in low elevation coastal zone (LECZ) 0.18 0.38 
Population density(pop/area) 0.01 0.04 
% of households with piped drinking water  0.87 0.19 
% of households with sewage system 0.60 0.29 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 2011; 
IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007. 
57 
 
Table II-6. Factor Correlations 
Normalized Indicator Socioeconomic 
Status 
Correlation 
Infrastructure 
Correlation  
Poor 
Governance 
Correlation  
%  of non-working age population -0.88 -0.20 -0.11 
Log of median equivalized household 
income 
0.97 -0.08 0.10 
% below the absolute poverty line -0.95 -0.01 -0.08 
% Disabled -0.51 0.42 0.01 
 IFDM health indicator (composite health 
indicator) 
0.78 0.20 -0.03 
IFDM education indicator(composite 
education indicator) 
0.78 0.14 -0.12 
% of owner-occupied homes -0.45 -0.19 0.19 
% unemployed or inactive -0.90 0.16 0.00 
% with mobile phone 0.79 0.16 0.18 
% with TV 0.67 0.49 0.14 
% with radio 0.71 0.32 0.01 
Housing/land-use plan 0.24 -0.08 0.14 
Environmental risk management plan 0.16 0.09 0.58 
Presence of slums  0.01 -0.05 0.64 
Presence of tenements 0.08 0.09 0.43 
Presence of informal settlements 0.17 -0.11 0.41 
Specific actions taken to reduce flood risk 0.27 0.11 0.52 
Minimum distance to main road -0.21 -0.69 -0.04 
 % with automobile 0.95 -0.03 -0.04 
% of households constructed with low 
quality building material 
-0.13 -0.76 0.02 
Average # of people per household -0.77 -0.38 0.09 
Municipality in low elevation coastal zone -0.16 0.05 0.48 
Population density(pop/area) 0.06 -0.01 0.55 
% of hholds with piped drinking water  0.79 0.24 0.06 
% of hholds with sewage system 0.67 0.29 0.11 
Eigenvalue (Variance) 9.55 2.10 2.08 
Cumulative Variance Explained 0.61 0.74 0.88 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 2011; 
IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007. 
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Table II-7. Indicators by Factor: Ordered by Factor Correlation Score                       
Factor 1:           
Socioeconomic 
status        
 Factor 2: 
Infrastructure 
 Factor 3: Poor 
Governance  
 
Log of median 
equivalized hh 
income 
0.97 % of hh constructed 
with low quality  
building material 
-0.76 Presence of slums 0.64 
% below absolute 
poverty line 
-0.95 Minimum distance 
to main road 
-0.69 Environmental risk 
plan 
0.58 
 % with 
automobile 
0.95   Population density 0.55 
% unemployed or 
inactive 
-0.90   Actions taken to 
reduce flood risk 
0.52 
%  of non-working 
age population  
-0.88   Municipality in 
LECZ 
0.48 
% with mobile 
phone 
0.79   Presence of 
tenements 
0.43 
% of hh with piped 
water  
0.79   Presence of 
informal 
settlements 
0.41 
IFDM education 
indicator 
0.78     
 IFDM health 
indicator  
0.78     
Average # of 
people per hh 
-0.77     
% of hh with radio 0.71     
% of hh with TV 0.67     
% of hh with 
sewage  system 
0.67     
Housing/land-use 
plan 
0.24     
% of owner-
occupied homes 
-0.45     
% Disabled -0.51     
      
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 2011; 
IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007. 
Factor 1: Socioeconomic Status 
 The first factor, which I label socioeconomic status, explains 61 percent of the variance 
across municipalities. Indicators that highly, positively correlate with Factor 1 include median 
income, percent of households with automobile, and percent of households with mobile phones 
and piped drinking water. Percent in absolute poverty and percent not working highly, negatively 
59 
 
correlate to Factor 1. Education and health scores highly, positively correlate with Factor 1, also 
markers of socioeconomic status. Given the correlation values, Factor 1 is considered a measure 
of socioeconomic status, where a higher Factor 1 score indicates lower vulnerability. 
Factor 2: Infrastructure 
 The second factor, which I term infrastructure, explains 13 percent of the variance across 
municipalities. Indicators highly, negatively correlated with Factor 2 include the percentage of 
households constructed from poor quality building material and the minimum distance to a main 
road (the higher the value, the further the distance from a main road). Factor 2, like Factor 1 is 
thus classified as a measure which indicates lower vulnerability.  
Factor 3: Poor Governance   
 The third and final retained factor, which explains 13 percent of the variance across 
municipalities, I describe as a measure of poor governance. Indicators which positively and 
highly correlate with Factor 3 include the presence of slums, tenements, informal settlements, 
location within a LECZ and population density. The presence of an environmental risk plan and 
specific measures enacted to reduce flood risk also correlate positively with Factor 3, but to a 
lesser degree than the “slums” indicator. This could be because many of the densely populated, 
low elevation areas along the coast are also among the largest, most developed municipalities 
and therefore have more advanced policies. As the majority (though not all) of the indicators 
which correlate positively and highly with Factor 3 increase vulnerability, Factor 3 is considered 
a measure which indicates higher vulnerability. 
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4. Weighting and Combining Factors to Create the Final Index Score 
Each factor generated by the factor analysis explains a different proportion of the total 
variance across municipalities. Combined, the three factors explain 88 percent of the variance 
across municipalities. I use an equal weighting method to aggregate the factors. Although there 
are many possible options for weighing factors, equal weighting is preferred in the absence of 
strong theoretical support for weighting one factor over another (Cutter et al. 2003). Another 
weighting method, used by Nicoletti et al. (1999), is to weight factors based on the cumulative 
variance explained by each factor. This method however prioritizes variation in indicators across 
municipalities over actual contribution of the given indicator toward the overall vulnerability of 
the municipality. For example, the factor highly correlated with income may explain more 
variance between municipalities than the factor highly correlated with presence of slums, but 
socioeconomic status may not necessarily be more indicative of vulnerability than presence of 
slums. For this reason, I follow Cutter et. al. (2003) approach and given equal weight to each 
factor when aggregating to create the final index. I aggregate the three factors as follows: 
Factor 3 - Factor 2 - Factor 1= Vulnerability Index Score 
 I subtract Factors 1 and 2 from Factor 3 as Factors 1 and 2 indicate lower vulnerability 
while Factor 3 indicates higher vulnerability. The final vulnerability index score is, therefore, a 
measure of vulnerability such that a higher score indicates a higher level of vulnerability. I also 
conduct my analysis on each factor separately to gain a better understanding of which 
components of vulnerability, if any, are tied to income inequality. 
 Factor analysis, commonly used as an exploratory research tool to reduce a lengthy list of 
collinear variables into a more manageable size, has become an increasing common technique 
for constructing indexes of socioeconomic status and wellbeing (Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006). 
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Critics suggest that the method is arbitrary as it relies too heavily on subjective conclusions by 
the researcher. It is, after all, up to the researcher to assign a specific “concept” to each factor, 
rather than simply construct the index by aggregating each specific indicator. However, any 
index construction technique requires a measure of subjectivity.  Decisions about which 
indicators to include and how each should be weighted are never cut and dry. Researchers 
constructing indexes using factor analysis, much like those using more straightforward 
aggregation techniques, need to be guided by theory and the literature to ensure their indexes 
truly reflect the social conditions they aim to capture. By constructing the index using 
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich’s (2006) vulnerability framework and parameters, I am closely 
following the prescriptions of the vulnerability literature. Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) also 
recommend using factor analysis to aggregate the indicators in their vulnerability framework. 
While factor analysis has its critics, it is also acknowledged as a useful way to identify 
which indicators are most valuable (Cutter et al. 2003; Nardo et al. 2005; Schneiderbauer and 
Ehrlich 2006).When building an index which attempts to capture a complex social situation, such 
as vulnerability, it is certain that indicators will be correlated with each other. Factor analysis is 
recognized as one method of ensuring that all factors used in the index are adding new 
information and explanatory power.  
 Another common method for aggregating sub-indicators and determining weights is the 
multiple linear regression model. This method however assumes independence across the sub-
indicators. When sub-indicators are correlated, as with those used in this analysis, the multiple 
linear regression model technique is inappropriate.  
To test the sensitivity of the vulnerability index to alternative aggregation and weighting 
methods, I re-construct the index using an alternative method, an additive approach. The results 
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of the sensitivity analysis suggest that the selection of aggregation method does not significantly 
alter results. The vulnerability scores under the alternative aggregation method were highly 
correlated with those obtained using the factor analysis method. A summary of the sensitivity 
analysis and results are described in Appendix A. Sensitivity Analysis 
 This dissertation aims to test whether income inequality, apart from its relationship to 
absolute poverty, is a determinant of municipality vulnerability. This is challenging to test 
empirically as vulnerability, absolute poverty and certain measures of income inequality are all 
correlated. It is possible, however, to be poor and less vulnerable than others who are equally 
poor, depending on social structural components. This is the argument Klinenberg (2002) makes 
in Heat Wave, where he shows how lower income residents in a tight-knit community fared 
much better during the Chicago heat wave than equally low-income residents living in a 
community with weaker social ties. Capturing this phenomenon using the vulnerability index 
above surely has its difficulties. One may make the argument that many indicators in the index 
are often correlated with poverty and therefore it is not possible to cleanly distinguish between 
the effects of income inequality and poverty on vulnerability. For this reason, when I run 
regression models to test whether income inequality is a predictor of vulnerability, I control for 
the percentage of the population within each municipality that falls below the absolute poverty 
line. I also test income inequality as a predictor using several different measures of income 
inequality which are not correlated with absolute poverty. This approach allows for the model to 
parse out the effects of absolute poverty vs. income inequality on vulnerability.  
Admittedly, this is not a perfect solution. One could argue that absolute poverty is an 
endogenous variable, such that at higher levels of vulnerability to flooding, absolute poverty 
increases. While this may be true in some areas, it does not have to be the case. Many areas that 
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are vulnerable to future flooding as a result of increasing climate change have not yet weathered 
a flood. As such, although one can imagine scenarios where the flood vulnerability level has 
influenced the absolute poverty level, this is not necessarily the case for each municipality under 
analysis.  
 When modelling complex social phenomena with social scientific quantitative models, it 
is often challenging to define unequivocally every independent variable in the model as strictly 
exogenous. The best one can do is to test several different model specifications, acknowledge the 
model limitations and draw on social theory to support the empirical findings. 
D. Mapping vulnerability 
 In the above factor analysis, I calculate municipality vulnerability based on certain 
municipality characteristics, but do not explicitly consider the spatial component of vulnerability 
to flooding. Tobler's First Law of Geography states that "everything is related to everything else, 
but near things are more related than distant things" (Tobler 1970).  Flood hazard (frequency and 
severity of flooding) is not randomly distributed in space, and thus, according to Tobler’s law, 
can create a situation where vulnerable municipalities may be clustered together in space. For 
example, if there is a flood in a particular region, neighboring municipalities may be jointly 
exposed, and therefore have fewer available resources in neighboring areas to draw upon. This 
was the case in the Chicago heat wave (Klinenberg 2002). Spatial dependence can also arise due 
to regional geographies. For example, some areas of the country are more developed and 
prosperous than others. The Northern part of the country lies within the Amazon rainforest while 
the arid Northeast has historically had lower levels of economic development than the more 
affluent Southeast. Lastly, the political economy of a state may be responsible for spatial 
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dependence. Municipalities within the same state are subject to the same political environment 
which may be influencing their vulnerability levels in similar ways.  
 Map 1 identifies Brazilian coastlines and national boundaries to place the 1276 urban 
municipalities under analysis within the larger geography of South America. Map 2 shows urban 
areas within urban municipalities, as identified by night time lights data (NOAA 2010). Urban 
municipalities are those with over 20,000 residents and at least 50 percent of households 
categorized as urban. While some rural municipalities do have urban areas, only urban areas 
within urban municipalities are displayed in Map 210.  
  
                                                 
10 In Appendix B. Identifying Urban Areas within Urban Municipalities, I examine an alternative 
method of identifying urban areas within municipalities using Brazilian census tracts designated 
as urban, as opposed to night time lights data. I compare a map of night time lights urban extents 
with an urban census tract map and describe why I selected night time lights data to define urban 
areas, rather than census tract data.  
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Map 1. South America 
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Map 2. Urban Areas of Brazil 
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1. Analysis of Spatial Dependence of Vulnerability 
To identify whether there is, in fact, spatial dependence, I map municipality vulnerability 
scores using ArcGIS software. Map 3 displays the distribution of vulnerability scores across 
municipalities. It is clear that there is a spatial pattern to vulnerability scores. Municipalities in 
the Northern areas appear significantly more vulnerable, compared to those in the Southeast.  
It is important to note that there is a significant differential between municipality land 
area and municipality population size in Brazil. Although the large (in terms of land area) 
municipalities in the North are highly vulnerable, they are also less populated than those in the 
Southeast. To capture the distribution of vulnerable populations across Brazilian municipalities, I 
map vulnerability score by population size in Map 4. In subsequent maps, in an effort to reduce 
clutter, I do not include population counts. I ask the reader to keep this population differential in 
mind, however, when examining future maps.  
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Map 3. Flood Vulnerability in Urban Municipalities of Brazil 
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Map 4. Flood Vulnerability by Population Size in Urban Municipalities  
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Next I map each component of vulnerability separately in Map 5, Map 6 and Map 7. 
Socioeconomic status displays strong spatial dependence. The infrastructure and governance 
components of vulnerability appear to be more randomly distributed in space. 
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Map 5. Socioeconomic Status 
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Map 6. Infrastructure Quality 
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Map 7. Governance Score 
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To test whether the observed spatial dependencies in the overall vulnerability score and 
its components are statistically significant, I calculate a commonly used measure of spatial 
autocorrelation (the degree to which neighboring vulnerability scores are similar or dissimilar), 
the Global Moran’s I. I use inverse distance for the calculations, which means that neighboring 
municipalities have a greater influence on a given municipality score than municipalities that are 
farther away (Lloyd 2010). The Global Moran’s I score for the vulnerability index is 0.51 with a 
p-value of 0.00. This indicates significant, positive spatial autocorrelation of vulnerability scores. 
I also calculate the Global Moran’s I score for each component of vulnerability. The results are 
listed on each map and summarized in the Table II-8 below. While all components of 
vulnerability have some degree of spatial dependence, the socioeconomic status factor has the 
most while the governance factor has the least. 
Table II-8. Spatial Autocorrelation of Vulnerability and Its Three Components 
Measure Global Moran's I P-Value 
Flood Vulnerability Index 0.51 0.00 
Socioeconomic Status 0.77 0.00 
Infrastructure 0.30 0.00 
Poor Governance 0.24 0.00 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 2011; 
IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007. 
 In Map 8 I display another measure of spatial autocorrelation, the Anselin Local Moran’s 
I values. This spatial statistic is a type of cluster analysis and identifies whether neighboring 
municipalities have similarly high (high-high) or similarly low (low-low) vulnerability scores 
(Lloyd 2010). It also displays outliers, those municipalities which are different from their 
neighbors, i.e., a municipality with a low score surrounded by high scores (low-high) and 
municipalities with high scores surrounded by low scoring municipalities (high-low). It is clear 
that there is significant clustering of municipality vulnerability scores. The municipalities in the 
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North and Northeast regions have high vulnerability scores while those in the Southeast have 
lower scores. There are some outliers however. In the Southeast, for example, some 
municipalities are high-low, i.e., those with higher scores are surrounded by those with lower 
scores. The Northeast has some low-high areas, municipalities with lower scores surrounded by 
those with higher scores. 
76 
 
 
Map 8. Vulnerability Cluster Analysis: Local Moran's I 
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2. Analysis of Flood Risk: Vulnerability, Hazard and Exposure  
 It is important to recall that in this dissertation I define vulnerability apart from hazard 
and exposure, following the risk triangle framework (Crichton 1999). In Map 9 I display flood 
hazards across all municipalities. Flood hazard is captured in two ways: the number of likely 
floods a municipality is projected to experience in the next 100 years, and whether a municipality 
is located within a low elevation coastal zone (LECZ). LECZs are considered flood hazards as 
these zones are at risk of flooding from sea-level rise and storm surges as a result of climate 
change (McGranahan et al. 2007). In Brazil, however, LECZs are not strictly coastal zones. 
These areas also include low elevation inland delta areas that will be impacted by sea-level rise 
and storm surges.11 The flood frequency projections are calculated by the Global Assessment 
Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR 2011).  
                                                 
11 The location of the municipality in a low elevation coastal zone is also an element in the 
vulnerability index. In the context of climate change, LECZ is both a marker of vulnerability and 
flood exposure as sea levels are predicted to rise in the coming years due to increasing 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
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            Map 9. Flood Hazards in Brazil  
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 I combine flood hazard, flood exposure and flood vulnerability in Map 10 to display 
those municipalities with high, overall flood risk. I define high flood risk municipalities as those 
municipalities with a high or very high vulnerability index score, a significant flood hazard and 
urban areas exposed to flood hazards. Urban areas are identified using night time lights data, 
which were captured using satellites.  
 Flood exposure is represented by whether the urban areas within a municipality are 
exposed to flood hazards. Urban municipalities with urban areas located either within an LECZ 
or which are projected to flood more than twice in 100 years are considered to have high flood 
exposure. In Appendix C. Identifying Urban Flood Exposure Using Spatial Methods, I describe 
how I identify urban areas with flood exposure using spatial data conditioning methods in 
ArcGIS (Lloyd 2010). 207 urban municipalities are exposed to coastal flooding, i.e., have urban 
areas located within a LECZ. 670 urban municipalities are exposed to moderate inland flooding, 
i.e., have urban areas projected to flood at least twice in 100 years, and 129 urban municipalities 
are exposed to severe inland flooding, i.e. have urban areas projected to flood 4 or more times in 
100 years. 
Urban municipalities with larger populations also have higher exposure, compared to those 
with smaller populations. Although population is not captured in Map 10, it is listed in the 
accompanying table. The exposed population figures listed in the table are the total number of 
people in urban households within each municipality. These population counts are calculated 
from 2010 census tract data. Over 41.3 million urban residents, approximately 26 percent of the 
urban population and 22 percent of the total population of Brazil, are located in municipalities 
with high flood risk. 
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          Map 10. Urban Municipalities with High Flood Risk  
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  In Appendix D. Close up Maps of Flood Risks, maps for high flood risk municipalities in 
the Northeast and Southeast of Brazil are displayed. Table II-9 corresponds to Map 10 and lists 
those urban municipalities designated as high flood risk. These 83 municipalities have a 
vulnerability index score at least one standard deviation above the mean and have urban areas 
located within an LECZ and/or urban areas which are projected to flood more than twice in 100 
years. Municipalities numbered 1 through 69 are those with urban areas located within a LECZ 
but not projected to have more than two floods in the next 100 years. Municipalities numbered 
70 through 83 are those with urban areas projected to flood more than twice in 100 years. The 
first six municipalities listed in the table are those with urban areas exposed to both types of 
flood hazards, i.e., urban areas located within an LECZ and urban areas projected to flood more 
than twice in the next 100 years. The subsequent high risk municipalities are listed in descending 
order by urban population count.  
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Table II-9. High Flood Risk Urban Municipalities 
Map 
number Municipality State 
Vulnerability 
index score 
Urban 
population 
# of total 
projected 
floods in 
urban 
areas 
# of urban 
areas in 
LECZ 
81 Porto Alegre 
Rio Grande do 
Sul 0.66 1409351 41 3 
82 Sapucaia do Sul 
Rio Grande do 
Sul 0.69 130469 17 1 
70 Camocim Ceará 0.71 44657 13 1 
77 Laranjal do Jari Amapá 1.17 37904 4 1 
80 Portão 
Rio Grande do 
Sul 0.78 25276 17 1 
78 Almeirim Pará 1.25 19965 4 1 
79 São Paulo São Paulo 0.8 11152344 19 0 
60 Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro 0.96 6320446 2 1 
16 Salvador Bahia 0.95 2674923 0 1 
17 Fortaleza Ceará 0.69 2452185 2 1 
29 Recife Pernambuco 0.65 1537704 2 1 
47 Belém Pará 0.99 1381475 0 1 
61 São Gonçalo Rio de Janeiro 0.75 998999 0 1 
20 São Luís Maranhão 0.78 958522 0 1 
1 Maceió Alagoas 0.97 932129 2 1 
34 Natal 
 Rio Grande do 
Norte 0.8 803739 2 1 
58 Nova Iguaτu Rio de Janeiro 0.75 787563 2 1 
26 Jaboatão dos Guararapes Pernambuco 0.88 630595 0 1 
36 Aracaju Sergipe 0.78 571149 0 1 
46 Ananindeua Pará 0.68 470819 0 1 
62 São João de Meriti Rio de Janeiro 0.94 458673 0 1 
64 Santos São Paulo 0.79 419086 0 1 
56 Campos dos Goytacazes Rio de Janeiro 0.67 418725 2 1 
53 Serra Espírito Santo 0.8 406450 2 1 
68 Florianópolis Santa Catarina 0.65 405286 0 1 
39 Macap Amapá 0.97 381214 2 3 
27 Olinda Pernambuco 0.86 370332 0 1 
54 Vitória Espírito Santo 0.79 327801 2 1 
28 Paulista Pernambuco 0.93 300466 0 1 
63 Guarujá São Paulo 0.83 290696 0 1 
65 Novo Hamburgo Rio Grande do Sul 0.65 234798 2 1 
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6 Camaçari Bahia 1.06 231973 2 1 
51 Santarém Pará 0.79 215790 2 1 
66 São Leopoldo Rio Grande do Sul 0.68 213238 2 1 
57 Macaé Rio de Janeiro 0.83 202859 2 1 
35 Parnamirim 
 Rio Grande do 
Norte 0.85 202456 0 1 
69 Itaja Santa Catarina 0.82 173452 2 1 
23 Cabo de Santo Agostinho Pernambuco 0.95 167783 0 1 
11 Lauro de Freitas Bahia 0.67 163449 0 1 
9 Ilhéus Bahia 0.83 155281 2 1 
55 Cabo Frio Rio de Janeiro 0.67 140486 2 1 
71 Timon Maranhão 0.66 135133 26 0 
83 Uruguaiana Rio Grande do Sul 0.67 117415 29 0 
15 Porto Seguro Bahia 0.76 104078 2 1 
40 Santana Amapá 1.01 99111 2 1 
21 Bayeux Paraíba 0.71 98793 2 1 
24 Igarassu Pernambuco 1.01 93931 0 1 
22 Abreu e Lima Pernambuco 0.79 86625 0 1 
44 Abaetetuba Pará 1.19 82998 0 1 
18 Paço do Lumiar Maranhão 0.74 78811 0 1 
8 Candeias Bahia 0.75 75994 0 1 
48 Bragança Pará 0.88 72621 2 1 
67 Sapiranga Rio Grande do Sul 0.76 72286 2 1 
42 Parintins Amazonas 1.26 69890 2 1 
38 São Cristóvão Sergipe 0.82 66665 2 1 
25 Ipojuca Pernambuco 0.78 59719 2 1 
41 Itacoatiara Amazonas 1.3 58157 2 1 
74 Cruzeiro do Sul Acre 1.39 55326 4 0 
5 São Miguel dos Campos Alagoas 0.68 52566 0 1 
3 Marechal Deodoro Alagoas 0.79 43392 2 1 
33 Macaíba 
 Rio Grande do 
Norte 0.67 42631 0 1 
49 Oriximin Pará 0.98 40147 2 1 
14 Nova Viçosa Bahia 0.77 33526 2 1 
50 Salinópolis Pará 0.8 33391 0 1 
12 Mata de São João Bahia 0.8 29825 2 1 
45 Alenquer Pará 1.02 27722 0 1 
59 Parati Rio de Janeiro 0.79 27689 0 1 
13 Mucuri Bahia 0.77 27492 2 1 
7 Canavieiras Bahia 0.75 25903 2 1 
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43 Óbidos Pará 1.29 25466 2 1 
76 Sena Madureira Acre 1.62 25112 4 0 
19 São Bento Maranhão 0.68 23508 0 1 
31 Sirinhaém Pernambuco 0.93 21484 2 1 
37 Laranjeiras Sergipe 0.74 21257 2 1 
4 São Luís do Quitunde Alagoas 0.71 20588 0 1 
32 Canguaretama 
 Rio Grande do 
Norte 0.67 20235 2 1 
52 Itapemirim Espírito Santo 0.78 19330 2 1 
10 Ituberá Bahia 0.91 19252 0 1 
2 Maragogi Alagoas 1.26 18625 0 1 
75 Feijó Acre 0.91 16636 4 0 
72 São José do Belmonte Pernambuco 0.76 16168 19 0 
30 Rio Formoso Pernambuco 1.07 13373 2 1 
73 Luzilândia Piauí 0.66 13268 26 0 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 2011; 
IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 2011. 
 This spatial presentation of flood risk maps measures of vulnerability, flood hazard, and 
flood exposure as separate entities. Flood hazard and flood exposure may also be impacting the 
level of vulnerability in a given municipality. In the subsequent chapters, when analyzing income 
inequality as a predictor of vulnerability, I control for both the flood hazard and flood exposure 
in the models, acknowledging that while vulnerability is measured as its own entity, apart from 
hazard and exposure, both of these elements may also be impacting the level of vulnerability of a 
municipality.  
 In this chapter, I briefly reviewed the vulnerability literature and how income inequality 
is addressed by vulnerability scholars. I draw on an established vulnerability index framework 
and construct a vulnerability index for urban Brazilian municipalities. Next I map vulnerability 
scores and detect the presence of strong spatial autocorrelation of vulnerability. Lastly, I map 
those municipalities with high vulnerability, high flood hazard and high flood exposure, to 
demonstrate the magnitude of the population at potential risk of flooding. In the next chapters, I 
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delve more concretely into the income inequality literature and continue to assemble further 
evidence for the hypothesized relationship between income inequality and vulnerability. 
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III. Income Inequality as a Social Determinant 
A. Literature Review 
 The income inequality literature is broad and encompasses a plethora of topics ranging 
from the extent to which different nations and political systems create income inequality (Förster 
and Vleminckx 2004), to the impacts of women’s employment on the inequality of incomes 
within households (Harkness 2013), to how the inclusion of unpaid work can impact levels of 
income inequality across households (Folbre et al. 2013). While there are some outliers, the bulk 
of income inequality research can be divided into three board topics: the causes of income 
inequality, the impacts of income inequality, and different methods of measuring income and 
income inequality. This dissertation is most concerned with the latter two, and more specifically, 
with their intersection.   
 The first task is to examine whether or not income inequality within urban municipalities 
in Brazil impacts municipality vulnerability to climate change, with a focus on flooding in 
particular. The second is to select the appropriate measures of income inequality. The third is to 
determine whether the location of the income inequality along the income distribution impacts 
the relationship between income inequality and vulnerability. As this dissertation’s concern with 
income inequality is three-fold, I divide the literature review into three sections. First, I present a 
discussion of works focused on the impacts of income inequality more broadly. Next, I briefly 
address measures of income inequality. Lastly, I discuss previous works focused on whether the 
location of the income inequality along the distribution “matters” in terms of its impacts on 
social cohesion, economic growth and vulnerability. 
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1. Impacts of Income Inequality 
While there is little consensus in the literature on the exact consequences of income 
inequality for a given society or community, many scholars posit that the effects are negative in 
high-income countries.  Declines in health, increased violence, political instability, prolonged 
absolute poverty, a lack of social mobility, spatial segregation, and unequal access to and 
distribution of resources and protections, are all negative impacts commonly cited in the 
literature (Subramanian and Kawachi 2003; Kennedy et al. 1998; Cardoso 1972; Frank 2007; 
Massey 1996; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Gornick and Jӓntti 2013).  
While all of these impacts are both serious and alarming, this dissertation is most 
concerned with how income inequality may be impacting spatial segregation and the distribution 
of resources needed for adaptation, e.g., sea walls and health services. I take this more narrow 
focus for it is through these two less obvious pathways that income inequality may relate to a 
municipality’s level of vulnerability to climate change. While absolute poverty most plainly 
relates to vulnerability, this relationship is not discussed in depth as it is already well-chartered 
territory in the vulnerability literature (Adger 1999; Ribot 2011).  
In middle-income countries, the impacts of income inequality can be more difficult to 
categorize as wholly negative. Kuznets (1955) popularized the notion that rising income 
inequality is a consequence of economic development, a trajectory called the Kuznets curve. 
According to the Kuznets curve, as poorer societies develop, income inequality rises. Once they 
transition to high-income countries, levels of income inequality begin to decline. As such, in 
middle-income countries, higher income inequality may be an indicator of economic 
development.  
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Scholars of income inequality (Frank 2007; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Kennedy et al. 
1998) suggest that high levels of inequality lead to a breakdown of social cohesion, i.e., the 
“willingness of members of society to cooperate with each other in order to survive and prosper” 
(Stanley 2003:1). While this weakening of social cohesion can manifest itself in many ways, the 
most relevant to this dissertation is the link between social cohesion and resource access. Figure 
3 below outlines the relationships between social cohesion, income inequality, access to 
resources, assets and options, and vulnerability. This chapter is concerned with examining the 
linkages displayed by the red arrows in the diagram, while Chapters 2 and 4 focus on the blue 
arrow, the connection between resource access and vulnerability.    
 
Figure 3. Concept Map: Relating Income Inequality and Vulnerability 
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Income inequality is thought to break down social cohesion, which leads to both spatial 
segregation and elites governing in their best interest. Thus, municipalities with higher income 
inequality tend to be more spatially segregated (Massey 1996) and political power is often 
concentrated in the elite class (Cardoso 1972). Elite influence can take two forms. The first is a 
phenomenon known as “opting out” (Frank 2007), where elites direct public resources away 
from public services they don’t need, such as adaptation infrastructure, and towards projects that 
suit their own interests. An example of this might be directing public funding towards the 
construction of Olympic stadiums, rather than improving drainage infrastructure in lower income 
areas. Another form of elite influence is directing funds slated for adaptation for their own 
benefit, such as building sea walls in elite neighborhoods, rather than in lower income 
neighborhoods.  
It is important to note that these relationships operate in both directions, i.e., elites 
governing in their best interest can also lead to increased income inequality (Portes 2010). For 
example, government officials may choose to reduce taxes on capital gains, a reform which 
returns income to those at the higher end of the income distribution more than to those farther 
down on the income distribution. While I do not explicitly measure the power of elites as part of 
the vulnerability index, I do believe the role of elites is an important element in the relationship 
between income inequality and vulnerability. As such, I include the elite actors in the conceptual 
model, even though I do not include an indicator of vulnerability that directly captures their 
influence. Instead, the relative levels of socioeconomic status, infrastructure and governance 
captured in the vulnerability index are all theorized to be, at least in part, the result of elites 
governing in their own best interest.   
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In their best-selling, though heavily critiqued, book The Spirit Level (2010), Wilkinson 
and Pickett explain that income inequality and the resulting breakdown in social cohesion lead to 
a host of impacts that are harmful to society. Income inequality cleaves society into distinct 
classes, where the elite, who control the bulk of the resources, feel little connection to or 
responsibility toward those who populate the rest of the income distribution. Klinenberg (2002), 
in his discussion of the heat wave in Chicago, points to how income inequality led to the spatial 
segregation of high and low-income communities, and how this spatial divide increased 
vulnerability of Chicago residents to the heat wave. Government officials failed to designate 
cooling centers or increase ambulance services to low-income communities during the initial 
heat wave. Living in high-income, air-conditioned communities, officials were ostensibly 
unaware that poor, elderly citizens in low-income communities on the city outskirts were dying 
in their homes due to heat exhaustion. 
Klinenberg (2002) also makes the point that neighborhoods with close-knit communities 
with high levels of social cohesion suffer less than disparate neighborhoods during natural 
disasters. He shows how two equally low-income neighborhoods weathered the heat wave 
differently. Klinenberg suggests that the high level of social cohesion of the Latino community 
led to fewer causalities, as neighbors helped each other manage the heat. While the level of 
social cohesion within neighborhoods surely impacts vulnerability, this dissertation is concerned 
with social cohesion between neighborhoods. As such, income inequality is measured at the 
municipality, rather than the neighborhood level12.  
                                                 
12 Unfortunately socioeconomic data is not available at the neighborhood level. Therefore, the 
level of social cohesion within neighborhoods could not be controlled for in the analysis.  
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Massey (1996) also describes this phenomenon of how income inequality leads to spatial 
segregation, in his work comparing urban areas in Chicago in the 1930s and the 1980s. He 
explains that lower income communities are increasingly more geographically clustered and 
isolated as a result of rising income inequality. He notes how these lower income urban 
communities suffer, in part, due to inferior public resources access.  
Massey (1996), Klinenberg (2002) and Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) all document the 
impacts of income inequality in developed countries; however, there is also mounting evidence 
of the negative impacts of income inequality in middle-income countries as well. Perlman 
(2011), in her ethnographic study of favelas in Brazil in 1968, provides a vivid example of how 
the lack of social cohesion, resulting from income inequality, leads to inequitable resource 
distribution for the urban poor. Perlman asked a resident how he felt when he saw the luxury 
homes in Rio de Janeiro while his own favela lacked the most basic services such as running 
water and electricity. He responded: “After the government helps the rich and less rich, then, 
later on, it will be our turn-our time will come” (Perlman 2011: Ch 8).   
Increasing income inequality is also discussed at great length by scholars of urbanization 
in the developing world (National Research Council 2003). These authors document how 
increasing income inequality, often a consequence of urbanization, has led to increased spatial 
segregation and the creation of slums and shanty-towns in cities in developing countries around 
the globe. The elite classes, benefiting from a colonial history of uneven development, have 
maintained power, and are thus able to control the bulk of urban resources and direct public 
funds for their own benefit. This leaves the lower income families to cluster in geographically 
isolated and marginalized communities, without access to even the most basic services, such as 
clean water and sanitation facilities (Cardoso 1972; Frank 2000).  
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In the context of developing, middle-income countries, it is important to mention the 
relationship between income inequality and absolute poverty. Often the negative impacts of 
income inequality are assumed to be simply a consequence of high levels of absolute poverty. 
While absolute poverty undoubtedly contributes to vulnerability in developing countries 
(Hardoy, Mitlin, and Satterthwaite 2001; McGranahan et al. 2007), this dissertation is more 
concerned with the impacts of income inequality on the inequitable distribution of public 
resources, as opposed to the link between income inequality and absolute poverty.   
2. Measuring Income Inequality  
 Measurements of income inequality capture the magnitude of the dispersion of income 
along a defined distribution. Although the concept is relatively straight-forward, the myriad 
methods of measuring income inequality are less so, and there is great debate in the literature 
over which measures are most useful (Atkinson 1970; Charles-Coll 2011). The Gini index 
measures the total income inequality that exists across the entire distribution. While this measure 
is helpful in capturing overall levels of income inequality in a single summary statistic, it does 
not show where along the income distribution the income inequality is located.  
Another class of income inequality measures, the general entropy indexes, which include 
the Theil index, have the added benefit of decomposition properties, where it is possible to 
determine the levels at which different demographic groups of the population are contributing to 
the overall income inequality, i.e., women or the elderly (Bourguignon 1979; Charles-Coll 
2011).  The generalized entropy measures are also common in assessing the spatial distribution 
of income inequality (Center for International Earth Science Information Network-CIESIN-
Columbia University 2005).  However, these measures can be difficult to interpret. Charles-Coll 
(2011) draws on Sen’s description of the Theil index to illuminate its complexity. “But the fact 
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remains that it is an arbitrary formula, and the average of the logarithms of the reciprocals of 
income shares weighted by income shares is not a measure that is exactly overflowing with 
intuitive sense” (Sen 1973: 36).  
 To parsimoniously identify where the disparities in income occur along the distribution, 
different classes of income inequality measures are available. The percentile ratio and income 
share measures and ratios have the ability to identify where along the income distribution the 
income inequality lies. The percentile ratio measures compare income levels at two points in the 
income distribution. Examples of common percentile ratio measures include the 90th/50th 
percentile ratio, which captures top half income inequality and the 50th/10th percentile ratio, 
which captures the bottom half. Percentile ratio measures are not exclusively designed to capture 
top or bottom half income inequality however. The 90th/10th percentile ratio and the 80th/20th 
percentile ratio are often used to approximate overall income inequality across the entire 
distribution.  
Income share measures compare the total share of income held by a given proportion of 
the population. For example, the income share of the top 10 percent is the percent of overall 
income held by households located in the top 10 percent of the income distribution. In 2009, the 
top 10 percent of households in Brazil held 42.9 percent of total national income (World Bank 
2014a). 
 Income share measures can also be calculated as ratios. The Palma ratio, a relatively new 
income inequality measure, is the ratio of the income share held by the top 10 percent of 
households compared to the income share held by the bottom 40 percent of households (Cobham 
and Sumner 2013; Palma 2011). The Palma ratio correlated closely with the Gini index at the 
national level (Palma 2011).  
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Income inequality can also be measured by incorporating assumptions about social 
welfare within the calculation. Atkinson (1970) points to how measures of income inequality 
inherently imply a value judgment about the nature of income inequality and social welfare, i.e., 
how averse a given society is to inequality. The Atkinson index (a family of measures), captures 
this “normative” judgment by incorporating an inequality aversion parameter, ε, which allows 
the researcher to select the level of inequality aversion, and thus which portion of the distribution 
should receive more weight in the final calculation of inequality. As the inequality aversion 
parameter approaches zero, more weight is placed on changes at the top of the income 
distribution, while as the parameter approaches infinity, more weight is placed on the bottom end 
(Allison 1978). Given this unique property of the Atkinson index, the ability to adjust the 
inequality aversion parameter, the Atkinson index is well suited to measure inequality at 
different portions of the distribution. In practice, the income inequality aversion parameter is 
typically assigned values between 0.5 and 2 (De Maio 2007; Laporte 2002; Regidor et al. 2003).  
Thus the Atkinson index with a parameter of 1 will be more sensitive to the income position of 
those at the bottom of the distribution, as compared to an index calculated with the parameter set 
to 0.5 (Jones Jr. and Weinberg 2000). The Atkinson index takes on values between 0 and 1, and 
can be interpreted as the level of social welfare that could be achieved if incomes were evenly 
distributed. The higher the Atkinson index value, the more social welfare that could be gained 
through redistribution, and thus the higher the level of current inequality. Another common way 
to apply the Atkinson index is by calculating the percentage of total income required to achieve 
the same level of social welfare, if incomes were evenly distributed, where 1- Atkinson index = 
percent of income. Thus an Atkinson index score of 0.2 indicates that 80 percent of total income 
is required to achieve the same level of social welfare, if incomes were evenly distributed (De 
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Maio 2007).   
3. Considering the Location of the Income Inequality along the Distribution 
The Gini index is used by a host of income inequality scholars to measure the impacts of 
income inequality on society and the economy (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Subramanian and 
Kawachi 2003; Kenworthy 2004; Rodríguez 2000). However, scholars have found conflicting 
evidence of its impacts. Kenworthy (2004), in his analysis of the impacts of income inequality on 
economic growth, found no significant effect. Rodríguez (2000) notes that income inequality, as 
measured by the Gini index, has been found to have negative impacts on growth.  
Alderson, Beckfield and Nielsen (2005) employ a relative distribution measure to chart 
the change in the distribution of incomes in high-income countries over time. They find that 
increasing income inequality in the United States, since the late 1960’s, was a result of income 
polarization. Their work highlights the range of income distributions possible under a single 
summary measure of income inequality, and advocates for more careful analysis of the location 
of income inequality along the distribution, rather than simply relying on summary measures 
such as the Gini index, to understand shifts in income inequality over time. 
Voitchovsky (2005), also aware of the limitations of the Gini index, employs income 
share ratio measures in her work focused on determining the impacts of income inequality on 
growth. She hypothesizes that top half and bottom half income inequality have differing impacts 
on economic growth, and thus one cannot employ a summary measure, such as the Gini index, to 
test her hypothesis. She finds that while top half income inequality has positive impacts on 
economic growth, bottom half income inequality depresses growth. In her work, she measures 
top half income inequality as the ratio of the income share held by the top quintile to the middle 
quintile (Q5/Q3). Bottom half income inequality she measures as the ratio of the income share 
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held by the middle quintile to the income share held by the bottom quintile (Q3/Q1). 
Voitchovsky selects the quintile ratio measures, as opposed to the percentile ratio measures (i.e., 
90th/50th and 50th/10th) to ensure that potential measurement error at the bottom and top ends 
of the distribution would not unfairly bias results.  
Acknowledging the complex nature of the relationship between income inequality and 
economic performance, Voitchovsky (2014) conducted a meta-analysis, reviewing over 70 
empirical works. While she finds much disagreement in the literature, Voitchovsky also 
identifies a few conditions which appear to hold true across the multitude of competing evidence. 
These include that income inequality may have a positive impact on economic performance in 
the short term, and a negative effect in the long term, and that inequality of opportunities (human 
capital as opposed to strictly income measures) may have negative effects on economic growth. 
Voitchovsky concludes that the effects of income inequality on economic performance are likely 
context specific. Instead of attempting to identify a panacea effect, she advocates for a more 
nuanced exploration of the impacts of income inequality, such as whether incomes clustered at 
the top of the distribution tend to stymie overall economic growth.  
Robert Frank, in his book, Falling Behind: How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle 
Class (2007), explains how rising incomes at the top of the income distribution, are harmful to 
the middle class in the United States. He argues that this type of top-heavy income distribution, 
when the top five to ten percent has an increasingly larger share of total income, is problematic, 
as these high-income households drive prices of basic goods, such as housing and education, out 
of reach for many middle class families, and force struggling families to work overtime and take 
on excess debt.  
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The negative impacts of this top-heavy type of income distribution, often measured as the 
distance between incomes at the top of the income distribution (i.e., top end income inequality), 
have also been addressed by development scholars. Portes (2010) argues that when institutions 
are controlled by elites, the under classes in upper-middle income countries are vulnerable to 
exploitation. When there is significant income concentrated at the top of the distribution, elite-
dominated institutions fail to protect and promote the interests of all members of society. Top 
end income inequality, and the power it bestows on elites to allocate state resources according to 
their own interests, is a well-documented theme which runs through much of the globalization 
and development literatures (Roberts and Hite 2007). There are cases where top end income 
inequality can work in favor of more equitable resource allocation and poverty alleviation. This 
is the case in welfare states (Brady 2005; Scruggs and Allan 2006), i.e., societies with highly 
progressive tax systems and/or generous benefit programs, such as Sweden, where taxes and 
transfers significantly reduce income inequality (Jäntti 1997; Förster and Vleminckx 2004). This 
type of redistribution is rarely observed in middle-income or low-income countries. 
 By employing several different measures of income inequality to test the hypothesis of 
whether income inequality impacts vulnerability, this analysis will add to the subsection of 
income inequality literature, briefly captured above, which focuses on not just the presence of 
income inequality and its impacts, but also the relevance of its location along the income 
distribution. 
B. Data and Methods 
To measure income and income inequality in Brazil, I use household data from the 2010 
Brazilian census hosted in the Integrated Public Use Micro data Series (IPUMS) International 
database. The survey data provide a measure of gross individual monthly income. Gross income 
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includes both earned income and income from transfers including pensions and social welfare 
programs. It does not include non-cash or near cash transfers.13 I include data from all 
households, both rural and urban, within urban municipalities. 
 To calculate income, I convert the gross individual monthly income to equivalized 
household income. First I sum all individual incomes within each household to obtain total gross 
household income. Next I equivalize total household income to account for economies of scale, 
according to the following formula: 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ÷ √# 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠     
I use the square root of the household size as this is the halfway point between the 
assumption of perfect economies of scale and zero economies of scale within the household. This 
method is commonly used in the Luxembourg Income Study literature to account for economies 
of scale within households (Voitchovsky 2005)14.  
There are a variety of approaches in the spatial demographic literature for creating small 
area estimates of poverty and inequality. These methods are typically based on combining census 
data with a smaller sample of household survey data (Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw 2002; 
Hentschel at al. 1998). The Elbers et al. approach is useful when income or infant mortality data 
are not in the census data, but are available in a smaller sample of household surveys. 
                                                 
13 I use pre-tax, gross income as this is the only income measure available from the Brazilian 
census. This is a measure of cash income from all sources including earned, capital and transfers.  
14 While the selection of the square root of the total number of household members (i.e., the 
number of household members to the power of 0.5) is a common choice for equivalizing 
household income, a range of values between 0.2 and 0.8 have also been employed by income 
inequality scholars. Coulter, Cowell, and Jenkins (1992) find that measures of income inequality 
are sensitive to the choice of equivalence scale. The selection of 0.5, a parameter that estimates 
the halfway point between perfect and zero economies of scale, is however, commonly accepted 
as a suitable measure in the income inequality literature.   
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Fortunately, where income is concerned, the Brazilian census is comprehensive and data are 
representative to the municipality level. As such I follow the convention of Potter, Schmertmann, 
and Cavenaghi (2002) and aggregate individual income data to construct equivalized household 
income. I then calculate income inequality within the municipality using equivalized household 
income. 
To examine whether the effects of income inequality are different depending on where 
along the income distribution the income inequality is located, I calculate income inequality 
within municipalities using seven different measures: one summary measure (Gini index), two 
measures of both bottom and top half income inequality and two specifications of the Atkinson 
Index with ε= 0.5 and with ε= 115.  
I select the Gini index as it is most commonly used to measure income inequality in the 
vulnerability literature. Taking Voitchovsky’s (2005) concerns to heart, that percentile ratios 
may be vulnerable to measurement error, I employ both percentile and income share ratios to 
capture top and bottom half inequality. I use the 90th/50th percentile ratio and the mean values 
of the income shares of the 5th quintile over the 3rd quintile (mean of Q5/mean of Q3) to 
measure top half income inequality. I use the 50th/10th percentile ratio and the mean of Q3/mean 
of Q1 income share ratio to measure bottom half income inequality16.  Lastly, I use two versions 
                                                 
15 I also calculated the Atkinson Index with ε= 2, however the mean score was 0.98 with a 
standard deviation of 0.027.  99 percent of municipalities had scores above 0.93. Given the lack 
of variation in the scores under this specification of the Atkinson Index, it is not suitable for 
determining the impacts of income inequality on vulnerability in this dissertation.  
16 In two municipalities, Santo Antônio do Içá and São Gabriel da Cachoeira, both located in the 
North region in the state of Amazonas, the mean value of Q1 was equal to zero.  In twenty-four 
municipalities, the 10th percentile income was equal to zero. For these zero values, I impute the 
minimum value in order to calculate the inequality measures. While there is no consensus in the 
literature on how best to handle zero values in income inequality calculations, imputing the 
minimum value is an acceptable method to manage this. Another common method is to impute 
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of the Atkinson Index with the inequality aversion parameter set to 0.5 and 1.17 A key difference 
between the Atkinson and Gini Index measures on the one hand, and the percentile and income 
share ratio measures on the other, is the scope of the calculations. The latter set only contain data 
on one segment of the distribution in relation to another. The former consider the entire 
distribution in the calculations. For example, the 90th/50th percentile ratio only contains 
information about two points within the top half of the income distribution (the 90th and the 50th 
percentiles). The Atkinson Index (0.5), the measure of top end income inequality, contains 
information about the entire income distribution and calculates not just the distance between the 
top incomes and the middle, but the distances between all incomes, weighting distances at the 
top more than distances at the bottom. 
Table III-1 displays each income inequality measure I use in the analysis, along with a 
brief description of the key strengths and weaknesses of each. 
                                                 
the value of one for zero values. I do not use this convention as there is no theoretical 
justification for this method, and it results in vastly larger standard deviations. As this 
dissertation is concerned with comparative levels of income inequality under different measures, 
imputing the minimum value for zero values is preferable to imputing the value of one, which 
may overestimate income inequality. The majority of people with zero monthly gross income are 
not in the labor force (83.2 percent), while 14.4 percent are unemployed. For individuals who 
have irregular income or did not work in the past month, the monthly income reported should 
represent the average monthly income earned over the past year. Thus it is likely that individuals 
in households which report zero income subsist off the land, even though they are not officially 
working as part of the agricultural labor force.    
17 As it is not possible to compute the Atkinson index with zero values, for individuals with zero 
equivalized household income, I impute the minimum income value of $R 0.41.  
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Table III-1. Income Inequality Measures: Strengths and Weaknesses 
Income Inequality 
Measure 
Type Strength Weakness 
Gini Index Summary 
measure 
Commonly used and 
easy to interpret 
Cannot identify where 
along the distribution 
the income inequality 
lies 
Atkinson (0.5) Top end Able to assess impacts 
of inequality due to 
distances between 
incomes at the top end 
of the distribution 
Not very intuitive 
Atkinson (1) Bottom end Able to assess impacts 
of inequality due to 
distances between 
incomes at the lower 
end of the distribution 
Not very intuitive 
90th/50th 
 
Top half Able to assess impacts 
of inequality due to 
gaps between the top 
and the middle 
Does not include any 
information about 
bottom half of 
distribution or those 
above the 90th 
percentile 
Mean Q5/Q3 Top half Able to assess impacts 
of inequality due to 
gaps between the top 
and the middle 
Does not include any 
information about 
bottom half of 
distribution 
50th/10th Bottom half Able to assess impacts 
of inequality due to 
gaps between the 
middle and the bottom 
Does not include any 
information about top 
half of distribution; 
Sensitive to zero 
incomes at the 10th 
percentile 
Mean Q3/Q1 Bottom half Able to assess impacts 
of inequality due to 
gaps between the 
middle and the bottom 
Does not include any 
information about top 
half of distribution 
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C. Income Inequality within Municipalities 
I calculate income inequality within each of the 1276 urban municipalities in Brazil 
across 25 states. To highlight the difference in levels of income inequality within each 
municipality, depending on which measure is employed, I map the seven different measures of 
income inequality below. I also include inland flood hazard, defined by the number of projected 
floods per 100 years, and coastal flood hazard, defined as low elevation coastal zones, to display 
the breadth of flood hazards across Brazil. While the Northwestern Amazon region and coastal 
areas are undoubtedly at risk, there are also considerable flood risks in urban municipalities 
across the nation (EMDAT 2014).  
In order to facilitate easier comparison across measures, I map income inequality scores 
by tercile, defining high income inequality as the top tercile, medium income inequality as the 
middle tercile and low income inequality as the bottom tercile, for each measure. Using terciles 
to compare income inequality measures allows for easier visible detection of municipalities that 
may score high on one measure, relative to other municipalities, but average or low on another 
measure. One weakness of using terciles is that the number of municipalities categorized as 
having high, medium and low levels of income inequality are the same under each measure, i.e., 
approximately 425 municipalities fall into each category for every measure. Thus, it is important 
to remember that these categories are simply a tool to illustrate relative levels of income 
inequality under each measures in each municipality, and not an absolute categorization of level 
of income inequality in each municipality. 
103 
 
 
                Map 11.Gini Index of Brazilian Municipalities 
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    Map 12. Atkinson Index (0.5) of Brazilian Municipalities 
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              Map 13. Atkinson Index (1.0) of Brazilian Municipalities   
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   Map 14. Mean Q5/Mean Q3 of Brazilian Municipalities  
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    Map 15. 90th/50th of Brazilian Municipalities  
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    Map 16. Mean Q3/Mean Q1 of Brazilian Municipalities  
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     Map 17. 50th/10th of Brazilian Municipalities  
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It is clear that income inequality varies significantly across municipalities, and 
that the relative level (high, medium, low) of income inequality within a municipality 
does vary, in some cases, depending on the measurement tool employed. For example, 
several municipalities in the Southwest have relatively high levels of income inequality 
as measured by the Gini index, and relatively high levels of top half income inequality; 
however, they also have average or low levels of bottom half income inequality.  
Another way to compare the relative magnitude and location of income inequality 
along the distribution across municipalities is to categorize municipalities by income 
inequality type. In Figure 4 below, I use the mean Q3/Q1 to define bottom half income 
inequality and mean Q5/Q3 for top half income inequality. I divide income inequality 
magnitude into two groups, high and low, where high is a ratio value of 3 or above, and 
low is a ratio below 3. For example, municipalities in which the mean Q5/Q3 ratios (the 
average of the top 20 percent income share over the average of the middle twenty percent 
income share) are three or above are categorized as having high top half income 
inequality.   
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           Figure 4. Percent of Municipalities by Income Inequality Type and Magnitude 
            Source: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014 
  It is clear that while the majority of municipalities have both top and bottom half 
income inequality, more municipalities have high top half income inequality, compared 
to those with high bottom half income inequality. 
To examine the relationships across income inequality measures in more detail, I 
calculate the Pearson’s r correlation coefficient between each measure. The Pearson’s r 
correlation coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates a perfect correlation and 0 
denotes no relationship. 0.4 to 0.6 is considered to be a moderate correlation while 0.7 to 
0.9 signifies a strong correlation between variables (Dancey and Reidy 2004). As income 
inequality and its impacts on vulnerability are linked to absolute poverty, I also examine 
the correlation between each income inequality measure, and the percentage of the 
population in the municipality in absolute poverty. Absolute poverty is calculated as the 
proportion of those in a municipality with equivalized household monthly income below 
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R$ 233.51, the poverty threshold used by the OECD for Latin America (see Chapter 2 for 
specific calculations). In Table III-2, I provide descriptive statistics for each of the seven 
inequality measures, and the level of absolute poverty for each municipality, all of which 
vary considerably across municipalities.  
Table III-2. Descriptive Statistics of Income Inequality Measures and Absolute Poverty 
Rates 
 Mean SD Min  Max 
Gini Index 0.47 0.05 0.32 0.68 
Atkinson Index (0.5) 0.20 0.04 0.09 0.45 
Atkinson Index (1) 0.42 0.10 0.19 0.93 
90th/50th 2.89 0.49 1.94 7.05 
Mean Q5/Q3 3.75 0.65 2.20 6.99 
50th/10th 4.66 6.51 1.75 128.57 
Mean Q3/Q1 4.59 7.78 1.89 209.11 
Absolute Poverty Rate 13.69% 11.22% 0.25% 58.03% 
n=1276 urban municipalities     
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014.  
Table III-3 displays the correlation coefficients for the seven income inequality 
measures and the level of absolute poverty within each municipality.  
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Table III-3. Correlation Coefficients of Income Inequality Measures and Absolute 
Poverty Rates 
 Gini 
Index 
Atkinson 
(0.5) 
Atkinson
(1.0) 
90th  
/50th   
Mean 
Q5/Q3 
50th 
/10th  
Mean 
Q3/Q1 
Gini Index 1.00       
Atkinson (0.5) 0.98 1.00      
Atkinson (1) 0.98 0.98 1.00     
90th/50th 0.70 0.61 0.60 1.00    
Mean Q5/Q3 0.91 0.84 0.88 0.86 1.00   
50th/10th 0.35 0.45 0.37 0.11 0.19 1.00  
Mean Q3/Q1 0.34 0.42 0.37 0.21 0.27 0.46 1.00 
Absolute 
Poverty Rate 
0.66 0.74 0.70 0.15 0.37 0.40 0.33 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014.  
 
It is worth noting that the two measures which aim to capture top half income 
inequality, the 90th/50th and the mean Q5/Q3, are unsurprisingly highly correlated, with 
a coefficient of 0.86. The lower correlation for the two measures which attempt to capture 
bottom half income inequality, the 50th/10th and mean Q3/Q1, at 0.46, could be due to 
the treatment of zero values in the 50th/10th percentile measure, as twenty-four 
municipalities reported zero income at the 10th percentile. Interestingly, the Gini index is 
more strongly correlated to measures of top half, rather than bottom half inequality.  This 
confirms the previously illustrated finding (see Figure 4) that more of the income 
inequality within municipalities in Brazil is likely attributable to top half, rather than 
bottom half income inequality. The larger prevalence of top half income inequality in 
2010 may be partially explained by Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez’s (2013) 
findings that income inequality declined in Brazil between 2000 and 2010 due to an 
increase in incomes at the bottom of the distribution, particularly due to progressive 
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government transfers. This reduction in bottom half income inequality could explain 
why, by 2010, top half income inequality is so much more significant than bottom half. It 
is also likely that top half income inequality has been consistently larger than bottom half 
income inequality, and even though overall income inequality has declined, top half 
income inequality has not followed suit. 
The Atkinson measures correlate most closely with the Gini index, which is 
unsurprising as both the Gini and the Atkinson indexes measure inequality across the 
entire distribution, whereas the top and bottom half measures only include data from their 
respective portions of the distribution. Interestingly the Atkinson index with parameter of 
0.5, which is less sensitive to changes at the bottom of the distribution, correlates more 
closely with absolute poverty, compared to the 1.0 specification, suggesting absolute 
poverty is more closely related to top end, rather than bottom end inequality.  
The Atkinson index with parameter 1.0, which is more sensitive to the bottom end 
of the distribution, does not correlate closely with the two measures of bottom half 
inequality. This is likely due to the fact that even though this specification of the 
Atkinson Index does weight bottom incomes more heavily, it still takes the entire 
distribution into account. As the lion’s share of the income inequality is in the top half of 
the distribution, it follows that bottom half measures would only weakly correlate with 
measures of the entire distribution.         
The weak correlations between absolute poverty and most income inequality 
measures, and particularly top half income inequality measures, are important to keep in 
mind when presented with the models analyzing the relationship between income 
inequality and vulnerability. Map 18 shows the distribution of absolute poverty rates 
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across urban municipalities. While absolute poverty rates follow a similar pattern to 
income inequality measures, they are not identical.   
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                Map 18. Absolute Poverty Rates of Brazilian Municipalities  
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A common critique of models that attempt to parse out the impacts of income 
inequality is the notion that income inequality is simply a measure of absolute poverty in 
developing nations. The extremely weak correlation between top half income inequality 
and absolute poverty (the correlation between absolute poverty and the 90th/50th ratio is 
0.15) is evidence that top half income inequality can be divorced from absolute poverty 
and therefore the inclusion of both measures as independent variables within a single 
regression model does not create serious problems of multicollinearity.  
More surprising perhaps, is the weak correlation between bottom half income 
inequality and absolute poverty. This is likely due to low levels of median incomes. 605 
municipalities (47 percent) have absolute poverty levels above 10 percent and 349 
municipalities (27 percent) have levels above 20 percent, while 25 percent of 
municipalities have median incomes below $R 460, less than twice the absolute poverty 
line. This suggests that some municipalities with higher rates of absolute poverty may 
actually have lower levels of bottom half income inequality, a situation common in 
poorer countries though counter-intuitive from a developed county perspective, where 
median incomes are substantially higher than the absolute poverty line. Map 19 shows 
municipalities with absolute poverty rates above 16 percent (the highest tercile cut-off), 
and relatively low to moderate levels of bottom half income inequality (as measured by 
50th/10th percentile ratios). Fifty-five municipalities have both high rates of absolute 
poverty and relatively low to moderate levels of bottom half income inequality.  
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   Map 19. Absolute Poverty and Bottom Half Income Inequality  
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In the next chapter, drawing on the seven income inequality measures outlined 
above, I analyze the relationship between income inequality and vulnerability to flooding 
in Brazil. By testing the predictive power of each income inequality measure separately, I 
will be able to distinguish not just whether income inequality is a predictor of 
vulnerability, but more precisely, I will also be able to determine whether the impact of 
income inequality differs depending on its location along the income distribution. 
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IV. Is Income Inequality a Predictor of Vulnerability to 
Flooding? 
 In the previous chapters I provide a brief review of two separate, yet conceptually 
overlapping literatures in the field of sociology: income inequality and vulnerability. In 
this next section, I unite the two by testing whether income inequality is a predictor of 
vulnerability of urban municipalities. To test this hypothesis, I use multi-level regression 
models, which allow for controls at both the state and municipality level. To parse out 
whether the observed relationship between income inequality and vulnerability is actually 
just a consequence of absolute poverty levels in a given municipality, I control for the 
percentage of individuals living below the absolute poverty line in each municipality. 
A. Linking Income Inequality and Vulnerability Literatures 
 The vulnerability literature, and particularly the inherent urban vulnerability 
framework, suggest that socioeconomic inequalities drive the level of vulnerability in a 
given place, apart from the environmental or climatic conditions to which the denizens 
are exposed. Poverty is typically part of the story and vulnerability scholars point to the 
difficulties poor households face, both during the disaster and the recovery periods (Ribot 
2011). Income inequality, aside from its relationship to absolute poverty, is also 
considered by some vulnerability experts (Brooks, Adger, and Kelly 2005; Adger 1999) 
to play a significant role in increasing vulnerability. Income inequality creates spatial 
segregation by income level, allowing the high-income groups to silo themselves in safe 
spaces while the lower income groups are left to settle in more dangerous, unprotected 
locations. Bapista and Adamo (2014), in a study of disaster declarations in response to 
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excessive rainfall in Southern Brazil, found that the municipality which experienced the 
most damage had a significant population living in informal settlements. “These informal 
settlements often occupy areas along waterways and on steep hillslopes, which are highly 
vulnerable to flooding and landslides” (Baptista and Adamo 2014). Residents built 
settlements in unsafe areas as they could not afford housing in the city centers. This 
example of residential segregation due to income inequality has been well-documented 
by sociologists (Massey 1996). Of course it is not always the case that only the low-
income households are exposed to flood hazard. While both high-income and low-income 
groups may be exposed, higher income households are more likely to have the resources 
to protect themselves.   
 A second link between income inequality and vulnerability is the question of 
resource access. Adger (1999) and Klinenberg (2002) both provide compelling examples 
of how income inequality creates situations where government resources are allocated 
according to the priorities of the high-income, governing class. In the case of coastal 
areas in Vietnam, Adger (1999) describes how sea walls were constructed in areas around 
the homes of the high-income elite, while the rest of the population went unprotected. 
Klinenberg (2002) describes how an insufficient number of cooling centers and 
ambulances were allocated to residents during the heat wave, resulting in hundreds of 
deaths. Government officials living in air conditioned mansions in high-income suburbs 
were unaware of, or possibly even unconcerned by, the dire conditions of aging residents 
who lacked the basic education to protect themselves from the heat, and who lived in 
neighborhoods without health care or social service facilities.  
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 In this chapter, I test whether income inequality is a predictor of these conditions 
of spatial segregation and inequitable resource access and allocation that result in 
vulnerability. By measuring the vulnerability levels of 1276 urban municipalities in 
Brazil and analyzing their relationship with income inequality, I hope to buttress the 
above claims that income inequality, aside from its relationship to absolute poverty, is a 
statistically significant predictor of vulnerability. 
  Income inequality, as briefly covered in Chapter 3, is both a single concept and a 
multitude of measures. To understand whether the location of the income inequality 
along the income distribution impacts its relationship to vulnerability, I test seven 
different income inequality measures. If all measures of income inequality equally predict 
vulnerability to flooding, this finding will suggest that the location of the income 
inequality along the distribution is irrelevant. However, if the different measures of 
income inequality have a range of predictive power and statistical significance, this will 
provide evidence that the type of income inequality, not just income inequality in general, 
is material in regards to its relationship to vulnerability. Thus, by testing seven measures 
of income inequality, I can identify not simply whether income inequality in general, is a 
predictor of vulnerability, but also which type of income inequality along the distribution 
is the most significant predictor of vulnerability, controlling for absolute poverty.  
B. Data 
 To test the relationship between income inequality and vulnerability, I draw on 
several datasets. For the vulnerability measure, I use a vulnerability index constructed 
from household survey data, municipality data, and spatial datasets which provide 
information on location of primary roads, coastal areas and elevation (see Chapter 2 for 
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specifics on index construction). To measure income inequality and absolute poverty at 
the municipality level, I draw on income data provided in household surveys (see Chapter 
3 for a detailed description of income inequality and absolute poverty measure 
calculations). Table IV-1 lists the data source and type for each control variable in the 
models. 
Table IV-1. Data Sources 
Variables Data Source 
Data 
Type 
Inland flood 
frequency 
Flood frequency, Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk 
Reduction and night time lights (GAR 2011; NOAA 2010) Spatial 
Coastal flood 
exposure 
Low elevation coastal zones and night time lights (McGranahan 
et al. 2007; NOAA 2010) Spatial 
Municipality 
size 
Municipality population, IBGE 2011 Municipality Report 
(IGBE 2011) Numerical 
Aridity level 
Global aridity, Consortium for Spatial Information          
(CGIAR-CSI 2012) Spatial 
Percent in 
absolute 
poverty IBGE 2010 census (Minnesota Population Center 2014) Numerical 
Region 
variables 
Region classification, IBGE 2011 Municipality Report       
(IBGE 2011) Numerical 
 
 To control for exposure to environmental hazards, which may also contribute to the 
vulnerability of a given municipality, I use flood frequency data from the Global 
Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR 2011). These data provide a 
measure of inland flood frequency, which is the total number of inland floods projected 
to occur in an area within 100 years. To identify which areas of the municipality are 
urban, I use data from NOAA 2010, which categorizes urban areas using satellite data of 
night time lights (NOAA 2010). I also include an aridity measure from the Consortium 
for Spatial Information (CGIAR-CSI 2012). This spatial dataset categorizes the aridity 
level of a given area using an aridity index (AI) value. The AI is calculated as the ratio of 
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the mean annual precipitation (MAP) over the mean annual potential evapo-transpiration 
(MAE) observed between 1950 and 2000 (CGIAR-CSI 2012). To identify whether the 
urban areas within a municipality are located in low elevation coastal zones (LECZ), I 
use the LECZ 2010 data, which map the contiguous areas from the coast less than 10 
meters above sea level. The LECZ data include inland deltas which are vulnerable to sea-
level rise (McGranahan et al. 2007). 
 To control for the influence of the political economy of states on vulnerability, I 
use the Division into Regions macro region dataset provided by the IBGE. This dataset 
groups Brazilian states into five regions: north, northeast, southeast, south and central 
west. This region designation, originally used in the 1940s as a way to organize Brazilian 
national statistics, is now more commonly applied as a lens for understanding the 
historical and current political economies in Brazil. The IBGE proscribes the use of this 
classification for formulation of public policy as the regions segment the country based 
on the history of economic and social development, natural environment, and 
communication and commerce networks (IBGE 2014). In Transforming Brazil: A Reform 
Era in Perspective (Font 2003), an in-depth analysis of reform and development policies 
in modern Brazil, Font explains that “the enduring significance of regionalism and class 
relations” (Font 2003:10) remain, and continue to influence relationships between 
political actors at all levels of society. 
C. Methods 
 I use multi-level regression models to test whether income inequality is a 
predictor of vulnerability to flooding for urban municipalities in Brazil. The lower unit of 
analysis is the municipality, with the vulnerability index score of the municipality as the 
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dependent variable.  At the upper level, the state level, I control for the political economy 
of states using the Division into Regions classification.  
At the municipality level, I control for aridity, coastal flood hazard in urban areas, 
inland flood frequency in urban areas, the percent of the population below the absolute 
poverty line and the municipality population size .The IBGE groups municipalities into 
seven size categories (IBGE 2011). I follow this convention and group municipalities 
based on the IBGE size classifications. The IBGE municipality size classification is listed 
in Table IV-2 below. 
Table IV-2. Municipality Size Classification 
Size Classification Population  
1 < 5,000 
2 5,001-10,000 
3 10,001-20,000 
4 20,001-50,000 
5 50,001-100,000 
6 100,001-500,000 
7 500,001 + 
Source: IBGE 2011. 
I account for the spatial autocorrelation of municipality vulnerability (identified in 
Chapter 2) using the multi-level model structure. Table IV-3 contains descriptive 
statistics for all variables in all the models, save the income inequality measures (listed in 
Chapter 3).   
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Table IV-3. Descriptive Statistics for Multi-Level Model Variables 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Municipality-level Variables     
Inland flood frequency 2.4945 5.8667 0.0000 48.0000 
Coastal flood exposure 0.1622 0.3688 0.0000 1.0000 
Municipality size 4.6583 0.9242 3.0000 7.0000 
Aridity level 0.6897 1.2043 0.0000 3.0000 
Percent in absolute 
poverty 
0.1369 0.1122 0.0025 0.5803 
State-level Variables     
Southeast (omitted 
category) 
0.3723 0.4836 0.0000 1.0000 
North 0.0768 0.2664 0.0000 1.0000 
Northeast 0.3111 0.4631 0.0000 1.0000 
South  0.1716 0.3772 0.0000 1.0000 
Central-west 0.0682 0.2522 0.0000 1.0000 
Dependent Variables     
Vulnerability index 
score 
0.2810 0.3606 -0.5662 2.0532 
Socioeconomic status 0.2926 0.1859 -0.3003 0.6519 
Infrastructure quality 0.1202 0.1560 -0.6065 0.4521 
Governance 0.6938 0.2657 0.1713 1.5552 
 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007 
The key independent variable in the models is income inequality. The dependent 
variable, the vulnerability index score, is a composite measure which is comprised of 
three main factors: socioeconomic status, infrastructure and governance. To test which 
components of vulnerability income inequality is best able to predict, I also run the 
models substituting each of the three factors as the dependent variable.   
In Chapter 3, I examined the relationships between the seven different measures 
of income inequality and absolute poverty. I found that the Gini index, the Atkinson 
index (1.0) and the Atkinson index (0.5) are correlated with absolute poverty, with 
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Pearson’s r correlation coefficients of 0.66, 0.70 and 0.74, respectively. Given the 
potential for a multicollinearity problem in the model, I calculate the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) for the variables. Following standard convention (O’Brien 2007), I conclude 
that multicollinearity is not a serious concern as the variance inflation factors for all 
variables are below five. 
Given that even moderate collinearity between variables in a regression model 
may unfairly bias p-values of independent variables, I also use a secondary significance 
test. To test whether income inequality measures are predictors of vulnerability, aside 
from their relationship with absolute poverty, I compare the model fit statistic of these 
models (the deviance measure), to the model without an income inequality measure. In 
this way, I can ascertain whether a model which includes a measure of income inequality, 
is significantly different, in terms of predictive power, from a model which does not 
include any measure of income inequality.  
D. A Discussion of Control Variables 
1. Political History and Economy of Brazilian Regions   
In order to test whether income inequality is a predictor municipality 
vulnerability, I need to control for several factors at both the state and municipality level. 
The political economy and level of development of Brazilian states may be impacting 
municipality vulnerability. Brazil has developed unevenly, with the Southeastern region 
most economically prosperous and the Northeastern region most destitute (Da Veiga, da 
Cunha, and Sichieri 2004). To account for the differences in the political economy and 
level of development across states, I use a region variable, which codes states into the 
five geographic and economic regions determined by the IBGE. I use the Southeastern 
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region as the reference group as this region is the most prosperous and municipalities in 
this region have the lowest vulnerability scores, on average. Table IV-4 displays the 
demographic characteristics of urban municipalities by region.  
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Table IV-4. Regional Demographics of Urban Municipalities in Brazil (2010) 
 North Northeast Southeast South Central West 
Population 10,700,000 35,400,000 70,400,000 20,300,000 8,324,518 
% of population 7.4% 24.4% 48.5% 14.0% 5.7% 
Territory (%) 45.3% 18.3% 10.9% 6.8% 18.9% 
Average 
municipality 
equivalized median 
monthly household 
income (R$) 
R$ 517 R$ 429 R$ 880 R$ 976 R$ 781 
Average % of rural 
households per 
urban municipality 
26.5% 26.9% 10.6% 12.5% 13.8% 
Average 
municipality 
absolute poverty 
rate  
22.5% 25.4% 6.8% 5.3% 8.9% 
Average 
municipality 
education score 
0.65 0.66 0.86 0.78 0.76 
Average 
municipality health 
score 
0.68 0.74 0.85 0.88 0.83 
% of municipalities 
with slums 
43.9% 35.5% 33.1% 42.9% 12.6% 
% of municipalities 
in LECZ 
19.4% 23.9% 12.0% 26.0% 0.0% 
Average 
municipality 
vulnerability index 
score 
0.85 0.41 0.11 0.22 0.16 
Average 
municipality 
socioeconomic 
status score  
0.12 0.10 0.40 0.45 0.37 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; McGranahan et al. 2007 
Map 20 displays the regions of Brazil and the average urban municipality 
equivalized median monthly household income (R$). Map 20 also includes all primary 
roads in Brazil. The Northern region has very few primary roads, compared to the other 
four regions.   
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               Map 20. Regions of Brazil 
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 While there is considerable debate in the literature as to why Brazilian regions 
developed so unevenly and remain so, there is also consensus that regional inequalities 
can likely be traced back to the 19th century (Weinstein 1982). By the mid 1850’s, 
Brazil’s economy was heavily driven by agriculture exports, mainly cotton, sugar and 
coffee. Cotton and sugar were produced in the Northeastern region while coffee was 
farmed in the Southeast. Leff (1972) attributes the uneven regional development to 
Brazilian competitive advantage in coffee, relative to sugar and coffee. By the end of the 
19th century, coffee exports has significantly outpaced both sugar and cotton production. 
The demand for Brazilian coffee resulted in a strengthening of the Brazilian currency, a 
boon for the Southeastern region, yet a blow to the Northeastern sugar and cotton 
producers who could not complete with cheaper producers of sugar and cotton elsewhere, 
particularly in Louisiana and Cuba. As a result of booming coffee exports, the Southeast 
was able to industrialize and urbanize while the Northeast become increasingly more 
impoverished. Weinstein (1982) explains how “regionalism became a fundamental fact of 
political life for the Brazilian elites” (Weinstein 1982:263). 
 In 1889, Brazil secured its independence from Portugal and began a slow 
transition from colony to republic. The era from 1889-1930 is often referred to as the 
period of development of the “Old Republic.” During this period, there was a great effort 
to decentralize and return political control to the local levels. In the remote Northern and 
Northeastern regions, municipal governments were often controlled by the land owning 
elite, and thus decentralization resulted in further empowering the local elites (Lewin 
1987).  
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 During the “Old Republic”, there was little effort put forth by the federal 
government to smooth development between regions (Lewin 1987). The Brazil 
Revolution in 1930 ushered in the Vargas Era, led by Getulio Vargas, a native of Rio 
Grande do Sul, a state in the Southern region. Although the Great Depression led to the 
collapse of the export economy in Brazil, under Vargas’s quasi-dictatorship (Vargas 
appointed all state governors), Brazil’s economy grew, and the nation began to rapidly 
urbanize (Love 1970). However, economic growth was concentrated in the Southeast and 
rural areas remained underdeveloped.  
 After the Vargas era, Brazil was under military rule and only began to transition 
back to democracy in the 1970s. Neoliberal economic reforms were not put forth in 
earnest until 1994. By the early 2000s, Brazil had successfully transitioned into what   
Friedman and Hochstetler (2002) term a form of deliberative representation regime, one 
where there is purportedly egalitarian access to political opportunities. However, the 
regional divide in economic development in still clearly apparent.  
  Tompkins, Lemos, and Boyd (2008) point to how good governance is still 
lacking in the Northeastern region. Funds slated for drought alleviation adaptation 
programs are often either directly deposited into pockets of elite politicians, or used for 
short-term hand-outs to secure votes, rather than towards long-term programs, which are 
what the region truly requires.  
 The Northern region of Brazil is the least developed, comprised mostly of jungle. 
As a frontier region, rapid development is expected in the coming decades (Nepstad et al. 
2002). There is increasing pressure from the growing population to build roads and 
improve economic opportunities. As recently as 1970, the Northern region had the 
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highest fertility rate of all the regions, at 8.27 (Barbieri et al. 2010). The newly 
urbanizing areas are still less developed, compared to those in the Southern regions. The 
average socioeconomic status for urban municipalities in the Northern region, as 
measured by the vulnerability index (see Ch 2), is only 0.12, significantly below that of 
the Southeastern (0.40), Southern (0.45) and Central Western (0.37) regions. The 
Northeastern region, at 0.10, has the lowest socioeconomic status score of any region.  
 Given the political history and current economic development levels of the 
regions, scholars often consider region as a variable representing political economy 
and/or geo-political development in their analyses. Hervitz (1985), in his study of the 
effects of migration on fertility, categorizes the South and Southeast regions as modern, 
while the North and Northeastern regions as traditional, given their higher fertility rates 
and lower levels of economic development. Da Silva, Costa, and Macedo (2008) analyze 
the appetite for development of a sustainable urban transit model and find regional 
differences in priorities. The Northern region was the only region to give equal weight to 
social, economic, and environmental priorities, signaling that this region, more than any 
other, is most in need of development of all three sectors.  
 Menezes-Filho and Scorzafave (2011), in an effort to understand labor market 
participation in Brazil, control for region (as a categorical variable) and find that 
compared to those in the Central West region, people in the North and Northeast are less 
likely to have formal employment, while those in the South and Southeast are more likely 
to have formal employment. These relationships are reversed for informal employment. 
Unemployment is also higher in the Northern and Northeastern regions, compared to the 
Southern and Southeastern regions. 
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 Although Brazilian regions face different political, environmental, and economic 
realities, there is no evidence of region-wide climate change adaptation policies. Climate 
change adaptation policies are implemented at the municipality level (Puppim de Oliveira 
2009), even though there is an acknowledgement that it would be wise to implement 
policies that are successful in one municipality in other municipalities within the same 
region. This is particularly true of small-scale efforts to adapt to drought in the 
Northeastern region (Obermaier et al. 2009).   
2. Environmental Hazards 
I include control variables in the model which measure the extent to which 
municipalities have been exposed to environmental hazards, which in turn may have 
impacted the vulnerability to flooding of urban populations. The environmental hazards 
literature details how populations exposed to extreme weather, such as droughts and 
flooding, are often more vulnerable to future hazards (Smith 2013). Environmental 
justice scholars (Walker 2012) also point to how flooding and drought impact the social 
vulnerability of populations at risk. To control for these impacts, I include several 
environmental hazard variables in the model. These variables include the aridity level, the 
projected inland flood frequency within urban areas, and whether or not the urban 
settlements within a given municipality are located within low elevation coastal zones, a 
proxy for coastal flooding. Although these measures do not encapsulate all environmental 
hazards which may have impacted urban populations, such as heat waves or earthquakes, 
they do capture the most frequent and destructive hazards, drought and flooding, that 
urban populations in Brazil must contend with (EM-DAT 2014a).  
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I construct the aridity variable by assigning the maximum aridity value observed 
in the municipality. To calculate the projected inland flood frequency within urban areas, 
I use ArcGIS software to identify the maximum flood frequency value of each urban area 
within a municipality. I identify urban areas within municipalities using the night time 
lights data (NOAA 2010). Next I sum the maximum flood frequencies of each urban area 
in the municipality to obtain a final value for inland flood frequencies within urban areas 
of the given municipality. To identify coastal flood hazard, i.e., urban settlements located 
within low elevation coastal zones, I combine night time lights data and LECZ data to 
identify whether or not urban areas within a municipality fall within low elevation coastal 
zones. The coastal flooding variable is binary given the varying size of urban areas within 
coastal areas and the resolution of data. I experimented with summing the total number of 
urban areas that fall within low elevation coastal zones within municipalities. However, 
given the varying size of urban areas, this method was not a reliable way to differentiate 
the magnitude of coastal flood hazard across municipalities.18  
3. Spatial Autocorrelation  
 In Chapter 2, I tested for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the 
municipality vulnerability index scores. Both the Global Moran’s I and Anselin Local 
Moran’s I statistics showed significant spatial autocorrelation. To control for this spatial 
autocorrelation in the model, I experimented with several different model specifications. 
The two basic model types I tested were multi-level regression models and multi-level 
spatial lag models. For the multi-level regression models, I control for spatial 
                                                 
18 See Appendix C. Identifying Urban Flood Exposure Using Spatial Methods for a 
detailed description of spatial data conditioning methods in ArcGIS. 
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autocorrelation by accounting for the spatial dependencies of municipalities within a 
given state. This structure accounts for the idea that municipalities located within the 
same state will have more similar vulnerability scores, as compared to those in other 
states. 
  In the second class of models, the multi-level spatial lag models, I use the same 
multi-level structure, with municipalities as level 1 and state as level 2, but also include a 
spatially lagged dependent variable as a predictor in the model. In this specification I am 
accounting for spatial dependence of municipalities within states as well as spatial 
dependence of neighboring municipalities, i.e., that neighboring municipalities within a 
given state will have more similar vulnerability scores, as compared to municipalities 
located farther away from each other. Multi-level spatial lag models are a burgeoning 
analysis tool, most commonly used by scholars in geography and epidemiology. They 
aim to capture spatial autocorrelation which may stem from two separate factors, the 
influence of neighboring geographies, as well as the impacts of political categories such 
as health boards or health service areas (Ren et al. 2013; Langford et al. 1999). 
 Following spatial analysis conventions of creating neighborhoods based on 
geographic characteristics (Anselin 2003; Bivand, Pebesma, and Gómez-Rubio 2013; 
Pisati 2012), I tested several different specifications for the spatially lagged dependent 
variable. I assigned neighbors based on queen contiguity, four nearest neighbors, five 
nearest neighbors and several distance thresholds. These were five km, ten km, fifty km, 
one hundred km, two hundred km, and five hundred km. I also used a variogram to 
identify a distance threshold. The distance threshold returned by the variogram was very 
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large, 1,071.2 km. I tested this distance threshold as well, even though it appeared to be a 
poor approximation of neighborhood. 
I created neighbor lists based on each of these parameters, and then used these 
neighbor lists to create row standardized spatial weights. Next I applied the spatial 
weights to produce spatially lagged vulnerability index scores using R software. I tested 
each of these spatially lagged dependent variables in the multi-level model. In each case, 
the spatially lagged dependent variable was not significant. I tested the residuals of the 
multi-level regression model, without a spatial lag parameter, for spatial autocorrelation 
using the Global Moran’s I test. The result was not significant, suggesting that the multi-
level model sufficiently controls for the spatial autocorrelation of the vulnerability index 
scores (Bivand et al. 2013).  
This spatial analysis suggests that municipalities within the same state have more 
similar vulnerability scores as compared to municipalities in other states.  However, 
within states, there is no significant spatial dependence between neighboring 
municipalities, controlling for environmental hazards, poverty level and municipality 
size. This finding could be due to the fact that municipalities vary greatly in area, making 
a neighborhood specification using purely geographic parameters, such as a minimum 
distance or fixed number of geographic neighbors, difficult. Given these results, I 
conclude that the multi-level regression model is a better fit to the data and proceed with 
the standard multi-level model, dropping the spatially lagged dependent variable from the 
models. 
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E. Model Specifications 
To create the final multi-level model, I follow Luke’s (2004) methodology of 
starting with accessing the need for a multi-level model, by first calculating the 
unconstrained model, and subsequently adding predictor variables at both the 
municipality and state levels. The unconstrained model I specify as follows: 
Yij = γ00 + u0j + rij 
In the above model, Yij is the municipality vulnerability index score and γ00 is the 
grand mean of municipality vulnerability index scores (the fixed effect in the model). The 
random effects in the model are comprised of two components. u0j is the variability of 
vulnerability index scores between states and rij is the variability of vulnerability index 
scores within a state. This analysis of variance (ANOVA) model is used to determine the 
extent to which, if any, states might account for the observed variability of vulnerability 
scores between municipalities. To estimate this model, I used the xtmixed command in 
STATA software. Using the variance components estimated by the model, I calculate the 
intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), which measures the extent of the variance in the 
municipality index scores that can be accounted for by states. The ICC is calculated as 
follows: 
ICC= (variance component of intercept)/(variance component of intercept + 
variance component of the residual) 
In the model below, the ICC = 0.0998/(0.0998+0.0723) = 57.97%.  
This high ICC value (Luke 2004) indicates that a significant portion of the 
variability observed in vulnerability index scores is attributable to states. This confirms 
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the previous findings that spatial autocorrelation is present within the dependent variable, 
which was evidenced by significant Global and Local Moran’s I spatial statistics 
calculated in Chapter 2. These findings indicate the multi-level nature of the data and 
thus, the value of applying a multi-level model structure in this analysis. The results for 
this ANOVA model and ICC calculation are listed in Table IV-5. 
Table IV-5. Unconstrained Multi-level Model: Municipality Vulnerability Index Scores 
within States 
Fixed Effects Coef. SE 
Intercept 0.4217 0.0643 
   
Random Effects Std Dev. Var Comp. 
Intercept  0.3159 0.0998 
Residual 0.2689 0.0723 
   
ICC 57.97%  
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
Next I follow Luke’s (2004) prescription of building the model “from the bottom 
up” (Luke 2004:23). In Model 1, a random intercepts model, I include only municipality 
level controls: percent in absolute poverty (P), aridity level (A), coastal flood exposure 
(CF), inland flood frequency in urban areas (IF), municipality size(S) and the given 
measures of income inequality (II).19  
  
                                                 
19 I grand mean center each income inequality measure to ensure that slopes are estimated 
within a more appropriate range (Luke 2004), i.e., slopes are calculated based on the 
mean income inequality value rather than the unobserved zero value of income 
inequality. To ensure that income inequality along the entire distribution is accounted for 
in each model, I include either a single measure of total income inequality (Gini and 
Atkinson indexes) or measures of both top half and bottom half income inequality (mean 
quintile ratios and percentile ratios). 
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Mixed-effects Model 1: 
(Municipality vulnerability index)ij = γ00 + γ10(P)ij + γ20(A)ij + γ30(CF)ij + γ40(IF)ij + 
γ50(S)ij + γ60(II)ij + u0j + rij 
In Model 2, I include the state level predictor of region, the proxy for political economy 
of the state, to control for the effect of the political economy of the state on municipality 
vulnerability. As there are five regions, I include the four region dummy variables (N, 
NE, S, CW), with Southeast, as the omitted category20.     
Mixed-effects Model 2: 
(Municipality vulnerability index)ij = γ00 + γ01(N)j + γ02(NE)j + γ03(S)j + γ04(CW)j  + 
γ10(P)ij + γ20(A)ij + γ30(CF)ij + γ40(IF)ij + γ50(S)ij +  γ60(II)ij +  u0j + rij 
Model 3, the baseline model, is the same as Model 2, but it excludes any measure 
of income inequality (i.e., excludes γ60(II)ij). 
F. Findings 
The results of Models 1 and 2 for each income inequality measure are listed in 
tables below.  
                                                 
20 I experimented with several model specifications including random intercepts and 
slopes. I tested cross-level interactions of the region variables with income inequality and 
poverty. None of these interactions were significant. As such, I selected the most 
parsimonious model that best fit the data – the random intercepts model.   
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1. Multi-Level Regression Model Results 
Table IV-6. Multi-Level Regression Models: Gini Index 
Gini Index Model 1  Model  2  
Fixed Effects Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Municipality-level Variables     
Total income inequality 0.4312* 0.1964 0.3968* 0.1966 
Inland flood frequency 0.0018 0.0012 0.0018 0.0012 
Coastal flood exposure 0.2386*** 0.0206 0.2410*** 0.0206 
Municipality size 0.0872*** 0.0084 0.0877*** 0.0084 
Aridity level -0.0202* 0.0100 -0.0173# 0.0099 
Percent in absolute poverty 0.9373*** 0.1302 0.9623*** 0.1304 
Intercept -0.1847** 0.0710 -0.3625*** 0.0843 
     
State-level Variables     
Southeast (omitted category)     
North   0.5288*** 0.0969 
Northeast   0.0889 0.0884 
South    0.0698 0.1075 
Central-west   0.0668 0.1097 
     
Random Effects Std. Dev. SE Std. Dev. SE 
Intercept 0.2432 0.0380 0.1375 0.0248 
Municipality residual  0.2375 0.0048 0.2376 0.0048 
     
Log-likelihood -20.6871  -8.3390  
Deviance 41.3742  16.6780  
Number of observations 1276    
Number of groups 25    
 
#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
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Table IV-7. Multi-Level Regression Models: Atkinson Index (0.5) 
Atkinson Index(0.5) Model 1  Model  2  
Fixed Effects Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Municipality-level Variables     
Top end  income inequality 0.7431** 0.2493 0.7075** 0.2497 
Inland flood frequency 0.0018 0.0012 0.0018 0.0012 
Coastal flood exposure 0.2367*** 0.0206 0.2391*** 0.0205 
Municipality size 0.0858*** 0.0084 0.0862*** 0.0084 
Aridity level -0.0199* 0.0099 -0.0172# 0.0099 
Percent in absolute poverty 0.8389*** 0.1393 0.8642*** 0.1397 
Intercept -0.1661 0.0709 -0.3427*** 0.0837 
     
State-level Variables     
Southeast (omitted category)     
North   0.5210*** 0.0954 
Northeast   0.0930 0.0870 
South    0.0715 0.1056 
Central-west   0.0620 0.1078 
     
Random Effects Std. Dev. SE Std. Dev. SE 
Intercept 0.2387 0.0375 0.1349 0.0246 
Municipality residual  0.2372 0.0047 0.2373 0.0048 
     
Log-likelihood -18.6893  -6.3806  
Deviance 37.3787  12.7612  
Number of observations 1276    
Number of groups 25    
 
#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
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Table IV-8. Multi-Level Regression Models: Atkinson Index (1.0) 
Atkinson Index(1.0) Model 1  Model  2  
Fixed Effects Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Municipality-level Variables     
Bottom end  income inequality 0.1725# 0.1002 0.1598 0.1003 
Inland flood frequency 0.0019 0.0012 0.0019 0.0012 
Coastal flood exposure 0.2396*** 0.0206 0.2420*** 0.0206 
Municipality size 0.0893*** 0.0083 0.0895*** 0.0083 
Aridity level -0.0201* 0.0100 -0.0173# 0.0100 
Percent in absolute poverty 0.9608*** 0.1310 0.9837*** 0.1313 
Intercept -0.1965** 0.0706 -0.3737*** 0.0837 
     
State-level Variables     
Southeast (omitted category)     
North   0.5314*** 0.0965 
Northeast   0.0885 0.0881 
South    0.0680 0.1071 
Central-west   0.0693 0.1093 
     
Random Effects Std. Dev. SE Std. Dev. SE 
Intercept 0.2439 0.0381 0.1369 0.0248 
Municipality residual  0.2376 0.0048 0.2378 0.0048 
     
Log-likelihood -21.6110  -9.1065  
Deviance 43.2221  18.2131  
Number of observations 1276    
Number of groups 25    
 
#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
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Table IV-9. Multi-Level Regression Models: Mean Quintile Measures 
Mean Quintile Measures 
Top half: Mean Q5/ Mean Q3  
Bottom half: Mean Q3/ Mean Q/1 Model 1  Model  2  
Fixed Effects Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Municipality-level Variables     
Top  half  income inequality 0.0144 0.0122 0.0125 0.0122 
Bottom half income inequality -0.0010 0.0010 -0.0009 0.0010 
Inland flood frequency 0.0019 0.0012 0.0019 0.0012 
Coastal flood exposure 0.2397*** 0.0206 0.2420*** 0.0206 
Municipality size 0.0899*** 0.0084 0.0903*** 0.0084 
Aridity level -0.0199* 0.0100 -0.0170# 0.0100 
Percent in absolute poverty 1.0687*** 0.1226 1.0852*** 0.1231 
Intercept -0.2130** 0.0708 -0.3904*** 0.0844 
     
State-level Variables     
Southeast (omitted category)     
North   0.5386*** 0.0984 
Northeast   0.0840 0.0898 
South    0.0673 0.1093 
Central-west   0.0722 0.1114 
     
Random Effects Std. Dev. SE Std. Dev. SE 
Intercept 0.2488 0.0389 0.1399 0.0252 
Municipality residual  0.2376 0.0048 0.2378 0.0048 
     
Log-likelihood -21.9980  -9.5070  
Deviance 43.9960  19.0140  
Number of observations 1276    
Number of groups 25    
 
#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
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Table IV-10. Multi-Level Regression Models: Percentile Ratio Measures 
Percentile Ratio Measures 
Top half: 90th/ 50th Percentile  
Bottom half: 50th/ 10th Percentile Model 1  Model  2  
Fixed Effects Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Municipality-level Variables     
Top  half  income inequality 0.0269# 0.0152 0.0247 0.0152 
Bottom half income inequality 0.0008 0.0012 0.0009 0.0012 
Inland flood frequency 0.0018 0.0012 0.0018 0.0012 
Coastal flood exposure 0.2387*** 0.0207 0.2411*** 0.0206 
Municipality size 0.0876*** 0.0085 0.0880*** 0.0085 
Aridity level -0.0185# 0.0100 -0.0157 0.0099 
Percent in absolute poverty 1.0198*** 0.1231 1.0355*** 0.1236 
Intercept -0.1987** 0.0700 -0.3746*** 0.0829 
     
State-level Variables     
Southeast (omitted category)     
North   0.5285*** 0.0960 
Northeast   0.0875 0.0875 
South    0.0675 0.1063 
Central-west   0.0689 0.1085 
     
Random Effects Std. Dev. SE Std. Dev. SE 
Intercept 0.2426 0.0380  0.1359 
Municipality residual  0.2376 0.0048  0.2378 
     
Log-likelihood -21.2654  -8.7516  
Deviance 42.5307  17.5033  
Number of observations 1276    
Number of groups 25    
 
#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
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Table IV-11. Multi-Level Regression Model Without Income Inequality Measure 
No Income Inequality Measure Model 3  
Fixed Effects Coeff. SE 
Municipality-level Variables   
Inland flood frequency 0.0019 0.0012 
Coastal flood exposure 0.2434*** 0.0206 
Municipality size 0.0917*** 0.0082 
Aridity level -0.0161 0.0099 
Percent in absolute poverty 1.0736*** 0.1182 
Intercept -0.3974*** 0.0831 
   
State-level Variables   
Southeast (omitted category)   
North 0.5429*** 0.0974 
Northeast 0.0881 0.0891 
South  0.0652 0.1084 
Central-west 0.0756 0.1105 
   
Random Effects Std. Dev. SE 
Intercept 0.1387 0.0249 
Municipality residual  0.2380 0.0048 
   
Log-likelihood -10.3713  
Deviance 20.7427  
Number of observations 1276  
Number of groups 25  
 
#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
 
2. Discussion of Significance of Control Variables 
 In each of the five model specifications, percent in absolute poverty, coastal flood 
exposure and municipality size were significant predictors of vulnerability. Inland flood 
frequency in urban areas was not significant in any of the models. This may be because 
although the flood frequencies are based on previous flooding, they have a 100 year time 
horizon. As such, areas that are projected to flood in the future may not have experienced 
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any negative impacts thus far. Another possibility is the specification of the variable. 
Summing the total projected floods per 100 years does not take into account the 
difference in severity of the floods. It is possible that municipalities with similar inland 
flood frequency values have experienced floods of significantly different magnitude. 
Unfortunately the data do not provide severity estimations, suggesting that this inland 
flood frequency data may not be able to fully capture the disparate flood impacts across 
municipalities.  
In terms of state-level effects, the inclusion of the region control variables 
significantly reduced the variance between states, (the random effects intercept 
parameter, u0j). However the Northern region was the only significant region variable. 
This suggests that the political economy of the states in the North explains a significant 
portion of the observed variance in vulnerability between states. Put differently, 
controlling for municipality level differences, the effect of the political economy of the 
Northern region on vulnerability is significant, confirming Font’s (2003) assertion that 
regionalism still explains at least a portion of the variation in socioeconomic 
development, and resulting vulnerability, across municipalities.  
This finding also suggests that the bulk of the observed variability in vulnerability 
between states is due to differences in the political economies of the Northern vs. the 
Southeastern regions. It is worth noting that although the Northeastern region is often 
cited as highly vulnerable to climate change (Obermaier et al. 2009), it was not a 
significant predictor of flood vulnerability for urban municipalities. This is likely due to 
the fact that the vulnerability of the Northeastern region stems from its high absolute 
poverty rates, its susceptibility to drought and its large rural population dependent on 
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agriculture for subsistence (Barbieri et al. 2010; Obermaier et al. 2009). Aridity level and 
absolute poverty rate are separate controls in the model and rural municipalities are 
excluded from the analysis. Additionally, it is important to recall that the measure of 
vulnerability in this dissertation as only a measure of flood vulnerability, not overall 
vulnerability to any and all potential climate change impacts.  
The size of the effect of aridity varies across models. However, in all cases, the 
coefficient is negative, suggesting that more arid areas are less vulnerable to flood 
hazard. The significance of aridity declines with the addition of the state-level controls, 
indicating that it is the difference in the political economy and development level of the 
regions, rather than the current aridity level of a given municipality, that explains 
differences in vulnerability levels for different climates.21  
3. The Varying Impacts of Income Inequality 
Interestingly, the impact of income inequality varies considerably, depending on 
which measure is employed. While both the Gini index and the Atkinson index (0.5) are 
significant predictors of municipality vulnerability, the Atkinson index (1.0), the quintile 
ratio measures and the percentile ratios are not. The fact that the Gini index is a 
significant predictor suggests that at least some type of income inequality is related to 
vulnerability. However, the Gini index does not identify where along the income 
distribution the malign type of income inequality lies.  
                                                 
21 It is important to note that aridity and development are not unrelated. Aridity surely 
played a part in the historical development of the region and vice versa. As such, it is not 
possible to conclude that aridity is wholly insignificant in terms of flood vulnerability. 
Rather, it is informative as to how the natural environment of the region may have played 
a role in its economic development trajectory.   
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The lack of significance of the top half and bottom half quintile ratios, the top half 
and bottom half percentile ratios and Atkinson index (1.0) specifications, suggests that 
top half, bottom half and bottom end income inequality do not predict vulnerability, once 
municipality and state-level characteristics are taken into account.  
Rather, it appears that larger distances between incomes at the top end of the 
distribution, not just the top compared to those in the middle, is the type of income 
inequality that most impacts vulnerability. This type of income inequality is captured by 
the Atkinson index (0.5), which gives more weight to the income position of those at the 
top end of the distribution.  
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Table IV-12 compares the results of Model 2 for each of the seven income 
inequality measures. The Atkinson index (0.5) is the most significant predictor of 
vulnerability, across the seven measures of income inequality.  
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Table IV-12. Multi-Level Regression Models for Each Income Inequality Measure 
All Income Inequality 
Measures Gini Index 
Atkinson 
Index 
(0.5) 
Atkinson 
Index 
(1.0) 
Quintile 
Ratios 
Percentile 
Ratios 
Fixed Effects Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Municipality-level Variables      
Total income inequality 0.3968*     
Top end income inequality  0.7075**    
Bottom end income inequality   0.1598   
Top half income inequality    0.0125 0.0247 
Bottom half income inequality    -0.0009 0.0009 
Inland flood frequency 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 0.0019 0.0018 
Coastal flood exposure 0.2410*** 0.2391*** 0.2420*** 0.2420*** 0.2411*** 
Municipality size 0.0877*** 0.0862*** 0.0895*** 0.0903*** 0.0880*** 
Aridity level -0.0173# -0.0172# -0.0173# -0.0170# -0.0157 
Percent in absolute poverty 0.9623*** 0.8642*** 0.9837*** 1.0852*** 1.0355*** 
Intercept -0.3625*** -0.3427*** -0.3737*** -0.3904*** -0.3746*** 
      
State-level Variables       
South (omitted category)       
North 0.5288*** 0.5210*** 0.5314*** 0.5386*** 0.5285*** 
Northeast 0.0889 .093 .0885 0.0840 0.0875 
South  0.0698 .0715 .068 0.0673 0.0675 
Central-west 0.0668 .062 .0693 0.0722 0.0689 
      
Random Effects Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 
Intercept 0.1375 .1349 .1369 0.1399 0.1359 
Municipality residual  0.2376 .2373 .2378 0.2378 0.2378 
       
Log-likelihood -8.339 -6.3806 -9.1065 -9.5070 -8.7516 
Deviance 16.678 12.7612 18.2131 19.0140 17.5033 
Number of observations 1276     
Number of groups 25     
 
#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
 
Next, I conduct a significance test, to determine whether the models which 
include income inequality are better predictors of vulnerability, as compared to a baseline 
model, Model 3. This test is to provide further evidence that income inequality, aside 
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from its relationship to absolute poverty, significantly predicts vulnerability. I use the 
Model 3 deviance as a baseline for model fit. I compare the deviance of Model 3 with the 
deviance of each model that includes a measure of income inequality to determine 
whether a model which includes a given measure of income inequality is a significantly 
better fit for the data, as compared to a model without any measure of income inequality. 
The results of the deviance comparisons are listed in Table IV-13. 
Table IV-13. Comparing Model Fit Using Deviance Statistics 
Models Deviance Chi-square 
Degrees 
of 
freedom 
Significantly 
better fit? P-value 
Atkinson Index (0.5) 12.7612 7.9815 1 yes <0.01 
Gini Index 16.6780 4.0647 1 yes <0.05 
Atkinson Index (1.0) 18.2131 2.5296 1 no <0.1 
Percentile Ratios 17.5033 3.2394 2 no <0.25 
Mean Quintile Ratios 19.0140 1.7287 2 no <0.50 
Model 3: No income inequality measure 20.7427     
 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
 
The Gini index and the Atkinson index (0.5) models are the only two models 
which significantly predict vulnerability better than the baseline model, Model 3.  
These results confirm the hypothesis that income inequality is a significant 
predictor of vulnerability to flooding in urban Brazilian municipalities. More so, these 
findings suggest that the location of the income inequality along the distribution is 
material to understanding its impacts. When controlling for municipality and state-level 
characteristics, including absolute poverty, only top end income inequality is significant. 
This suggests that neither top nor bottom half income inequality alone significantly 
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impact vulnerability, once municipality and state-level differences are controlled for. 
Instead it is the situation of a runaway top income distribution, where the highest incomes 
are significantly higher than the next highest incomes, not just those in the middle, which 
causes harm.  
These findings support the theories put forth by Deaton (2013) and others that a 
run-away top is cause for concern. It also highlights the dangers of relying on the Gini 
index to parse out the true impacts of income inequality. For income distributions where 
the bulk of the income inequality is at the top of the income distribution, the Gini index is 
an appropriate measure of the dangers of income inequality. However, for distributions in 
which the income inequality lies mostly between the middle and the bottom, the Gini 
index could severely overestimated the harmful impacts of income inequality on 
vulnerability to flooding.  
A large gap between the middle and the bottom, once absolute poverty is 
controlled for, does not appear to create conditions of spatial segregation and uneven 
resources access. This could be due to the fact that those in the middle do not have 
enough income or power to create conditions of spatial segregation and uneven resource 
access. These social phenomena appear to be driven by the high-income elites, not when 
those in the middle have significantly more than those at the bottom.  
 Given that top end income inequality appears to be the true culprit, it is a little 
surprising that the two measures of top half income inequality, the mean of Q5/Q3 and 
the 90th/50th percentile ratio did not significantly predict vulnerability. This could be due 
to the fact that the most destructive type of income inequality is when extremely high 
incomes are clustered above the 90th percentile. The 90th/50th ratio would not capture 
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these top end incomes. While these top end incomes are included in the Q5/Q3 measure 
as part of the Q5 measure, they are only included as part of the average, which is likely 
dragged downward by the lower incomes at the 80th to 90th percentiles.  
It is also possible that the income positon of the highest income households is 
only significant when analyzed in relation to all others in the distribution, not simply in 
relation to those in the middle. For example, if the 90th percentile income is significantly 
higher than the 50th percentile, but not much more than the 60th, 70th or 80th percentiles, 
the income distribution is not as skewed as in the case where the 90th percentile is also 
considerably higher than the 60th, 70th or 80th percentiles. As such, the top half income 
inequality measures are not well-suited to capture this runaway top phenomenon. 
Conversely, the Atkinson Index (0.5), which captures the magnitude of the dispersion 
across the entire distribution, with an emphasis on the top end, does account for the 
differences between the 90th percentile, the 98th percentile and so on. 
4. Analysis of Socioeconomic Status, Infrastructure Quality and 
Governance as Dependent Variables 
In the above analysis, I determine which types of measures of income inequality 
predict vulnerability. As vulnerability is a composite measure, comprised of three factors 
(socioeconomic status, infrastructure and governance), it is useful to understand which 
elements of vulnerability are most impacted by income inequality. Spatial segregation 
and uneven access to resources are theorized to be consequences of income inequality. 
The poor governance component most closely correlates with the presence of slums and 
informal settlements, and high-population density. These indicators could all potentially 
be consequences of elites governing in their best interest, pushing lower income residents 
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to settle in unsafe and/or unauthorized locations with few resources or protections 
(Baptista and Adamo 2014; Hardoy et al. 2001). These measures could also be 
interpreted as evidence of higher income households driving up housing prices (Frank 
2007) and pushing lower-income households to settle in informal locations. As such, it 
should follow that the governance component of vulnerability would be most impacted 
by top half and/or top end income inequality. 
I run Model 2 with each component of vulnerability as the dependent variable to 
determine which income inequality measures predict each of the factors that comprise the 
final vulnerability index score. The results for Model 2 for each of the income inequality 
measures and each of the three factors which comprise the vulnerability index are listed 
in the tables below.  
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Table IV-14. Multi-Level Regression Model: Socioeconomic Status                                                                                
Dependent Variable: 
Socioeconomic Status Gini Index 
Atkinson 
Index (0.5) 
Atkinson 
Index (1.0) 
Quintile 
Ratios 
Percentile 
Ratios 
Fixed Effects Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Municipality-level Variables      
Total income inequality 0.1205***     
Top income inequality  0.1461***    
Bottom end income inequality   0.0355*   
Top half income inequality    0.0070*** 0.0150*** 
Bottom half income inequality    0.0003# 0.0008*** 
Inland flood frequency -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 
Coastal flood exposure -0.0922*** -0.0922*** -0.0916*** -0.0918*** -0.0926*** 
Municipality size 0.0126*** 0.0127*** 0.0134*** 0.0127*** 0.0116*** 
Aridity level -0.0056*** -0.005*** -0.0055*** -0.0056*** -0.0049** 
Percent in absolute poverty -1.2157*** -1.2256*** -1.2021*** -1.2009*** -1.2152*** 
Intercept 0.4260*** 0.4268*** 0.4207*** 0.4237*** 0.4305*** 
      
State-level Variables       
South (omitted category)       
North -0.0741*** -0.0743*** -0.0723*** -0.0754*** -0.0794*** 
Northeast -0.0444** -0.0436** -0.0446** -0.0445** -0.0444** 
South  0.0641*** 0.0639*** 0.0633*** 0.0634*** 0.0637*** 
Central-west -0.0008 -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0026 
      
Random Effects Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 
Intercept 0.0222 0.0222 0.0222 0.0224 0.0222 
Municipality residual  0.0388 0.0388 0.0390 0.0388 0.0381 
       
Log-likelihood 2304.0113 2303.3650 2299.3395 2305.6674 2325.7143 
      
Number of observations 1276     
Number of groups 25     
 
#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
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Table IV-15. Multi-Level Regression Model: Infrastructure Quality 
Dependent Variable: 
Infrastructure Quality Gini Index 
Atkinson 
Index (0.5) 
Atkinson 
Index (1.0) 
Quintile 
Ratios 
Percentile 
Ratios 
Fixed Effects Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Municipality-level Variables      
Total income inequality 0.0690     
Top end income inequality  0.0284    
Bottom end income inequality   0.0124   
Top half income inequality    0.0046 0.0045 
Bottom half income inequality    -0.0007* -0.0013*** 
Inland flood frequency -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 
Coastal flood exposure 0.0663*** 0.0666*** 0.0666*** 0.0662*** 0.0660*** 
Municipality size -0.0077** -0.0072** -0.0071** -0.0074** -0.0078** 
Aridity level -0.0046 -0.0044 -0.0045 -0.0048 -0.0051 
Percent in absolute poverty 0.0574 0.0684 0.0699# 0.0924* 0.1128** 
Intercept 0.2165*** 0.2126*** 0.2122*** 0.2111*** 0.2096*** 
      
State-level Variables       
South (omitted category)       
North -0.4564*** -0.4548*** -0.4548*** -0.4542*** -0.4510*** 
Northeast 0.0087 0.0088 0.0086 0.0060 0.0066 
South  -0.1620** -0.1626** -0.1626** -0.1618** -0.1609** 
Central-west -0.1789** -0.1779** -0.1778** -0.1784** -0.1762** 
      
Random Effects Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 
Intercept 0.0771 0.0771 0.0771 0.0762 0.0753 
Municipality residual  0.0742 0.0743 0.0743 0.0741 0.0739 
       
Log-likelihood 1462.9402 1462.3771 1462.3899 1465.2386 1468.8760 
      
Number of observations 1276     
Number of groups 25     
 
#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
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Table IV-16. Multi-Level Regression Model: Governance  
Dependent Variable: 
Governance Gini Index 
Atkinson 
Index (0.5) 
Atkinson 
Index (1.0) 
Quintile 
Ratios 
Percentile 
Ratios 
Fixed Effects Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Municipality-level Variables      
Total income inequality 0.5866***     
Top end income inequality  0.8879***    
Bottom end income inequality   0.2115*   
Top half income inequality    0.0246* 0.0449*** 
Bottom half income inequality    -0.0012 0.0005 
Inland flood frequency 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 
Coastal flood exposure 0.2194*** 0.2178*** 0.2212*** 0.2203*** 0.2185*** 
Municipality size 0.0933*** 0.0923*** 0.0963*** 0.0962*** 0.0925*** 
Aridity level -0.0236** -0.0230** -0.0233** -0.0235** -0.0217** 
Percent in absolute poverty -0.1766 -0.2765* -0.1316 -0.0071 -0.0495 
Intercept 0.2705*** 0.2877*** 0.2504*** 0.2361*** 0.2567*** 
      
State-level Variables       
South (omitted category)       
North -0.0031 -0.0092 0.0024 0.0061 -0.0038 
Northeast 0.0463 0.0514 0.0458 0.0388 0.0430 
South  -0.0233 -0.0223 -0.0263 -0.0263 -0.0247 
Central-west -0.1077# -0.1114# -0.1029# -0.1019 -0.1049# 
      
Random Effects Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 
Intercept 0.0739 0.0719 0.0732 0.0753 0.0720 
Municipality residual  0.2127 0.2124 0.2132 0.2130 0.2128 
       
Log-likelihood 143.6455 145.9708 140.8441 141.2066 143.6848 
      
Number of observations 1276     
Number of groups 25     
 
#=p< .10; *=p< .05; **=p< .01; ***=p<.001 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
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By testing the impacts of income inequality on each factor, a more in depth 
understanding of its effects on vulnerability emerges. Income inequality, and particularly 
measures of top half and top end income inequality, predict poorer governance yet higher 
socioeconomic status.  
These conflicting impacts are interesting, suggesting that income inequality is not 
a wholly negative force in Brazilian urban municipalities, but rather has both helpful and 
hurtful impacts. The presence of high-income households may be contributing to a higher 
level of socioeconomic status for the average household, possibly due to a positive 
correlation between top half and top end income inequality and economic growth 
(Voitchovsky 2005). In any case, this positive relationship appears to come at a cost. Top 
half and top end income inequality significantly predict poor governance, even 
controlling for the level of absolute poverty, suggesting that it is income inequality, and 
not absolute poverty, that creates situations of spatial segregation and unequal public 
resource access. Put another way, informal settlements and slums are not simply an 
artifact of poverty, but rather they are also deeply tied to top end and top half income 
inequality. These findings may also then lend support to Voitchovsky’s (2014) 
observation that economic growth and income inequality are positively correlated in the 
short term, but not in the long term. The presence of slums and informal settlements may 
inhibit a municipality’s ability to achieve further gains in socioeconomic development in 
the future. 22       
                                                 
22 Future analysis of the longer term impacts would be necessary to confirm this 
supposition.  
160 
 
The insignificance of top half and top end income inequality on infrastructure is 
not unexpected. The infrastructure component, most closely correlated with household 
building material quality and proximity to primary roads, has less to do with spatial 
segregation and uneven resource access. These indicators of vulnerability are more 
related to the overall level of development and political economy in the municipality, 
controlled for through the region variables. It is also worth noting that the bottom half 
measures of income inequality are negatively related to infrastructure, such that at higher 
levels of bottom half income inequality, municipalities tend to be located farther from 
main roads and a great percentage of houses are constructed from poorer quality building 
material. As we saw in Chapter 3, in Map 16 and Map 17, the municipalities with 
particularly high levels of bottom half income inequality are mostly located in more 
remote Northern regions, where many citizens at the bottom of the income distribution 
have zero or minimal income, are likely to be subsisting off the land, using natural 
materials to construct shelters, and perhaps not participating in the formal, income-
generating employment market. 
G. Discussion 
In this chapter, I link theoretical frameworks from the income inequality and 
vulnerability literatures to support the main supposition of this dissertation, that income 
inequality may be a significant predictor of vulnerability. Using multi-level regression 
models to control for both municipality and state-level characteristics, I find that top end 
income inequality is a significant predictor of vulnerability. Additionally, I find that 
absolute poverty, municipality size and coastal flood exposure are all significant 
predictors of vulnerability.  
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Next, by considering each of the three factors which comprise vulnerability 
separately, I discover an interesting twist in the relationship between income inequality 
and vulnerability. While top end and top half income inequality predict poorer 
governance, they are also significant predictors of socioeconomic status. Thus, 
municipalities with higher levels of top end and top half income inequality have poorer 
governance yet higher socioeconomic status. This finding adds to the complex and often 
competing literature on the effects of income inequality on economic development 
(Voitchovsky 2014), suggesting that top end and top half income inequality are positively 
correlated with socioeconomic development. It is unfortunately not possible, with this 
data, to determine whether top half and/or top end income inequality are consequences of 
rising levels of socioeconomic status or drivers.  
These results do, however, provide compelling evidence that top end and top half 
income inequality are linked to spatial segregation and uneven resources access, and thus 
increase the vulnerability of urban municipalities to flooding, an environmental hazard 
which will undoubtedly increase in frequency and severity due to climate change. 
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V. Conclusion 
A. Summary 
 In this dissertation I set out to test two hypotheses:  
1. Income inequality is a predictor of vulnerability to flood hazard in urban 
municipalities in Brazil.  
2. The predictive power of income inequality differs depending on the 
location of the income inequality along the distribution.   
 In the introductory chapter, I briefly review the income inequality and 
vulnerability literatures to provide theoretical justification for the above suppositions. I 
explain how this research project is different from previous work which links income 
inequality and vulnerability as it is not concerned with absolute poverty. Instead this 
dissertation focuses on how income inequality might impact vulnerability, apart from any 
relationship between income inequality and absolute poverty.  
 I present a conceptual model that is grounded in the two literatures yet uniquely 
highlights their intersection. Drawing on the income inequality literature, I suggest that 
income inequality causes a breakdown of social cohesion, through both spatial 
segregation and elites governing in their own best interest. These social phenomena, in 
turn, may lead to uneven access to resources and, thus, heightened vulnerability. Next I 
discuss why this relationship might be relevant from a policy perspective. Through 
content analysis of climate adaptation policies and practices, I provide evidence of the 
local nature of adaptation efforts and the role the government plays in directing funds for 
adaptation projects. Understanding where the most vulnerable groups are located is 
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essential to any adaptation policy and thus, any predictors of vulnerability are helpful to 
policy makers. If income inequality is a predictor of vulnerability, it is essential that 
policy makers include income inequality measures in their vulnerability assessments in 
order to correctly identify where adaptation resources should be allocated.    
The second hypothesis regarding the nature of the income inequality is equally 
material for adaptation policy. If the location of the income inequality along the 
distribution determines its impacts, then it is essential that vulnerability assessment tools 
employ the relevant measure of income inequality. This will ensure that only the type of 
income inequality that predicts vulnerability is captured, rather than other types of 
income inequality which may be unrelated to vulnerability. When crafting policies to 
combat income inequality, it is also important to differentiate the type of income 
inequality that is in need of reduction. Policies to reduce bottom end income inequality 
might include cash transfer to poor households while efforts to decrease top end income 
inequality demand an entirely different type of reform, such as a millionaire’s tax.    
 In order to test the hypotheses, the first order of business is to construct a measure 
of vulnerability at the municipality level. In Chapter 2, after carefully wading through the 
massive and often contradictory literature of vulnerability assessment, I select an 
assessment tool which most closely meets the needs of this project, mainly a measure that 
I can calibrate to a particular hazard and a framework that is flexible enough to allow for 
indicators at both the administrative and household level. Using factor analysis, I collapse 
the series of 25 indicators into three factors: socioeconomic status, infrastructure, and 
governance. Socioeconomic status most closely correlates with indicators of median 
income, employment, education and health. Indicators most closely related to 
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infrastructure are distance to a primary road and quality of household building material. 
The governance measure correlates most with the presence of slums, informal settlements 
and tenements, and population density.  
  Using an aggregation method and an equal weighting scheme, I generate a 
composite vulnerability index score for each of the 1,276 urban municipalities across 25 
states in Brazil. To illuminate spatial patterns of vulnerability, I map the composite 
vulnerability scores, as well as each of the three factor scores, and identify spatial 
dependence in vulnerability using spatial statistics. 
  With a vulnerability index in hand, the next step is to select the appropriate 
measures of income inequality. In Chapter 3, after briefly reviewing the multitude of 
options, I settle on seven distinct income inequality measures: the Gini index (a summary 
measure), two Atkinson index specifications (top end and bottom end specifications), the 
90th/50th percentile ratio and the mean Q5/mean Q3 ratio (top half), and the 50th/10th 
ratio and the mean Q3/mean Q1 ratio (bottom half).  
 I calculate the level of income inequality in each municipality under each measure 
and map the results, highlighting both the similarities and differences across measures. 
By calculating the correlation coefficient between each measure and absolute poverty, I 
find that, surprisingly, the strength of the correlation is minimal for the majority of 
income inequality measures. This finding – that income inequality and absolute poverty 
are not strongly correlated in urban municipalities in Brazil – highlights how in 
developing countries, any type of income inequality (overall, top half, bottom half, top 
end, bottom end) can be a signal of economic growth and development, rather than 
indicative of absolute poverty. 
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 In Chapter 4, I construct the final models to test the predictor power of income 
inequality in relation to vulnerability. Selecting a mixed-effects model structure due to 
the multi-level nature of the data, and setting the vulnerability index score constructed in 
Chapter 2 as the dependent variable, I control for absolute poverty, municipality size, 
environmental conditions, and the political economy of states to test whether each type of 
income inequality is a predictor of municipality vulnerability. 
I find that the Gini index and the Atkinson index (0.5) are significant predictors of 
vulnerability. These results provide strong evidence in support of the two hypotheses in 
this dissertation, mainly that a certain type of income inequality is a predictor of 
vulnerability and that the location of the income inequality along the distribution does 
matter in terms of its impacts. It appears that top end, rather than bottom end income 
inequality, significantly predicts vulnerability23.  
In addition to top end income inequality, absolute poverty, municipality size and 
coastal flood exposure are all significant predictors of vulnerability. These findings 
confirm the work of other vulnerability scholars (Romero-Lankao et al. 2013, Ribot 
2011) who suggest that both hazard exposure and absolute poverty, respectively, are key 
determinants of vulnerability. Controlling for absolute poverty and income inequality 
levels, coastal flood exposure is still a key predictor of vulnerability. Therefore, when 
assessing relative flood risk, it is important to measure all three components of risk: 
vulnerability, hazard and exposure. Measuring vulnerability apart from exposure is a 
                                                 
23 As the bulk of income inequality in Brazilian municipalities is top end income 
inequality, the Gini index, a measure which picks up any type of income inequality, was 
also a significant predictor.  
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valuable exercise to identity relative levels of adaptive capacity.  However, it is essential 
to keep in mind that vulnerability and exposure are inextricably linked, and regardless of 
present vulnerability level, areas that are exposed to a given hazard will have some level 
of hazard risk.   
The significance of municipality size is also worth noting. Municipalities with 
larger populations are more vulnerable, controlling for level of income inequality, 
absolute poverty and exposure. This suggests that larger municipalities may have fewer 
resources to go around and should be given extra consideration, compared to their smaller 
counterparts, in terms of efforts to increase adaptive capacity.  
Contrary to expectations, neither measure of top half income inequality 
significantly predicts vulnerability. To glean a better understanding of these results, I dig 
further into the data and separately test each of the factors which comprise the composite 
vulnerability score.  
This line of analysis yields some illuminating results. I find that while all types of 
income inequality positively predict socioeconomic status, when I control for absolute 
poverty, municipality size, and environmental conditions, top end and top half income 
inequality, not bottom half income inequality, predict the poor governance component of 
the vulnerability index, the factor most closely correlated with the presence of slums, 
informal settlements and high population density. These results provide strong evidence 
for the notion that the location of the income inequality along the distribution does matter 
in terms of its impacts. Top end and top half income inequality predict poor governance, 
reinforcing the notion that it is a top-heavy income distribution, rather than absolute 
poverty or a large gap between those at the bottom and those in the middle of the income 
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distribution (i.e., bottom half income inequality), that create situations where citizens are 
forced to live in segregated, informal communities with little access to public resources 
and protections. 
In sum, these findings suggest that the level of absolute poverty does not fully 
explain the presence of slums, informal settlements, and high-population density within a 
municipality. Top end and top half income inequality also play a role. As such, 
adaptation measures focused solely on poverty alleviation may be unsuccessful as they 
will neglect the underlying social dynamics of top end and top half income inequality that 
are contributing to vulnerability. I refer here mainly to the uneven access to resources 
brought about by elites governing in their own best interest and spatial segregation. 
In this dissertation, I concretely identify an association between top end income 
inequality and vulnerability using quantitative analysis. Additionally I show that top half 
and top end income inequality are related to higher level of slums and informal 
settlements in Brazilian municipalities. While this analysis cannot offer solid evidence of 
the theorized linkages, I drawing on the income inequality and vulnerability literature to 
speculate that elite influence and spatial segregation are the causal mechanisms which tie 
top end income inequality to increased vulnerability to flood hazard. High levels of top 
end income inequality lead to spatial segregation as high-income households drive up 
prices, pushing lower and middle-income households to settle in peripheral locations with 
inferior access to services. These peri-urban areas are often located in unsafe locations 
such as flood plains or on steep slopes prone to landslides (Sabatini 2006). 
The influence elites wield on public resource distribution in unequal, middle-
income countries is well known, and Brazil is no exception. Although strides have been 
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made towards a more democratic rule, patronage is still dominant, public/private 
partnerships are often developed in obscurity, and bribery of government officials is 
common practice (Power 2009; Weyland 1998). When elites influence how public 
resources are allocated, they may be increasing vulnerability to flood hazard in two main 
ways. Firstly, they may choose to steer public resources into adaptation projects that 
directly benefit their own interests, rather than those of the public. Here an example 
might be investing in a sea wall located in a low density, high-income coastal 
neighborhood, rather than in a more densely populated, lower-income area (Adger 1999). 
A second avenue of influence is “opting out” (Frank 2007).  This is the notion that elites 
choose to direct public funds away from public services they do not use. In the case of 
vulnerability to flood hazard, an example might be an effort to direct funds away from 
public drainage systems as elites have their own private sewage systems. Instead of 
focusing public spending on the public services they do not use, elites direct funds 
towards pet projects. An example of this “opting out” phenomenon could be the effort to 
direct funds toward Olympic stadiums, rather than improving drainage infrastructure in 
low-income areas.   
B. Further Research and Policy Implications 
1. Research Implications 
 In this dissertation, I find that top end income inequality predicts vulnerability to a 
single climate hazard in Brazilian municipalities, and theorize that this relationship 
should hold true for climate-related hazards in other rapidly urbanizing middle-income 
countries around the globe. In order to confirm the generalizability of these findings, 
further research is required. A similar analysis of other countries such as South Africa, 
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India and China could potentially buttress these findings. It would also be illuminating to 
examine the relationship between top end income inequality and vulnerability to other 
environmental hazards which are predicted to increase with climate change such as heat 
waves and air pollution.   
 While subsequent quantitative research projects using data from other countries 
could support the generalizability of the finding that top-end income inequality in 
associated with increased vulnerability to climate change, a qualitative approach could 
significantly aid in further understanding of the causal mechanisms at play. I suggest that 
elite influence is a driving factor. Evidence of elite influence, through interviews and 
ethnographic research of elite agents in middle-income countries, could provide 
compelling evidence of specifically how elites “opt out” and/or steer public resources 
toward their own interests. 
 This dissertation focuses on rapidly urbanizing, middle-income countries as there 
is clear evidence of corruption and undue elite influence in these burgeoning democracies 
(Weyland 1998). Another interesting avenue of research could be testing whether the 
relationship between top end income inequality and vulnerability to flood hazard also 
exists in high-income countries. The disparate distribution of impacts, as well as the 
opaque distribution of recovery funds, in the wake of both Hurricane Katrina in New 
Orleans and Hurricane Sandy in New York City, suggest that the phenomena under 
analysis in this dissertation may also be at play in the United States, a high-income 
country with high levels of top end income inequality. Further investigation of the 
linkages between top end income inequality and vulnerability in the United States could 
also be a valuable contribution to the income inequality and vulnerability literatures.      
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2. Policy Implications 
 Policy researchers engaged in climate change vulnerability assessment should 
find this dissertation germane to their work. Most acknowledge that absolute poverty 
contributes to vulnerability, while very few incorporate measures of income inequality 
into their vulnerability assessments (Birkmann 2006). Even those that do tend to rely on 
the Gini index, which does not specifically capture top end income inequality. As it is top 
end income inequality that predicts spatial segregation and uneven resource access, I 
advocate for the inclusion of top end income inequality measures in vulnerability 
assessments.  
 This recommendation complements the approach Schensul and Dodman promote 
in their edited volume, The Demography of Adaptation to Climate Change. They explain 
that “adaptation and poverty reduction are not the same thing, and, while vulnerability 
associated with poverty is related to climate vulnerability, the two do not overlap 
perfectly” (2013:3). They point to the need to identify the underlying causes of 
vulnerability in order to create smart adaptation policies. In this dissertation, by 
demonstrating that top end income inequality predicts poor governance and increased 
vulnerability to flooding in urban municipalities in Brazil, I suggest that income 
inequality may be one of the causal mechanisms which triggers heightened vulnerability 
to climate shocks. As such, I urge adaptation policy researchers to seriously consider the 
income distribution in their vulnerability assessments and acknowledge that in areas with 
significant top end income inequality, situations of spatial segregation and uneven 
resource access will likely need to be addressed, alongside issues of poverty, in order to 
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increase the adaptive capacity of urban municipalities in rapidly urbanizing middle-
income countries. 
 In addition to policy researchers, this work is also pertinent to climate change 
adaption policymakers. This dissertation suggests that in municipalities with high levels 
of top end income inequality, spatial segregation and elite influence on public resource 
allocation may be leading to unequal distribution of resources and protections. Spatial 
segregation pushes lower-income residents to settle in informal, unsafe locations. 
McGranahan et al. (2013) point to how flood plains are natural locations for informal 
settlements in the Global South, as the land is less valuable. In Brazil, areas on steep 
slopes, prone to landslides, are also popular locations for informal settlements. Given the 
limited adaptive capacity and increased flood risk for residents in these locations, 
adaptation policies focused on relocating residents of informal settlements to safe spaces 
is of paramount importance (McGranahan et al. 2013).  
 In contrast, poverty alleviation strategies such as cash transfers, that tacitly 
encourage informal settlement dwellers to remain in unsafe locations, do little to protect 
these informal settlement dwellers from flood hazard. A comprehensive relocation 
strategy, which provides informal settlers with affordable housing options, either through 
housing vouchers, or public housing projects in higher-income neighborhoods (Sabatini 
2006), away from steep slopes and flood plains, is one way to combat the spatial 
segregation brought about by top end income inequality. 
 Policies focused on moderating elite power and influence on public resource 
allocation are more difficult to identify and implement. Participatory budgeting initiatives 
have been successful at improving transparency in Belo Horizonte in Brazil (Sabatini 
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2006). These participatory budgeting processes have also been cited in the climate 
change adaptation policy literature as promising avenues for more efficient and equitable 
adaptation resource distribution (Petherick 2014). In Porto Alegre, Brazil, participatory 
budgeting helped expand electrification infrastructure to more lower-income 
communities (Souza 2001). Over 140 municipalities in Brazil have adopted some form of 
participatory budgeting, though with varying levels of success (Goldsmith 1999). Souza 
(2001) cautions that while the process is promising as a method for more equitable 
distribution of resources, the lowest-income residents are still often excluded from the 
process. Given that these residents are likely those in informal settlements, any 
participatory budgeting efforts related to climate change adaptation will need to focus on 
ensuring that these marginalized groups are given the opportunity to participate.  
 Other possibilities for more equitable resource distribution are inclusion of 
transparency clauses within multi-national aid packages and programs. Climate finance 
fund administrators in the United Nations, the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and other multi-nationals should be keenly aware of the potential 
influence of elites in areas with high levels of top end income inequality. Careful 
attention must be placed on ensuring that public funds are distributed with the needs of 
the population in mind, rather than biased toward elite interests.   
  
173 
 
VI. Addendum 
A. The View from the Ground  
 Statistical models are excellent tools for identifying and parsing out relationships 
between measurable conditions across large geographies and multiple scales. However, a 
key weakness of a multi-level regression model is its inability to vividly communicate the 
lived experience of individuals on the ground. While an in-depth qualitative analysis of 
vulnerability across municipalities is well beyond the scope of this dissertation, what 
follows is a brief photo essay which aims to breathe life into the numbers and to unite 
theory and findings with concrete imagery of the situation on the ground.   
 I visited five urban municipalities across four states – three with high 
vulnerability index scores, one with a moderate vulnerability score, and one with a low 
vulnerability score. The governance levels in each of the municipalities mimics the 
vulnerability scores. Top end and top half income inequality levels and poverty rates 
across the five municipalities vary as well. Table VI-1 displays the state, region, 
population, vulnerability index score, each component of vulnerability (socioeconomic 
status, infrastructure, and poor governance), top end and top half income inequality level 
and the absolute poverty rate of each municipality visited.   
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Table VI-1. Demographics of Municipalities Visited 
Vulnerability  level High  Medium Low 
Municipality 
Rio de 
Janeiro Salvador São Paulo Valença Ouro Fino 
State RJ Bahia SP Bahia MG 
Region SE NE SE NE SE 
Population 6355,949 2,693,606 11,300,000 89,510 31,734 
90th/50th 4.74 4.83 4.39 2.77 2.69 
Atkinson (0.5) 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.15 
Vulnerability score 0.96 0.95 0.80 0.22 -0.19 
SES 0.34 0.26 0.47 0.04 0.40 
Infrastructure 0.26 0.29 0.13 0.28 0.20 
Poor governance 1.56 1.50 1.41 0.53 0.42 
Absolute poverty rate 7.60% 11.11% 8.16% 23.80% 5.36% 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Minnesota Population Center 2014; IBGE 
2011; IBGE 2010; Sistema Firjan 2012; NOAA 2010; McGranahan et al. 2007; GAR 
2011. 
 
Map 21 shows the location and relative vulnerability index score of each municipality I 
visited.  
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     Map 21. Municipalities Visited  
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 This dissertation analyzes the relationship between income inequality and 
vulnerability at the municipality level. Thus, the relationships described, and the spatial 
resolution of the data employed in the analysis, are not as granular as the images below 
might suggest. In these photos, I capture only anecdotal evidence of residential 
segregation and the unequal distribution of public resources and services across the 
income distribution. Given these limitations, I encourage the reader to consider these 
images as visual aids that inspire a deeper comprehension of how top end income 
inequality might lead to a lack of spatial segregation, uneven resource access and 
heightened vulnerability for urban municipalities across Brazil.  
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B. Photo Essay 
1. Rio de Janeiro: High Top End Income Inequality 
 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is one of the most unequal municipalities in Brazil and has high 
exposure to flood hazard. Development lines the shore, e.g., Ipanema Beach, above, and 
steep elevation areas along the coast are prone to landslides  
 
Spatial segregation is common, with many informal settlements located on steep slopes 
prone to landslides and in low lying areas at risk of flooding. The Rochina favela is 
pictured above. 
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Infrastructure within the Rochina favela is in disrepair. The open sewer (left) is both a 
public health concern and unsuitable for preventing flooding within the narrow corridors 
of the favela. The electricity infrastructure (right) is also dangerous, with exposed wires 
and overloaded transformers, unable to cope with the strong winds and torrential 
downpours common during the rainy season. 
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Instead of directing public resources toward revamping infrastructure in the favelas, 
political officials, likely guided by elite influence, funneled public funds toward 
development of Olympic facilities. Above is an Olympic swimming facility constructed 
next to the Rochina favela. 
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2. Sao Paulo: High Top End Income Inequality 
     
Sao Paulo, the largest municipality is Brazil, is subject to severe inland flood hazard. 
Heavy precipitation causes rivers to rise and poor drainage means that water pools in the 
low lying areas of the city. High income residents live in modern buildings, like the 
residences shown above.  
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High end hotels, like Hotel Unique (above), are common, where locals and international 
business travelers lounge in comfort, far above the reach of the flood waters.  
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Unfortunately, the high rents in Sao Paulo are beyond the means of many residents. Low 
income residents are forced to settle in informal locations, many in low lying areas, well 
within the path of flood waters. Above is an informal home in a park alongside a major 
roadway in Sao Paulo.   
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3. Salvador: High Top End Income Inequality 
 
Salvador, a coastal city, has significant coastal flood exposure. The high income 
neighborhood of Barra is protected by a fortified sea wall (above).  
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The drainage infrastructure in the high income, high elevation colonial district (left) is 
well maintained. Sewers in the colonial district are modern and covered (right)  
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Informal settlements along the coastline are also common in Salvador (above). These low 
income households have informal sewage systems and no protection from rising sea 
levels or landslides due to increased precipitation or storm surges.  
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4. Valença: Moderate Top End Income Inequality 
Valença is a low lying, mid-sized city along the river delta, only a few kilometers up river 
from the Atlantic Ocean. Given the proximity to the coast and the river, Valença is at risk 
of flooding from coastal storm surges and inland flooding. Although almost 24 percent of 
residents fall below the absolute poverty line, Valença has limited spatial segregation and 
no informal settlements or slums. Even lower income residents living along the riverside 
(above) are protected from rising river levels.  
 
Lower income housing (above) is well-constructed and located on higher ground, safe 
from rising river levels.  
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5. Ouro Fino: Low Top End Income Inequality 
 
The small city of Ouro Fino, located away from the coast, does have some exposure to 
inland flooding and landslides. Steep slopes (above) require sound drainage systems 
(below) to keep rain waters from pooling at lower elevations.  
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Even though median income is only 66 percent that of Sao Paulo’s, there are no slums or 
informal settlements. The lack of high levels of top end income inequality may explain 
the lack of spatial segregation, apparent in the aerial view of the city (above). 
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VII. Glossary 
Atkinson Index: a family of measures of income inequality which take on values 
between 0 and 1. The higher the Atkinson index value, the more social welfare that could 
be gained through redistribution, and thus the higher the level of current inequality. An 
Atkinson index incorporates an inequality aversion parameter, ε, which allows the 
researcher to select the level of inequality aversion and thus which portion of the 
distribution should receive more weight in the final calculation of inequality. As the 
inequality aversion parameter approaches zero, more weight is placed on changes at the 
top of the income distribution while as the parameter approaches infinity, more weight is 
placed on the bottom end. The Atkinson Index is defined as (Allison 1978; Atkinson 
1970): 
𝐴𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 1 −  
𝑛
1
 [∑ (
𝑥𝑖
𝜇
)
𝑛
𝑖=1
1−𝑒
]
1
1−𝑒
 
In the above equation, n refers to the population size, x is the income of a given 
individual, µ is the arithmetic mean, and e is the inequality aversion parameter. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the Atkinson Index with an inequality aversion 
parameter set to 0.5 is considered a measure of top end income inequality while a 
parameter of 1.0 is a measure of bottom end income inequality. 
Anselin Local Moran’s I: a spatial statistic used to identify spatial autocorrelation of a 
given attribute at the local level through cluster analysis. A positive Local Moran’s I 
score indicates that neighboring features have similarly high or low values of the given 
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attribute. In practice, scores are mapped to identify clusters of high-high, low-low, high-
low (where a high value is surrounded by low values) and low-high (where a low value is 
surrounded by high values).    
Bottom end income inequality: a measure of income inequality which places more 
emphasis on distances between incomes at the bottom of the income distribution. 
Bottom half income inequality: a measure of income inequality which compares 
incomes in the middle of the distribution to incomes at the bottom of the distribution. It 
does not contain any information on incomes above the middle of the distribution, usually 
defined somewhere in the 40th to 60th percentile range. 
Deviance: a statistic that assesses the quality of the model fit and is often used to 
compare nested models. A higher deviance score indicates a poorer fit to the data. 
Gini Index: a measure of income inequality which ranges from 0 to 1. A score of 0 
denotes perfect equality–where everyone earns exactly the same amount. A Gini score of 
1 means perfect inequality, or that a single person earns all the income.  
Global Moran’s I: a spatial statistic which takes on values of -1 to 1 and is used to 
measure the extent of spatial autocorrelation. A value close to 1 indicates clustering, 
while a value close to 0 denotes a random distribution of the given attribute, i.e., no 
spatial autocorrelation. 
Income inequality measure: a measure which captures the magnitude of the dispersion 
of income along a defined distribution. 
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Queen contiguity: a specification of geographic neighbors used to calculate spatial 
weights. A queen specification defines as a “neighbor” any area which shares either a 
boundary or vertex.    
Top end income inequality: a measure of income inequality which places more 
emphasis on distances between incomes at the top of the income distribution.  
Top half income inequality: a measure of income inequality which compares incomes at 
the top of the distribution to incomes in the middle of the distribution. It does not contain 
any information on incomes below the middle of the distribution, usually defined 
somewhere in the 40th to 60th percentile range. 
Variance Inflation Factor: a measure used to determine the extent of multicollinearity 
present in a given set of variables in a multiple regression.  
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VIII. Appendix  
A. Sensitivity Analysis 
 To test the sensitivity of the vulnerability index score to a given aggregation 
method, I calculate the vulnerability index scores for each municipality using an 
averaging and additive approach (de Sherbinin 2014). First I divide the indicators into 
three sub-indexes: socioeconomic status, infrastructure and governance. Next I average 
the indicator scores for each sub-index and then add the sub-index average scores 
together to produce a final vulnerability index score. I map the vulnerability scores 
obtained using the additive approach alongside the scores calculated using factor 
analysis. Although there are some differences, there is considerable similarity between 
the two maps.   
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 Next I calculate the Pearson’s r correlation coefficient between the two measures 
and find a significant correlation of 0.66 between the two vulnerability index scores. 
While different aggregation methods do produce slightly different results, the choice of 
aggregation method does not significantly alter the relative level of vulnerability 
calculated in the majority of municipalities.     
Map 22. Flood Vulnerability Using Factor Analysis Map 23. Flood Vulnerability Using Additive 
Method 
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B. Identifying Urban Areas within Urban Municipalities 
 To identify where urban populations are located within municipalities, I use the 
night time lights, urban extents data available through the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). I rely on the night time lights data classification of 
urban, rather than the census tract classification of urban as the census data rely on the 
Brazilian definition of urban, which only encompasses “areas corresponding to cities 
(municipal headquarters), villages (district headquarters) or isolated urban areas” (IBGE 
2014a). While the night time lights data are not a perfect measure of “urbanness,” 
Dorelien et al. (2013) find that there is considerable agreement between night time lights 
data and the Demographic and Health Survey classification of urban across several 
developing countries. Households categorized as non-urban by the DHS, yet which fall 
within urban extents (based on night time lights), tend to be peri-urban settlements. As 
the focus of this analysis is capturing socioeconomic inequalities, and much of the peri-
urban, informal areas are occupied by groups of lower socioeconomic status, it is 
essential that these households are included. Therefore, given the characterization of 
“urban” used by the IBGE, which omits informal settlements not included within official 
boundaries, relying on the census tract definition of urban is not ideal. Below I map the 
census tracts designated as “urban” by the IBGE alongside the night time lights urban 
extents. While there is not perfect symmetry, is it clear that the night time lights extents 
align closely with the census tract designations, albeit providing a most inclusive urban 
designation.  
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Map 24. Urban Areas of Municipalities 
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Map 25. Urban Census Tracts 
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C. Identifying Urban Flood Exposure Using Spatial Methods 
 To calculate the total number of urban areas within a municipality at risk, first I 
spatial joined flood projection data with night time lights data. I selected the maximum 
value option such that when an urban area contained more than one flood projection 
value, the maximum value was assigned. Next, I summed up the maximum flood values 
for all urban areas located within a single municipality to estimate the total number of 
floods projected in urban areas within a given municipality. In other words, if an “urban” 
municipality is at risk of inland flooding, but the urban areas within that municipality are 
not affected, I calculate this as no exposure. To determine whether an urban area was 
within a LECZ, I intersected urban areas based on night time lights data with LECZ data 
to identify which urban areas were within LECZs. There was no distinction made 
between urban areas partially vs. fully contained within a LECZ. It is difficult to ascertain 
the exact boundaries of where an urban settlement exists using night time lights data. 
Thus, even if the urban extents identified using night time lights data are not completely 
within the LECZ, it is safe to assume that at least a non-trivial portion of the urban 
population may be at risk. McGranahan et al. (2007) find that for a majority of cities with 
land within an LECZ, one-sixth of the urban land falls within the LECZ, but one-fifth of 
the urban population does. The processes for identifying flood projection values and 
urban areas within LECZs are outlined in the graphics below. 
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Map 26. Spatial Methods for Calculating Municipality Flood Exposure 
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D. Close up Maps of Flood Risks  
 
Map 27. High Flood Risk Municipalities in Northeastern Brazil 
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Map 28. High Flood Risk Municipalities in Southeastern Brazil 
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